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Sociology of literary creativity

Methodology, problems, history

- | | | |
|-------------------|--|-----|
| Lucien Goldmann | The sociology of literature: status and problems of method | 493 |
| Jacques Leenhardt | The sociology of literature: some stages in its history | 517 |
| G. N. Pospelov | Literature and sociology | 534 |

Studies

- | | | |
|---------------------|--|-----|
| Umberto Eco | Rhetoric and ideology in Sue's <i>Les Mystères de Paris</i> | 551 |
| George Lukács | Lessing's <i>Minna von Barnhelm</i> | 570 |
| Geneviève Mouillaud | The sociology of Stendhal's novels: preliminary research | 581 |
| Matthias Waltz | Methodological reflections suggested by the study of groups of limited complexity: outline of a sociology of mediaeval love poetry | 599 |


The world of the social sciences

Research and training centres and professional bodies

- | | |
|--|-----|
| New institutions and changes of name and address | 617 |
|--|-----|

Meetings

- | | |
|---|-----|
| Approaching international conferences in the social sciences | 619 |
| The role of science and technology in economic development: second meeting of the Unesco panel of consultants, Paris, December 1966 | 624 |
| International Peace Research Association: Second General Conference, Tällberg, June 1967, by Jaap W. Nobel | 628 |



<i>International appointments vacant</i>	634
<i>Announcement</i>	647
<i>Documents and publications of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies</i>	648
<i>Books received</i>	658

*Sociology of
literary creativity*

Methodology, problems, history

The sociology of literature: status and problems of method

Lucien Goldmann

The genetic structural sociology of culture has given rise to a number of works which are characterized, in particular, by the fact that, in seeking to establish an operational method for the positive study of human facts—and, more especially, of cultural creation—their authors have been obliged to fall back on a type of philosophical reflection that might, in a somewhat general way, be described as dialectic.

The result is that this attitude may be presented either as an effort of positive research incorporating a mass of reflections of a philosophical character or as a philosophical attitude directed, in the first place, towards positive research and, in the end, constituting the methodological basis of a whole series of specific research activities.

Having, on more than one occasion, chosen the former of these methods of exposition, we shall endeavour to adopt the second. In doing so, however, it is important to stress from the very outset—but without much hope as to the effectiveness of this warning, for prejudices die hard—that the few remarks of a general and philosophical nature which follow are not prompted by any speculative intention and are put forward only in so far as they are essential to positive research.

The first general observation on which genetic structuralist thought is based is that all reflection on the human sciences is made not from without but from within society, that it is a part—varying in importance, of course, according to circumstances—of the intellectual life of that society and, through it, of social life as a whole. Furthermore, to the selfsame extent to which thought is a part of social life, its very development transforms that social life itself more or less, according to its importance and effectiveness.

In the human sciences, the subject of thought is thus seen to form part, at least to some extent and with a certain number of mediations, of the object to which it is directed. On the other hand, this thought does not constitute an absolute beginning and it is, in a very large measure, shaped by the categories of the society which it studies, or of a society deriving therefrom.

Thus the object studied is one of the constituent elements—and even one of the most important—of the structure of the thought of the research worker or workers.

Hegel summed all this up in a concise and brilliant formula—‘the identity of the subject and object of thought’. We have merely attenuated the radical character of this formula—the result of Hegelian idealism, for which all reality is spirit—by substituting for it another, more in conformity with our dialectic materialist position according to which thought is an important aspect, but only an aspect, of reality: we speak of the partial identity of the subject and the object of research, that identity being valid, not for all knowledge, but only for the human sciences.

Whatever view is taken of the difference between the two formulas, however, they both affirm implicitly that the human sciences cannot have as objective a character as the natural sciences and that the intervention of values peculiar to certain social groups in the structure of theoretical thought is, at the present time, both general and inevitable in them.

This does not in any way, moreover, mean that these sciences cannot, in principle, attain a rigour similar to that of the sciences of nature; that rigour will merely be different and it will have to allow for the intervention of valorizations that cannot possibly be eliminated.

The second basic idea of any dialectic and genetic sociology is that human facts are the responses of an individual or collective subject, constituting an attempt to modify a given situation in a sense favourable to the aspirations of that subject. This implies that all behaviour—and consequently every human fact—has a significant character, which is not always evident but which the research worker must, by his work, bring to light.

The same idea can be expressed in several different ways—by saying, for instance, that all human behaviour (and, probably, even all animal behaviour) tends to modify a situation felt by the subject to be a disequilibrium so as to establish an equilibrium or, again, that all human behaviour (and, probably, all animal behaviour) can be translated by the research worker in terms of the existence of a practical problem and of an attempt to solve that problem.

Starting from these principles, the structuralist and genetic conception, the creator of which is unquestionably George Lukàcs, favours a radical transformation of the methods of the sociology of literature. All the earlier works—and most of the university works undertaken subsequently to the appearance of this conception—were concerned and still are concerned, in this discipline, with the content of literary works and the relationship between that content and the collective consciousness, that is to say, the ways in which men think and behave in daily life. This being the standpoint adopted, they naturally arrive at the result that the relationships between these two contents are all the more numerous, and literary sociology is all the more efficacious, according as the author of the writings studied has given proof of less creative imagination and has contented himself with relating his experiences whilst transposing them as little as

possible. Furthermore, this type of study must, by its actual method, break up the unity of the work by directing its attention above all to whatever in the work is merely the reproduction of empirical reality and of daily life. In short, this sociology proves to be all the more fertile the more the works studied are mediocre. Moreover, what it seeks in these works is more documentary than literary in character.

It is not at all surprising, in these circumstances, that the great majority of those who are concerned with literature consider this kind of research as being, in the best of cases, only of very relative value and sometimes reject it altogether. Genetic structuralist sociology starts from premises that are not merely different but even quite opposite; we should like to mention here five of the most important of them:

1. The essential relationship between the life of society and literary creation is not concerned with the content of these two sectors of human reality, but only with the mental structures, with what might be called the categories which shape both the empirical consciousness of a certain social group and the imaginary universe created by the writer.
2. The experience of a single individual is much too brief and too limited to be able to create such a mental structure; this can only be the result of the conjoint activity of a large number of individuals who find themselves in a similar situation, that is to say, who constitute a privileged social group, these individuals having, for a lengthy period and in an intensive way, lived through a series of problems and having endeavoured to find a significant solution for them. This means that mental structures or, to use a more abstract term, significant categorial structures, are not individual phenomena, but social phenomena.
3. The relationship already mentioned between the structure of the consciousness of a social group and that of the universe of the work constitutes, in those cases which are most favourable for the research worker, an homology which is more or less rigorous but often also a simple significant relationship; it may therefore happen, in these circumstances—and it does indeed happen in most cases—that completely heterogeneous contents and even opposite contents, are structurally homologous, or else are found to be in a comprehensive relationship at the level of categorial structures. An imaginary universe, apparently completely removed from any specific experience—that of a fairy tale, for instance—may, in its structure, be strictly homologous with the experience of a particular social group or, at the very least, linked, in a significant manner, with that experience. There is therefore no longer any contradiction between, on the one hand, the existence of a close relationship between literary creation and social and historical reality and, on the other hand, the most powerful creative imagination.
4. From this point of view, the very peaks of literary creation may not only be studied quite as well as average works, but are even found to be particularly suitable for positive research. Moreover, the categorial structures with which this kind of literary sociology is concerned are precisely

what gives the work its unity, that is to say, one of the two fundamental elements of its specifically aesthetic character and, in the case we are interested in, its truly literary quality.

5. The categorial structures, which govern the collective consciousness and which are transposed into the imaginary universe created by the artist, are neither conscious nor unconscious in the Freudian sense of the word, which presupposes a repression; they are non-conscious processes which, in certain respects, are akin to those which govern the functioning of the muscular or nervous structures and determine the particular character of our movements and our gestures. That is why, in most cases, the bringing to light of these structures and, implicitly, the comprehension of the work, can be achieved neither by immanent literary study nor by study directed towards the conscious intentions of the writer or towards the psychology of the unconscious, but only by research of the structuralist and sociological type.

But these findings have important methodological consequences. They imply that, in the human sciences, all positive study must always begin with an effort to dissect the object studied, so that the object is seen as a complex of significant reactions, the structure of which can account for most of the partial empirical aspects they present to the research worker.

In the case of the sociology of literature, this means that, in order to understand the work he is studying, the research worker must in the very first place seek to discover a structure which accounts for practically the whole of the text and must, for that purpose, observe one fundamental rule—which, unfortunately, the specialists of literature respect only very rarely—namely, that the research worker must account for the whole of the text and must add nothing to it. This means, too, that he must explain the genesis of that text by trying to show how and in what measure the building up of the structure which he has brought to light in the work has a functional character, that is to say, to what extent it constitutes an instance of significant behaviour for an individual or collective subject in a given situation.

This way of posing the problem entails numerous consequences, which modify profoundly the traditional methods of study of social facts and, in particular, of literary facts. Let us mention a few of the more important of these, taking first the fact of not attaching special importance, in the comprehension of the work, to the conscious intentions of individuals and, in the case of literary works, to the conscious intentions of their authors.

Consciousness, indeed, is only a partial element of human behaviour and, most frequently, has a content which is not adequate to the objective nature of that behaviour. Contrary to the views of a certain number of philosophers, such as Descartes or Sartre, significance does not appear with consciousness and is not to be identified with it. A cat which is chasing a mouse behaves in a perfectly significant manner, without there being necessarily, or even probably, any consciousness, even of a rudimentary

character;¹ of course, when man and, with him, symbolic function and thought appear in the biological scale, behaviour becomes incomparably more complex; the sources of problems, conflicts and difficulties, and also the possibilities of resolving them, become more numerous and more involved, but there is nothing to indicate that consciousness often—or even occasionally—covers the whole of the objective significance of behaviour. In the case of the writer, this same idea may be expressed in a much simpler fashion: it very frequently happens that his desire for aesthetic unity makes him write a work of which the over-all structure, translated by the critic into conceptual language, constitutes a vision that is different from and even the opposite of his thought and his convictions and the intentions which prompted him when he composed the work.

That is why the sociologist of literature—and, in general, the critic—must treat the conscious intentions of the author as one indication among many others, as a sort of reflection on the work, from which he gathers suggestions, in the same way as any other critical work, but on which he must form his judgement in the light of the text, without according it any favour.

Next we have the fact of not over-estimating the importance of the individual in the explanation, which is above all the search for the subject, whether individual or collective, for which the mental structure which governs the work has a functional and significant character. The work has almost always, of course, an individual significant function for its author, but, most frequently, as we shall see, this individual function is not, or is only very slightly, connected with the mental structure which governs the truly literary character of the work, and, in any case, it does not in any way create it. The fact of writing plays—and, more precisely, the plays he really wrote—doubtless had significance for the individual Racine, in the light of his youth passed in Port-Royal, his relations later with people of the theatre and with the Court, his relations with the Jansenist group and its ideas, and also many events in his life with which we are more or less familiar. But the existence of the tragic vision was already a constituent element of the situations forming the starting-point from which Racine was led on to write his plays, whereas the building up of that vision, under the influence of the ideologists of the Jansenist group of Port-Royal and Saint-Cyran, was the functional and significant response of the *noblesse de robe* to a given historical situation. And it is with reference to that group and to its more or less developed ideology that the individual Racine had later to face a certain number of practical and moral problems which resulted ultimately in the creation of a work shaped by a tragic vision pursued to an extremely advanced degree of coherence. That is why it would be impossible to explain the genesis of that work and its significance merely by relating it to Racine's biography and psychology.

1. Descartes is thus obliged to reduce the cat to a machine, that is to say, to eliminate it as a specific reality, and Sartre leaves no place for it in *l'Être et le Néant*, which recognizes only the inert *En-soi* and the conscious *Pour-soi*.

Thirdly, we have the fact that what are commonly called 'influences' have no explanatory value and, at the very most, constitute a factor and a problem which the research worker must explain. There are at every moment a considerable number of influences which may have their effect on a writer; what has to be explained is the reason why only a small number of them, or even only a single one, has really had any effect, and also why the works which have exerted this influence were received with a certain number of distortions—and precisely with those particular distortions—in the mind of the person they influenced. But these are questions to which the answer must be sought in the work of the author studied and not, as is usually thought, in the work which is supposed to have influenced it.

In short, comprehension is a problem of the internal coherence of the text, which presupposes that the text, the whole of the text and nothing but the text is taken literally and that, within it, one seeks an over-all significant structure. Explanation is a problem of seeking the individual or collective subject (in the case of a cultural work, we think, for the reasons we have given above,¹ that it is always a collective subject that is involved), in relation to which the mental structure which governs the work has a functional character and, for that very reason, a significant character. Let us add that, so far as the respective places of explanation and interpretation are concerned, two things which seem to us to be important have been brought to light by the works of structuralist sociology and by their confrontation with psycho-analytical works.

The first is the fact that the status of these two processes of research is not the same from two standpoints.

When libido is involved, it is impossible to separate interpretation from explanation, not only during, but also after, the period of research, whereas, at the end of that period, the separation can be effected in sociological analysis. There is no immanent interpretation of a dream or of the delirium of a madman,² probably for the simple reason that consciousness has not even any relative autonomy on the plane of the libido, that is to say on the plane of the behaviour of an individual subject aiming directly at the possession of an object. Inversely, when the subject is transindividual, consciousness assumes much greater importance (there is no division of labour and, consequently, no action possible without conscious communication between the individuals who make up the subject) and tends to constitute a significant structure.

1. See Lucien Goldmann; *Le Dieu Caché*, Gallimard, 1956; *Sciences Humaines et Philosophie*, Gonthier, 1966; *Recherches Dialectiques*, Gallimard, 1959; *Le Sujet de la Création Culturelle* (communication to the second Colloque International de Sociologie de la Littérature, 1965).
2. This, moreover, is why in France, where Freud's celebrated book *Traumdeutung* was published under the title *Explication des Rêves*, it was only after many years that certain psycho-analysts perceived that 'Deutung' means interpretation and not explanation. In actual fact, if, for a long time, this title did not give rise to any problems, this was above all because it was as valid as the original title. It is, in fact, impossible, in the Freudian analyses, to separate interpretation from explanation, as they both appeal to the unconscious.

Genetic sociology and psycho-analysis have at least three elements in common, namely: (a) the assertion that all human behaviour forms part of at least one significant structure; (b) the fact that to understand such behaviour it must be incorporated in that structure—which the research worker must bring to light; (c) the assertion that structure is really comprehensible only if it is grasped at its genesis, individual or historical, as the case may be. In short, just like the sociology which we favour, psycho-analysis is a genetic structuralism.

Their opposite character resides, above all, in one point: psycho-analysis attempts to reduce all human behaviour to one individual subject and to one form, whether manifest or sublimated, of desire for the object. Genetic sociology separates libidinal behaviour, which is studied by psycho-analysis, from behaviour of an historical character (of which all cultural creation forms part) which has a transindividual subject and which can be directed towards the object only through the mediation of an aspiration after coherence. It follows that, even if all human behaviour is incorporated both in a libidinal structure and in an historical structure, it has not the same significance in the two cases, and the dissection of the object must not be identical either. Certain elements of art or of a literary composition—but not the work or the composition in their entirety—may be incorporated in a libidinal structure, and this will enable the psycho-analysts to understand them and to explain them by relating them to the individual's subconscious. The significances revealed will, however, in this case, have a status of the same order as that of any drawing or any written composition of any madman; furthermore, these same literary or artistic works, incorporated in an historical structure, will constitute relative structures which are practically coherent and unitary, possessing very great relative autonomy; this is one of the constituent elements of their truly literary or truly artistic value.

All human behaviour and all human manifestations are, indeed, to a varying degree, mixtures of significances of both kinds. However, depending on whether the libidinal satisfaction predominates to the point of destroying the autonomous coherence almost completely, or whether, inversely, it is incorporated in the latter, whilst leaving it almost intact, we shall have before us either the product of a madman or a masterpiece (it being understood that most human manifestations lie somewhere between these two extremes).

The second is the fact that, despite the ample university discussions that have taken place, more particularly in the German universities, with regard to comprehension and explanation, these two processes of research are by no means opposed to one another and are not even different from one another.

On this point, we must, in the first place, eliminate all the romantic literature devoted to the sympathy, 'empathy' or identification necessary to understand a work. To us, comprehension seems to be a strictly intellectual process; it consists of the description as precisely as possible,

of a significant structure. It is, of course, true that as in the case of any intellectual process, it is favoured by the immediate interest the research worker takes in his subject—that is to say, by the sympathy or antipathy or indifference which the object of research inspires in him; but, on the one hand, antipathy is a factor which is just as favourable to comprehension as is sympathy (Jansenism has never been better understood or better defined than by its persecutors when they formulated the famous ‘Five Propositions’, which are a rigorous definition of the tragic vision) and, on the other hand, many other factors may be favourable or unfavourable to research, for instance, a good psychic disposition, good health or, inversely, a state of depression or an attack of toothache; but all this has nothing to do with logic or epistemology.

It is necessary to go further, however. Comprehension and explanation are not two different intellectual processes, but one and the same process, related to different co-ordinates. We have said above that comprehension is the bringing to light of a significant structure immanent in the object studied (in the case with which we are concerned, in this or that literary work). Explanation is nothing other than the incorporation of this structure, as a constituent element, in an immediately embracing structure, which the research worker does not explore in any detailed manner but only in so far as such exploration is necessary in order to render intelligible the genesis of the work which he is studying. All that is necessary is to take the surrounding structure as an object of study and then what was explanation becomes comprehension and the explanatory research must be related to a new and even vaster structure.

Let us take an example. To understand *Les Pensées* of Pascal or the tragedies of Racine is to bring to light the tragic vision which constitutes the significant structure governing the whole of each of these works; but to understand the structure of extremist Jansenism is to explain the genesis of *Les Pensées* and of the tragedies of Racine. Similarly, to understand Jansenism is to explain the genesis of extremist Jansenism; to understand the history of the *noblesse de robe* in the seventeenth century is to explain the genesis of Jansenism; to understand class relations in French society of the seventeenth century is to explain the evolution of the *noblesse de robe*, etc.

It follows that all positive research in the human sciences must necessarily be conducted on two different levels—that of the object studied and that of the immediately surrounding structure, the difference between these levels of research residing above all in the degree to which the investigation is carried on each of these planes. The study of an object—a text, a social reality, etc.—cannot indeed be considered sufficient except when it has revealed a structure which accounts adequately for a considerable number of empirical facts, especially those which seem to present particular importance¹ so that it becomes, if not inconceivable, at least improbable,

1. We have already said that in the case of literary texts the problem is simpler for, owing to the advanced structuration of the objects which are the subject of the research and the limited number of data (the whole text and nothing but the text), it is in most cases

that another analysis could put forward another structure leading to the same or to better results.

The situation is different in regard to the surrounding structure. The research worker is concerned with this only in respect of its explanatory function in relation to the object of his study. It is, moreover, the possibility of bringing such a structure to light that will determine the choice of that particular one among the more or less considerable number of surrounding structures which appear to be possible when the research is first embarked upon. The research worker will therefore halt his study when he has sufficiently revealed the relationship between the structure studied and the surrounding structure to account for the genesis of the former as a function of the latter. He can also, however, of course, carry his research much further; but, in that case, the object of the study changes at a certain moment and what was, for instance, a study on Pascal may become a study on Jansenism, or on the *noblesse de robe*, etc.

This being so, although it is true that in the practice of research, immanent interpretation and explanation through the surrounding structure are inseparable, and no progress can be made in either of these fields, except through a continual oscillation from one to the other, it is none the less important to make a rigorous distinction between interpretation and explanation in their nature and in the presentation of the results. Similarly, it is essential always to bear in mind not only the fact that the interpretation is always immanent in the texts studied (whereas the explanation is always external to them), but also the fact that everything which is placed in the relationship of the text with the facts which are external to it—whether it is a question of the social group, of the psychology of the author or of sunspots—has an explanatory character and must be judged from that standpoint.¹

possible, if not in theory, at all events in practice, to replace this qualitative criterion by a quantitative criterion, namely a sufficiently large portion of the text.

1. We stress this point because, in discussions with specialists in literature, we have very often found them claiming that they refuse explanation and content themselves with interpretation whereas, in reality, their ideas were quite as explicative as our own. What they were refusing was sociological explanation in favour of psychological explanation which traditionally accepted, had become almost implicit.

In fact—and this is a particularly important principle—the interpretation of a work must comprise the whole of the text at the literal level and its validity is to be judged solely and exclusively in relation to the proportion of the part of the text which it succeeds in integrating. Explanation must account for the genesis of the same text, and its validity is to be judged solely and exclusively in accordance with the possibility of establishing at least a rigorous correlation—and as far as possible a significant and functional relationship—between, on the one hand, the development of a vision of the world and the genesis of a text originating from it, and, on the other hand, certain phenomena external to the latter.

The two prejudices which are the most widespread and the most dangerous for research consist, on the one hand, in thinking that a text must be 'sensible'—that is to say, acceptable to the thought of the critic—and, on the other hand, in demanding an explanation in conformity with the general ideas either of the critic himself or of the group to which he belongs and whose ideas he embodies. In both cases, what is demanded is that the facts should be in conformity with the research worker's own ideas, whereas what should be done is to seek out the difficulties and the surprising facts which apparently contradict accepted ideas.

Now, though this principle seems easy to respect, deep-rooted prejudices cause it to be constantly transgressed in practice, and our contacts with specialists of literary studies have shown us how difficult it is to get them to adopt, with regard to the text they are studying, an attitude which, if not identical with, is at least similar to that of the physicist or the chemist who is recording the results of an experiment. To mention only a few examples taken haphazard, it was a specialist of literary history who explained to us one day that Hector cannot speak in *Andromaque* since he is dead, and that what occurs is therefore the illusion of a woman whom an extraordinary and quite hopeless situation has driven to the extreme limits of exasperation. Unfortunately there is nothing at all like that in Racine's text, from which we learn only, on two occasions, that Hector—the dead Hector—has spoken.

Again, another historian of literature explained to us that Dom Juan cannot be married every month because, even in the seventeenth century, that was in practice impossible, and that consequently it was necessary to take that affirmation in Molière's play in an ironical and figurative sense. It is hardly necessary to say that if this principle is accepted, it is very easy to make a text say anything one likes—even the exact opposite of what it explicitly states.¹

What would be said of a physicist who denied the results of an experiment and substituted for them others which pleased him better, for the sole reason that the former appeared to him to be unlikely.

Again, in a discussion at the Royaumont symposium (1965) it was extremely difficult to get the supporters of psycho-analytical interpretations to admit the elementary fact that—whatever opinion one may hold of the value of this kind of explanation, and even if it is given a preponderant value—one cannot speak of the subconscious of Orestes or of a desire of Oedipus to marry his mother, since Orestes and Oedipus are not living men but texts and one has no right to add anything whatsoever to a text which makes no mention of the subconscious or of incestuous desire.

The explanatory principle, even for any serious psycho-analytical explanation, can reside only in the subconscious of Sophocles or Aeschylus, but never in the subconscious of a literary character who exists only through what is explicitly affirmed about him. In the field of explanation, it is to be noted that literary specialists have a regrettable tendency to give pride of place to psychological explanation, regardless of its efficacy and its results, simply because it seems to them the most plausible, whereas quite obviously the only truly scientific attitude consists in examining, in as impartial a manner as possible, all the explanations that are put forward, even those which are apparently the most absurd (that is why we men-

1. Similarly, in a fairly well-known dissertation on Pascal, the author quoting the latter's affirmation to the effect that 'things are true or false according to the point of view from which one looks at them', added, as a good Cartesian, that Pascal had of course expressed himself badly and that what he meant was that things *appear* to be true or false according to the point of view from which one looks at them.

tioned sunspots just now, although no one has seriously thought of finding an explanation in them), making a choice solely and exclusively in accordance with the results to which they lead and in accordance with the more or less considerable proportion of the text which they make it possible to account for.

Starting from a text which for him represents a mass of empirical data similar to those by which any other sociologist who undertakes a piece of research is faced, the sociologist of literature must first tackle the problem of ascertaining how far those data constitute a significant object, a structure on which positive research can be carried out with fruitful results.

We may add that, when faced by this problem, the sociologist of literature and art finds himself in a privileged situation as compared with research workers operating in other fields, for it can be admitted that in most cases the works which have survived the generation in which they were born constitute just such a significant structure,¹ whereas it is by no means probable that the analyses of the daily consciousness, or even current sociological theories, coincide in those other fields with significant objects. It is by no means certain for instance that objects of study such as 'scandal', 'dictatorship', 'culinary behaviour', etc., constitute such objects.

However that may be, the sociologist of literature must—like any other sociologist—verify this fact and not admit straightaway that such and such a work or such and such a group of works which he is studying constitutes a unitary structure.

In this respect, the process of investigation is the same throughout the whole field of the sciences of man. The research worker must secure a pattern, a model composed of a limited number of elements and relationships, starting from which he must be able to account for the great majority of the empirical data of which the object studied is thought to be composed.

It may be added that, having regard to the privileged situation of cultural creations as an object of study, the requirements of the sociologist of literature may be much greater than those of his fellow sociologists. It is by no means excessive to require a model to account for three-quarters or four-fifths of the text and there are already in existence a certain number of studies which appear to satisfy this requirement. We use the term 'appear' because, simply as a result of the insufficiency of material means, we have never been able to carry out a check of any work paragraph by paragraph, or speech by speech, although from the methodological standpoint, such a check obviously presents no difficulty.²

It is obvious that, most frequently in general sociology and very frequently in the sociology of literature, when research is concerned with several

1. This fact itself constituting the epistemological and psycho-sociological condition of such survival.

2. It may be added, in this connexion, that in a first attempt which we undertook in Brussels, and which was concerned with Jean Genêt's *Les Nègres*, it was possible, for the first pages, to account not only for the initial hypothesis regarding the structure of the universe of the work but also for a whole series of formal elements of the text.

works, the research worker will be led to eliminate a whole series of empirical data which appeared at the outset to form part of the proposed object of study, and on the other hand, to add other data of which he had not thought in the first place.

We shall give just one example. When we started a sociological study on the works of Pascal, we were very quickly led to separate *Les Provinciales* from *Les Pensées* as corresponding to two different visions of the world, and therefore to two different epistemological models, with different sociological bases—centrist and semi-Cartesian Jansenism, the best known representatives of which were Arnauld and Nicole, and extremist Jansenism, which was unknown up to that time and which we had to seek and find in the person of its chief theologian, Barcos, the abbé of Saint-Cyran, not far removed from whom were, amongst others, Singlin, Pascal's director, Lancelot, one of Racine's masters, and above all, Mother Angélique.¹ The bringing to light of the tragic structure which characterized the thoughts of Barcos and Pascal led us, moreover, to include in our research four of the chief plays of Racine, namely, *Andromaque*, *Britannicus*, *Bérénice* and *Phèdre*—a result which was all the more surprising because, up to that time, misled by superficial manifestations, the historians of literature who were trying to discover relationships between Port-Royal, and Racine's works sought them on the plane of content and directed their attention above all to the Christian plays (*Esther* and *Athalie*) and not to the pagan plays, the structural categories of which nevertheless corresponded strictly to the structure of thought of the extremist Jansenist group.

Theoretically, the success of this first stage of the research and the validity

1. The major difficulty presented by most studies on Pascal arises, moreover, from the fact that the authors of the works in question, starting from a psychological explanation, whether explicit or implicit, did not even imagine that Pascal could, in a few months, and perhaps even in a few weeks, have passed from one philosophical position to another, strictly opposite, which he was the first among the thinkers of Western Europe to formulate with extreme rigour. They admitted as being self-evident the existence of a kinship between *Les Provinciales* and *Les Pensées*.

Now, as the two texts did not—and do not—lend themselves to a unitary interpretation, they were obliged to invoke all sorts of reasons (stylistic exaggerations, texts written for libertines, texts expressing the thought of libertines and not Pascal's thought, etc.) to explain that Pascal meant to say—or at least thought—something quite different from what he had in fact written. We took the opposite course, starting by taking note of the rigorously coherent character of each of the two works and of the fact that they were almost entirely the opposite of each other, and only after that posing the question of how it was possible for any individual—however great a genius he might be—to pass so quickly from one position to another, quite different and even opposed, and it was this that led us to the discovery of Barcos and of extremist Jansenism, which suddenly threw a light on the whole problem.

In fact, while he was writing *Les Provinciales*, Pascal had to face an elaborate theological and moral school of thought, which enjoyed great prestige in Jansenist circles and which criticized him and rejected the views which he maintained. He had therefore, for a period of more than a year, to ponder the question whether it was he or his extremist critics who were right. The decision in favour of a change of position thus came to maturity slowly in him, and there is nothing surprising in the fact that a thinker of Pascal's stature after a prolonged period of meditation on a position which finally led to its adoption, should have been able subsequently to formulate it in a more radical and more coherent fashion than had been done by the chief theorists who had defended that position before he did.

of a model of coherence are shown, of course, by the fact that the model accounts for practically the whole of the text. In practice, there is however another criterion—of the nature not of law but of fact—which indicates with sufficient certainty that one is on the right path. This is the fact that certain details of the text, which had not in any way attracted the research worker's attention up to that point, suddenly appear to be both important and significant.

Let us once more give three examples in this connexion.

At a time when verisimilitude constitutes a rule that is almost unanimsously accepted, Racine, in *Andromaque*, makes a dead man speak. How can such an apparent incongruity be accounted for? It is sufficient to have found the pattern of the vision which governs the thought of extremist Jansenism to note that, for that thought, the silence of God and the fact that he is simply a spectator have as their corollary the fact that there exists no intramundane issue which makes it possible to safeguard fidelity to values, no possibility of living validly in the world, and that any attempt in this direction is blocked by unrealizable—and moreover in practice unknown—requirements of divinity (requirements which most frequently present themselves in a contradictory form). The profane transposition of this conception in Racine's plays results in the existence of two mute characters, or of two mute forces, which incarnate contradictory requirements: Hector, who demands the fidelity, and Astyanax, who demands the protection of Andromaque; Junie's love for Britannicus, which demands that she should protect him, and her purity which demands that she should accept no compromise with Néron; the Roman people and love, for Bérénice; later, the Sun and Venus, in Phèdre.

Although, however, the mutism of these forces or of these beings in the plays which incarnate absolute requirements is bound up with the absence of any intramundane solution, it is obvious that at the moment when *Andromaque* finds a solution by which it seems to her to be possible for her to marry Pyrrhus in order to protect Astyanax and to commit suicide before becoming his wife, in order to safeguard her fidelity, the mutism of Hector and Astyanax no longer corresponds to the structure of the play and aesthetic requirements, stronger than any external rule, result in the extreme improbability of the dead man who speaks and indicates a possibility of overcoming the contradiction.

We take as our second example the famous scene of the appeal to magic in Goethe's *Faust*, in which Faust addresses himself to the Spirits of the Macrocosm and of the Earth, which correspond to the philosophies of Spinoza and Hegel. The reply of the second Spirit sums up the very essence of the play and, even more, of the first part of it—the opposition between, on the one hand, the philosophy of enlightenment, whose ideal was knowledge and comprehension, and, on the other hand, dialectical philosophy, centred on action. The reply of the Spirit of the Earth—'You resemble the Spirit you understand, and not me'—is not merely a refusal; it is also its justification. Faust is still at the level of 'understanding', that is to say,

at the level of the Spirit of the Macrocosm, which is precisely what he wanted to outdistance. He will not be able to meet the Spirit of the Earth until the moment when he finds the true translation of the Gospel according to Saint John ('In the beginning was action') and when he accepts the pact with Mephistopheles.

Similarly, in Sartre's *La Nausée*, if the self-taught character—who also represents the Spirit of Enlightenment—reads the books in the library in the order of the catalogue, this is because the author has, consciously or unconsciously, aimed his satire at one of the most important features of the thought of enlightenment—the idea that knowledge can be conveyed with the help of dictionaries in which the subjects are arranged in alphabetical order (it is only necessary to think of Bayle's *Dictionnaire*, Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique* and, above all, the *Encyclopédie*).

Once the research worker has advanced as far as possible in the search for the internal coherence of the work and its structural model, he must direct himself towards explanation.

Having reached this point, we must interpolate a digression concerning a subject which we have already touched upon. There is, indeed—as we have already said—a radical difference between the relationship of interpretation to explanation in the course of the research and the way in which that relationship presents itself at the end of the research. In the course of research, indeed, explanation and comprehension strengthen each other mutually, so that the research worker is led to revert continually from one to the other whereas, at the time when he halts his research, in order to present the results of it, he can, and indeed must, separate his interpretative hypotheses immanent to the work fairly sharply from his explanatory hypotheses which transcend it.

As it is our intention to stress the distinction between the two processes, we shall develop the present statement on the imaginary supposition of an interpretation that has been carried to an extremely advanced point by means of immanent analysis and which is only subsequently directed towards explanation.

To look for an explanation means to look for a reality external to the work which presents a relationship to the structure of the work which is either one of concomitant variation (and this is extremely rare in the case of the sociology of literature) or, as is most frequently the case, a relationship of homology or a merely functional relationship, that is to say, a structure fulfilling a function (in the sense which these words bear in the sciences of life or the sciences of man).

It is impossible to say *a priori* which are the realities external to a work which are capable of fulfilling such an explanatory function with reference to its specifically literary features. It is, however, an actual fact that, up to the present time, in so far as historians of literature and the critics have concerned themselves with explanation, they have based themselves mainly on the individual psychology of the author and sometimes—less frequently and, above all, only fairly recently—on the structure of thought of certain

social groups. It is therefore, for the moment, unnecessary to consider any other explanatory hypotheses, although one has certainly no right to eliminate them *a priori*.

Against the psychological explanations, however, several overwhelming objections present themselves as soon as one reflects on them a little more seriously. The first—and the least important—of these is that we have very little knowledge of the psychology of a writer whom we have not known and who, in most cases, has been dead for years. The majority of these so-called psychological explanations are therefore simply more or less intelligent and fanciful constructions of an imaginary psychology, built up, in most cases, on the basis of written evidence and in particular on that of the work itself. This is not merely going round in a circle but going round in a vicious circle, for the so-called ‘explanatory’ psychology is nothing other than a paraphrase of the work it is supposed to explain.

Another argument—a much more serious one—which may be brought against psychological explanations is the fact that, so far as we are aware, they have never succeeded in accounting for any notable portion of the text, but merely for a few partial elements or a few extremely general features. Now, as we have already said, any explanation which accounts for only 50 to 60 per cent of the text offers no major scientific interest, since it is always possible to construct several others which explain an equal portion of the text, although naturally not the same portion. If results of this kind are accepted as satisfactory, it is possible at any moment to fabricate a mystic, Cartesian or Thomist Pascal, a Cornelian Racine, an existentialist Molière, etc. The criterion for the choice between several interpretations then becomes the brilliance of mind or the intelligence of such and such a critic as compared with another—and this, of course, has nothing whatsoever to do with science.

Lastly, the third—and perhaps the most important—objection that can be brought against psychological explanations is the fact that although they undoubtedly do account for certain aspects and certain characteristic features of the work, these are always aspects and characteristic features which in the case of literature are not literary, in the case of a work of art are not aesthetic, in the case of a philosophical work are not philosophical, etc. Even the best and most successful psycho-analytical explanation of a work will never succeed in telling us in what respect that work differs from a piece of writing or a drawing by a madman, which psycho-analysis can explain to the same degree, and perhaps better, with the aid of similar processes.

This situation derives, we think, in the first place from the fact that although the work is the expression both of an individual structure and of a collective structure, it presents itself as an individual expression, especially as: (a) the sublimated satisfaction of a desire for the possession of an object (see the Freudian analyses of Freudian inspiration); (b) the product of a certain number of individual psychic ‘montages’, which can find expression

in certain special features of the writing; (c) the more or less faithful or more or less distorted reproduction of a certain number of facts acquired or experiences lived through.

But in all this there is nothing that constitutes any literary, aesthetic or philosophical significance—in short, any cultural significance.

To remain in the realm of literature, the significance of a work does not lie in this or that story—the events related in the *Orestes* of Aeschylus, the *Electra* of Giraudoux and *Les Mouches* of Sartre are the same, yet these three works quite obviously have no essential element in common—nor does it lie in the psychology of this or that character, nor even in any stylistic peculiarity which recurs more or less frequently. The significance of the work, in so far as it is a literary work, is always of the same character, namely, a coherent universe within which the events occur and the psychology of the characters is situated and within the coherent expression of which the stylistic automatisms of the author are incorporated. Now, what distinguishes a work of art from the writing of a madman is precisely the fact that the latter speaks only of his desires and not of a universe with its laws and the problems which arise in it.

Conversely, it is true that the sociological explanations of the Lukácsian school—however few as yet in number—do precisely pose the problem of the work as a unitary structure of the laws which govern its universe and of the link between that structured universe and the form in which it is expressed. It is also true that these analyses—when they are successful—account for a much greater portion of the text, frequently approaching the whole. It is true, lastly, that they not only bring out, in many cases, the importance and significance of elements that had completely escaped the critics by making it possible to establish links between those elements and the rest of the text, but they also bring to light important and hitherto unperceived relationships between the facts studied and many other phenomena of which neither the critics nor the historians had thought until then. Here again we shall content ourselves with a few examples.

It had always been known that, at the end of his life, Pascal had reverted to science and to the world, since he even organized a public competition on the problem of roulette, and also the first public conveyances (five-sous coaches). Yet no one had established any relationship between this individual behaviour and the writing of *Les Pensées* and, in particular, the central fragment of that work relating to the *Pari*. It is only in our interpretation, when we connected the silence of God and the certainty of his existence, in Jansenist thought, with the special situation of the *noblesse de robe* in France, after the wars of religion, and with the impossibility of finding a satisfactory intramundane solution to the problems by which it was faced, that we became aware of the link between the most definitely extremist form of that thought, which carries uncertainty to the point of its most radical expression by extending it from the divine will to the very existence of the divinity, and the fact of situating the refusal of the world not in solitude,

external to it, but within it by giving it an intramundane character.¹

Similarly, once we had established a relationship between the genesis of Jansenism among the *gens de robe* and the change in monarchical policy and the birth of absolute monarchy, it became possible to show that the conversion of the Huguenot aristocracy to Catholicism was nothing other than the reverse of the same medal and constituted one and the same process.

One last example, which goes as far as the problem of literary form. It suffices to read Molière's *Dom Juan* to see that it has a different structure from the other great plays of the same author. Indeed, although Orgon, Alceste, Arnolphe and Harpagon are confronted by a whole world of interhuman relations, a society and, in the case of the first three of them, a character who expresses worldly good sense and the values which govern the universe of the play (Cléante, Philinte and Chrysale), there is nothing of that sort in *Dom Juan*. Sganarelle has only the servile wisdom of the people which we find in nearly all the valets and servants of the other plays of Molière; so that the dialogues in *Dom Juan* are in reality only monologues in which different characters (Elvire, the Père, the Spectre), who are in no way related to one another, criticize Dom Juan's behaviour and tell him that he will end up by provoking the divine wrath, without his defending himself in any way. Furthermore, the play contains one absolute impossibility, namely, the affirmation that Dom Juan gets married every month, which, quite obviously, was out of the question in the real life of the period. Now, the sociological explanation easily accounts for all these peculiarities. Molière's plays are written from the standpoint of the *noblesse de cour*, and the great character plays are neither abstract descriptions nor psychological analyses, but satires of real social groups, the picture of which is concentrated in a single psychological trait or special peculiarity of character; they are aimed at the *bourgeois*, who loves money and does not think that it is made above all to be spent, who wishes to exert his authority in the family, who wants to become a gentleman; the religious bigot and the member of the Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement, who interfere with the life of others and combat the libertine morality of the Court; the Jansenist—worthy of respect, of course, but too strict and refusing the slightest compromise.

Against all these social types, Molière can bring social reality, as he sees it, and his own moral attitude—libertine and epicurean—the liberty of woman, readiness to compromise, a sense of proportion in all things. In the case of *Dom Juan*, on the contrary, there is no question of a different social group, but of individuals who, within the very group depicted by the work of Molière, exaggerate and display no sense of proportion. That is why it is impossible to set in opposition to Dom Juan any moral attitude different from his own. All that can be said to him is that he is right to do

1. This return to the sciences, which was a strictly logical piece of behaviour, of course shocked the other Jansenists who, being certain of the existence of God, did not admit the *Pari*; whence the childish legend of the fit of toothache which led to the discovery of roulette.

what he does, but not to exaggerate or go as far as the absurd. Moreover, in the only sphere in which the moral attitude of the Court, at all events in theory, approves the fact of going to the extreme limit and does not find any exaggeration—that of courage and daring—Dom Juan becomes an entirely positive character. Apart from this, he is right to give alms to the beggar, but not to do so in a blaspheming manner; it is not absolutely necessary that he should pay his debts, but he must not make too much of a fool of Monsieur Dimanche (again, in this matter, Dom Juan's attitude is not really antipathetic). Finally, the chief subject of controversy in the matter of the moral attitude of the libertine being, of course, the problem of relations with women, Molière had to make it understood that Dom Juan is right to do what he does, but that, in this also, he goes beyond the limit. Now, apart from the fact, which is clearly indicated, that he goes too far in assaulting even peasant women and in not keeping up his rank, this limit could not be defined with any degree of precision. Molière could not say that Dom Juan was wrong in seducing a woman every month, whereas he should be satisfied to seduce one every two or every six months; whence the solution which expresses exactly what had to be said—Dom Juan gets married—and there is nothing reprehensible about that; it is even a very good thing to do—but, unfortunately, he gets married every month; which is really going too far!

Having spoken especially, in this article, of the differences between the structuralist sociology of literature, on the one hand, and the traditional explanation offered by psycho-analysis or literary history, on the other hand, we should now like also to devote a few paragraphs to the supplementary difficulties by which genetic structuralism is separated from formalistic structuralism, on the one hand, and from empirical and non-sociological history, on the other hand.

For genetic structuralism, the whole range of human behaviour (we employ this term in its widest possible sense embracing also psychical behaviour, thought, imagination, etc.) has a structural character. At the opposite extreme therefore from formalistic structuralism, which sees in structures the essential sector, but only a sector, of over-all human behaviour, and which leaves aside what is too closely connected with a given historical situation or a precise stage of a biography, thus leading up to a sort of separation between the formal structures and the particular content of that behaviour, genetic structuralism lays down as a principle the hypothesis that structural analysis must go much further in the sense of the historical and the individual and must one day, when it is much more advanced, constitute the very essence of the positive method in history.

But it is then that, finding himself faced by the historian, who attaches prime importance to the individual fact, in its immediate character, the sociologist who is a supporter of genetic structuralism encounters a difficulty which is the opposite of the one which separated him from the formalist for, notwithstanding the opposition which exists between them, the historian and the formalist both admit one essential point, namely,

the incompatibility between structural analysis and concrete history.

Now it is evident that immediate facts do not have a structural character. They are what in scientific parlance might be called a mixture of a considerable number of processes of structuration and destructuration, which no man of science could study as they are, in the form in which they are immediately given. It is a well-known fact that the noteworthy progress of the exact sciences is precisely due, *inter alia*, to the possibility of creating experimentally, in the laboratory, situations which replace the mixture, the interplay of active factors constituted by the realities of daily life, by what might be called pure situations—for instance, the situation in which all the factors are made constant with the exception of one which can be made to vary and of which the action can be studied. In history, such a situation is, unfortunately, impossible to achieve; it is none the less true, however, that here, as in all other fields of research, what is immediately apparent does not coincide with the essence of phenomena (otherwise, as Marx once said, science would be useless), so that the chief methodological problem of the social and historical sciences is precisely that of working out the techniques by means of which it is possible to bring to light the principal elements the mixture and interplay of which constitute empirical reality. All the important concepts of historical research (Renaissance, Capitalism, Feudalism, and also Jansenism, Christianity, Marxism, etc.) have a methodological status of this nature, and it is very easy to show that they have never coincided in any strict fashion with any particular empirical reality. It is none the less true that genetic structuralist methods have made it possible nowadays to establish concepts which are already very close to less comprehensive realities but which continue, of course, to retain a methodological status of the same nature. Although we cannot here dwell at length on the fundamental concept of the possible conscious,¹ let us at least say that, in its orientation towards the concrete, structuralist research can never go as far as the individual mixture and must stop short at the coherent structures which constitute the elements of it.

This is perhaps also the place to state that, as reality is never static, the very hypothesis that it is entirely constituted of processes of structuration implies the conclusion that each of these processes is, at the same time, a process of the destructuration of a certain number of earlier structures, at the expense of which it is in course of coming into being. The transition, in empirical reality, from the predominance of the former structures to the predominance of the new structure is precisely what dialectical thought designates as 'the transition from quantity to quality'.

It would therefore be more correct to say that, at any given moment, social and historical reality always presents itself as an extremely complex mixture, not of structures, but of processes of structuration and destructuration, the study of which will not have a scientific character until the

1. See Lucien Goldmann, *Conscience Réelle et Conscience Possible* (communication to the fourth World Sociology Congress, 1959) and *Sciences Humaines et Philosophie*, Gonthier, 1966.

day when the chief processes have been made clear with a sufficient degree of rigour.

Now, it is precisely on this point that the sociological study of the masterpieces of cultural creation acquires special value for general sociology. We have already emphasized that, in the whole range of social and historical facts, the characteristic feature and the privilege of the great cultural creations reside in their extremely advanced structuration and in the weakness and fewness of heterogeneous elements incorporated in them. This means that these works are much more readily accessible to structuralist study than is the historical reality which gave birth to them and of which they form part. It means also that, when these cultural creations are brought into relationship with certain social and historical realities, they constitute valuable pointers in regard to the elements of which these realities are constituted.

This shows how very important it is to incorporate the study of them in the field of sociological research and in general sociology.¹

Another problem which is of importance to research is that of verification. In dealing with it, we should like to mention a project which we have had in mind for some time but which we have so far not been able to carry out. It is a question of passing from individual and artisanal research to a form of research which is more methodical and, above all, is of a collective character. The idea was suggested to us by work for the analysis of literary texts on punched cards which, in most cases, is of an analytical character and starts from constituent elements in the hope of arriving at a general comprehensive study—which, to us, has always seemed to be problematical, to say the least.

The discussion has gone on for a long time; in modern times, it has continued since the days of Pascal and Descartes. It is the argument between dialectic and positivism. If the whole, the structure, the organism, the social group, the relative totality, are greater than the sum of the parts, it is illusory to think that it is possible to understand them by starting from the study of their constituent elements, whatever the technique employed in the research. Inversely, it is obvious that one cannot content oneself with the study of the whole either, since the whole exists only as the sum of the parts that make it up and of the relationships by which they are linked.

In fact, our research always took the form of a continual oscillation

1. In so far as the great literary works are directed towards what is essential in the human reality of a period, the study of them may also furnish valuable indications regarding the psycho-sociological structure of events. It is thus that Molière might, it seems to us, have seized on and described an essential aspect of historical reality when, in the cabal of the bigots, he distinguishes the effort to group the *bourgeoisie* in the resistance to the recent social changes and the new morality to which they have given birth, more particularly at the Court, from the few rallying-points of the great lords. For Tartuffe, Orgon's attempted seduction is essential. For Dom Juan, the decision to pretend hypocritically to be a good man and a bigot is only one among many exaggerations and lies on the same plane as, for instance, his libertinage and his provocative and outrageous attitude in the scene with the beggar.

between the whole and the parts, by means of which the research worker attempted to build up a model, which he compared with the elements, and then reverted to the whole and made it precise, after which he came back once more to the elements, and so on, until the time came when he considered both that the result was sufficiently substantial to be worth publishing and that any continuation of the same work on the same object called for an effort that would be disproportionate as compared with the additional results he might hope to obtain from it. It is in this sequence of research that we have thought it might be possible to introduce—not at the beginning, but at some intermediate stage—a process that would be more systematic and above all collective. It has seemed to us, indeed, that when the research worker has built up a model which appears to him to present a certain degree of probability, he might, with the help of a team of collaborators, check it by comparing it with the whole of the work studied, paragraph by paragraph, in the case of a text in prose; line by line, in the case of a poem; speech by speech in the case of a play, by determining: (a) to what extent each unit analysed is incorporated in the over-all hypothesis; (b) the list of new elements and new relationships not provided for in the initial model; (c) the frequency, within the work, of the elements and relationships provided for in this model.

Such a check should enable the research worker subsequently (a) to correct his outline, so as to account for the whole of the text; (b) to give his results a third dimension—that of the frequency, in the work in question, of different elements and relationships making up the over-all pattern.

Never having been able to carry out a piece of research of this kind on a sufficiently vast scale, we decided recently to undertake one, so to speak experimentally, as a sort of prototype, with our collaborators in Brussels, on Genêt's *Les Nègres*, a work concerning which we had already sketched out a fairly advanced hypothesis.¹ Progress is, of course, extremely slow and the study of a single text like *Les Nègres* will take more than an academic year. But the results of the analysis of the first ten pages were surprising, inasmuch as, over and above the mere verification, they have enabled us to take the first steps with our method in the field of form, in the narrowest sense of the word, whereas we had thought hitherto that that field was reserved for specialists whose absence from our working groups we had always greatly regretted.

Lastly, to conclude this introductory article, we should like to mention a possibility of extending research, which we have not yet explored but which we have been contemplating for some time, by taking as a starting-point Julia Kristeva's study on Bakhtin.²

Although we have not said so explicitly in the present article, it is

1. See Lucien Goldmann, *Le Théâtre de Genêt: Essai d'Étude Sociologique*, Cahiers Renaud-Barrault, November 1966.

2. Published in *Critique*, No. 239. We should make it clear that we are not entirely in agreement with Kristeva's positions and that the considerations we have presented here have merely been developed after reading her study, without strictly coinciding with hers.

obvious that, in the background of all our research, there is a precise concept of aesthetic value in general and of literary value in particular. This is the idea developed in German classical aesthetics, passing from Kant, through Hegel and Marx to the early works of Lukács, who defines this value as a tension overcome between, on the one hand, sensible multiplicity and richness and, on the other hand, the unity which organizes this multiplicity into a coherent whole. From this point of view, a literary work is seen to be all the more valuable and more important according as this tension is both stronger and more effectively overcome, that is to say, according as the sensible richness and multiplicity of its universe are greater and as that universe is more rigorously organized, and constitutes a structural unity.

Having said this, it is no less obvious that, in almost all our work, as in that of all research workers who are inspired by the early writings of Lukács, the research centres round one single element of this tension—unity, which, in empirical reality, takes the form of a significant and coherent historical structure, the foundation of which is to be found in the behaviour of certain privileged social groups. All the research of this school in the field of the sociology of literature had hitherto been directed, in the very first place, towards bringing to light coherent and unitary structures governing the all-embracing universe which, in our view, constitutes the significance of every important literary work. This is because, as we said earlier, it is only quite recently that this research has taken its very first steps in the direction of the structural link between the universe and the form which expresses it. In all this field of research, the other pole of tension—the multiplicity and richness—was admitted merely as one item of the data concerning which it could at most be said that, in the case of a literary work, it was made up of a multiplicity of individual and living beings who found themselves in particular situations, or else of individual images—making it possible to differentiate between literature and philosophy, which expresses the same visions of the world on the plane of general concepts. (There is no ‘Death’ in *Phèdre* and no ‘Evil’ in Goethe’s *Faust*, but only *Phèdre* dying and the strictly individualized character of Mephistopheles. On the other hand, there are no individual characters either in Pascal or in Hegel, but only ‘Evil’ and ‘Death’.)

In pursuing our research in the sociology of literature, we have however always acted as if the existence of *Phèdre* or of Mephistopheles was a fact on which that science had no hold, and as if the more or less living, concrete and rich personality of those characters was a purely individual aspect of creation connected, in the first place, with the talent and psychology of the writer.

Bakhtin’s ideas, as expounded by Kristeva, and the probably more radical form which she gives them when she develops her own conceptions,¹

1. To the division of literary works into monological and dialogical, Kristeva adds the fact that even the literary works which Bakhtin describes as monological contain, if they are valid as literature, a dialogical and critical element.

seemed to us to open up a whole new and supplementary field for sociological investigation applied to literary creation.

Just as, in our concrete studies, we emphasized almost exclusively the vision of the world, the coherence and unity of the literary work, so Kristeva,¹ in her study programme, rightly characterizing this dimension of the mental structure as being connected with doing, with collective action and—at the extreme limit—with dogmatism and repression, stresses above all what is open to question, what is opposed to unity and what, in her view (and we think she is right on this point also), has a non-conformist and critical dimension. Now, it seems to us that all the aspects of literary work brought to light by Bakhtin and Kristeva correspond quite simply to the pole of richness and multiplicity in the classical conception of aesthetic value.

This means, in our view, that Kristeva adopts a unilateral position when she sees in cultural creation, in the first place, although not exclusively, the function of opposition and multiplicity (of 'dialogue' as opposed to 'monologue', to use her terminology) but that what she has described nevertheless represents a real dimension of every truly important literary work. Moreover, by stressing the link which exists between the vision of the world, coherent conceptual thought and dogmatism, Kristeva has implicitly drawn attention to the sociological character not only of these elements, but also of what they refuse, deny and condemn.

By incorporating these reflections in the considerations that we have developed so far, we are led on to the idea that almost all great literary works have a function that is partially critical in so far as, by creating a rich and multiple universe of individual characters and particular situations—a universe that is organized by the coherence of a structure and of a vision of the world—they are led to incarnate also the positions which they condemn and, in order to make the characters which incarnate them concrete and living, to express all that can be humanly formulated in favour of their attitude and their behaviour.

This means that these works, even if they express a particular vision of the world, are led, for literary and aesthetic reasons, to formulate also the limits of this vision and the human values that must be sacrificed in its defence.

It follows that, on the plane of literary analysis, it would, of course, be possible to go much further than we have done hitherto, by bringing to light all the antagonistic elements of the work which the structured vision must overcome and organize. Some of these elements are of an ontological nature, especially death, which constitutes an important difficulty for any vision of the world as an attempt aimed at giving a sense to life. Others are of a biological nature, especially eroticism, with all the problems of

1. Not knowing Russian, and not having been able to read Bakhtin's works, it would be difficult for us to distinguish clearly between Bakhtin's own ideas and their development by Kristeva. For that reason we refer in the present article to the whole of the positions of Bakhtin and Kristeva whilst attributing them to the latter.

suppression studied by psycho-analysis. But there are also a certain number, by no means negligible, of elements of a social and historical nature. This is why sociology can, on this point, make an important contribution by showing why the writer, in a particular historical situation, chooses, among the great number of possible incarnations of antagonistic positions and attitudes which he condemns, precisely the few which he feels to be particularly important.

The vision of the tragedies of Racine condemns in radical fashion what we have called *les fauves* dominated by passion and *les pantins* who continually make mistakes about reality. But it is hardly necessary to recall to what point the reality and human value of Oreste, Hermione, Agrippine, or of Néron, Britannicus, Antiochus, Hippolyte or Thésée are incarnated in Racine's tragedy and to what a point Racine's text expresses in comprehensive fashion the aspirations and sufferings of these characters.

All this should be the object of detailed literary analyses. We consider it probable, however, that if passion and the struggle for political power find a much stronger and more powerful literary expression in Racine's works than virtue which is passive and incapable of understanding reality, this difference of intensity in literary expression has its foundation in the social, psychical and intellectual realities of the society in which Racine lived and in the reality of the social forces to which the Jansenist group was opposed.

We have already indicated the reality of the social groups to which, in Molière, Harpagon, Georges Dandin, Tartuffe, Alceste and Dom Juan corresponded (the *bourgeoisie*, the Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement and the cabal of the bigots, the Jansenists, the aristocracy of the Court given to exaggeration) or, in Goethe's *Faust*, Wagner (the thought of enlightenment).

We halt our study at this point. It is obvious that this final part has, for the moment, only the value of a programme, the realization of which will depend on the course taken by the future development of sociological research relating to cultural creation.

[Translated from the French.]

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The sociology of literature: some stages in its history

Jacques Leenhardt

The expression 'sociology of literature' covers two very different types of research, bearing respectively on literature as a consumer product and literature as an integral part of social reality, or, considered from another angle, bearing on society as the place of literary consumption and society as the subject of literary creation.

Even these distinctions, however, are not sufficiently precise; on the one hand, literary consumption, the final phase of the process, entails production with a view to consumption and then the distribution of the works produced through channels which, owing to their respective characteristics, lead to discrimination between the different literatures disseminated and which must therefore be defined in each case: bookshop, lending library, etc.; on the other hand, we shall see that the writers considered in this article do not perhaps throw sufficient light on the relationship between a society and its literature.

It is necessary, however, to establish *a priori* this fundamental distinction, which will explain the choice of the works and trends of thought to be dealt with here and which will therefore also justify the exclusion of an entire part of contemporary sociological research on literature. Thus, the present article will contain no information about literary consumption and its conditions.

Let us begin with a historical definition of the subject under consideration. The idea of a sociology of literature may be said to be already completely contained in the title of Madame de Staël's *De la Littérature considérée dans ses Rapports avec les Institutions Sociales* (1810). With the help of the sociological concepts of her own time and of Montesquieu's time, Madame de Staël undertook to show the original characteristics of the ancient and modern literatures of the north and of the south. For us, she is a precursor possessing great insight but not sufficiently versed in sociology to be able to realize her aim completely. The desire to carry out a 'positive' study of literature should, however, be recognized as the first requirement of all sociological research aimed at 'excluding . . . the ideas which circulate around us and

which are only, so to speak, the metaphysical representation of certain personal interests'.¹

The ideological character which literary criticism tends to assume could not be more firmly denounced, and it is easy to understand Madame de Staël's taste for German literature, which she regarded as 'perhaps the only literature which began with criticism',² while she considered that, in France, 'the domination of an aristocratic class . . . explains why art has been essentially respect for good form'.³

If Madame de Staël's example can help us to classify present-day research in the field of the sociology of literature, it is because she inaugurated a sociological tradition which never precisely defined the relationship between society and literature, or between society and the writer, although it affirmed the existence of such a relationship. It might be said that, for the exponents of this tradition, this relationship is determined by the entire range of co-variations, but that, unfortunately, there is no theory of these co-variations, whereas, if this relationship is considered in terms of functionality, the Marxian theory of consciousness offers a fundamental instrument on the theoretical level. In this connexion, a cautious approach is necessary for the Marxian theory of consciousness has put forward several and frequently contradictory points of view. (It should be recalled that Marx was the first to declare that he was not a 'Marxist'.) Leaving these quarrels aside we shall take as our starting-point a simple and a very general axiom: human thought and, consequently, its products are closely bound up with man's actions, particularly his actions in regard to the world about him.

Even more than a theory of consciousness, which, at least at the level on which we consider it, is almost a truism, it was method which the precursors of the sociology of literature lacked most. They could not pursue their ideas right to the point of a scrupulous reading of texts: thus the comparisons which their 'intuition' suggested to them remained distant or artificial. It is true that their lack of a clearly defined method did not prevent their studies from yielding positive and often abundant results, but the field of variation of their explanations, from the vaguest to the most ingeniously arbitrary, cannot hide this fundamental shortcoming.

This article will be concerned mainly with the situation in the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. We have been obliged to make this arbitrary choice owing to the usual difficulties: problem of languages (Eastern European countries), inadequate information (South America) and, lastly, the impossibility of dealing exhaustively with our subject in a few pages.

Sociological literary criticism in the United States of America has evolved, perhaps more than anywhere else, in accordance with the social

1. Madame de Staël, *De la Littérature considérée dans ses Rapports avec les Institutions Sociales*, Éditions Droz, 195, p. 295.

2. Madame de Staël, *De l'Allemagne*, Paris, Flammarion, Vol. 1, Chapter IV, p. 147.

3. *ibid.*, pp. 216-17.

situation. After the First World War great interest was taken in novelists of the realistic school (Dos Passos, Steinbeck) and there was a great surge of enthusiasm for community ideals. At the same time, the purpose of criticism was considered to be the active participation in history rather than a real attempt at criticism.¹ It was in this spirit that the *Partisan Review*—which was to survive on this political basis only until 1936—was founded in 1934.²

V. F. Calverton, whose book *The Never Spirit* is typical of this first generation of American 'sociological' criticism declared: 'The genesis or environment of a piece of art is indispensable to an understanding of its effects upon its observers.'³

Thirty years later, Roy Harvey Pearce, in 'Historicism Once More', sought to re-establish 'a kind of criticism which is, by definition, a form of historical understanding'.⁴ After the formalism of the 'new critics', he again felt the need to study literary forms from the standpoint of their historical and social importance.

Thus, this tradition, based at the start on complete ideological and critical confusion, made its reappearance, but after a rather long eclipse.⁵ However, it was not until 1957, when L. Löwenthal's *Literature and the Image of Man* and I. Watt's *The Rise of the Novel* were published, that American criticism began to ascribe real importance to the sociological approach to literature.

In *The Rise of the Novel*, Ian Watt studies eighteenth-century English literature, particularly Defoe, Richardson and Fielding. He notes that these first three English novelists were of the same generation; this was not a mere coincidence; moreover their genius could not have created a new literary form (the novel) unless there had been particularly favourable literary and social conditions. To ascertain these conditions, the specific nature of the novels in question must be defined. They have always been noted for their 'realism', it being stressed that 'Moll Flanders is a thief,

1. It is significant that the best bibliography relating to the subject under consideration, namely the bibliography published by H. D. Duncan in *Language, Literature and Society*, Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1953, gives, under the heading 'General treatments of the nature of literary perspective', forty-eight titles distributed by decades as follows: before 1900, 2; 1900-9, 4; 1910-19, 1; 1920-9, 12; 1930-40, 22; 1940-9, 6; after 1950, 1.
2. This review had the following programme: 'Working toward the abolition of the system that breeds "imperialist war, fascism, national and social oppression".' It reappeared in 1937 with a declaration of political neutrality.
3. V. F. Calverton, *The Never Spirit*, New York, 1925, p. 61; see also *The Liberation of American Literature*. Mention must be made here of J. Cabau's very instructive book: *La Prairie Perdue. Histoire du Roman Américain*, Le Seuil, 1966, in which the author attempts to trace American novelists' eternal quest for the 'prairie', which symbolizes the golden age of the North American continent.
4. R. H. Pearce, 'Historicism Once More', *Kenyon Review*, 1958.
5. In his book entitled *The Liberal Imagination. Essays on Literature and Society*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1951, L. Trilling tries to show the relationship between the instability of society and that of the characters he studies. 'The predicament of the characters in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and of Christopher Sly seems to imply that the meeting of social extremes and the establishment of a person of low class always suggested to Shakespeare's mind some radical instability of the senses and the reason' (p. 210).

Pamela a hypocrite, and Tom Jones a fornicator'.¹ Watt, on the contrary, emphasizes another and, in his view, more essential aspect: 'the novel's realism does not reside in the kind of life it presents, but in the way it presents it'.¹ It is on the basis of this definition that he is able to compare the English eighteenth-century novel and French philosophical realism; he adopts a dispassionate attitude and is more concerned with 'scientific' truth than his predecessors and with the sociological conditions of the period.

Although all of Watt's concrete analyses are aimed at showing the 'realistic attitude' which characterizes these novels, he emphasizes that their success is due solely to the link which exists between this new literary *genre* and a new public. The period concerned saw an increase in the size of the reading public which, until then, had been extremely limited owing to the lack of public instruction and the exorbitant price of books (a copy of *Tom Jones* cost more than a farm worker's weekly wage). Numerous factors played a part in this development (libraries, suppression of patronage by booksellers, instruction given in charity schools and the fall in the price of books, especially of novels). However, for Watt, the essential point is to show that the three novelists concerned found themselves ideologically situated at the very centre of the preoccupations of this new public, this middle class: 'As middle-class London tradesmen they had only to consult their own standards of form and content to be sure that what they wrote would appeal to a large audience . . . not so much that Defoe and Richardson responded to the new needs of their audience, but that they were able to express those needs from the inside. . . .'²

'In so doing, Defoe initiated an important new tendency in fiction: his total subordination of the plot to the pattern of the autobiographical memoir is as defiant an assertion of the primacy of the individual experience in the novel as Descartes's *Cogito ergo sum* was in philosophy.'³

It will no doubt be objected that this is essentially a 'literary' study. In our view, this in no way means that it may not approach the subject from a sociological angle; moreover it must be admitted that if literary experts had not themselves profited by what sociology has to offer them it is unlikely that sociologists would have seriously interested themselves in literature for some considerable time to come.

In this connexion, we cannot but share L. Löwenthal's astonishment when, in 1961, in *Literatur und Gesellschaft*, he sadly notes that: 'It is symptomatic that (in the U.S.A.) there is still no complete and up-to-date bibliography relating to the sociology of literature and art.'⁴

The enormous American production of sociological works obviously

1. I. Watt, *The Rise of the Novel*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1957, p. 11.

2. *ibid.*, p. 59.

3. *ibid.*, p. 15.

4. 'Es ist symptomatisch, dass es (in den USA) keine bis auf heutigen Tag fortgeführte, umfassende Bibliographie zur Literatur- und Kunstsoziologie gibt.' L. Löwenthal, *Literatur und Gesellschaft*, Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1964, p. 244. (American edition: *Literature, Popular Culture and Society*, Prentice-Hall, 1961.)

comprises numerous 'notes' on literature but these notes do not at all compensate for the general dearth which is so obvious in this field. Many theoretical summaries by 'literary critics' must also be mentioned, particularly the *Theory of Literature* by René Wellek and Austin Warren; in Chapter IX, entitled 'Literature and Society', the authors make a brief critical study of Taine and certain Soviet mechanist Marxists¹ such as Grib and Smirnov, in particular, but unfortunately without taking into account other trends of sociological criticism and without getting to the heart of the problems involved or providing the theoretical tools for a real sociology of literature. Thus, we are nearly always reduced to generalities, which although correct, are of little practical value; however, they seem to satisfy many authors. The following may be quoted as an example: 'The sociology of knowledge also aids intellectual history by indicating in what way literature can affect society. As has been pointed out, this system does not claim that all thought is socially determined.'²

Thus, these studies seem too often to be fragmentary; in any case, they do not replace solid and concrete studies such as L. Löwenthal's *Literature and the Image of Man*, which is extremely rare of its kind. It must be noted, however, that Löwenthal is a writer in the German sociological tradition and that, since 1926, he has worked in Frankfurt with Th. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, to whom, incidentally, his study is dedicated.³ The chapters on Cervantes, Shakespeare and Molière are particularly interesting. Speaking about Molière, Löwenthal points out the great similarity between the ideas of the dramatist and those of the philosopher Gassendi, and he states: 'With the exception of the Misanthrope, there is not a single person in Molière's plays who claims the right and the responsibility to create the world in the image of his own reason as did the figures of Shakespeare and Cervantes. A completely new tone is evident. Except for a light touch of ritualized deference, no major figure in Molière feels in any way motivated by affairs and ideologies of the State and, except for the Misanthrope, no person goes into mourning and despair as a result of alienation from the established mores of society.' Further on, Löwenthal adds: 'Middle-class society is entering a period of common sense and adjustment.'⁴

Fairly remote from the preoccupations and methods of Watt and Löwenthal, but closer to a certain formalism with which he has combined a

1. R. Wellek and A. Warren, *Theory of Literature*, New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1942. It is significant that the critics nearly always attack the most mechanistic authors in order to refute every attempt at a sociological approach, Grib and Smirnov rather than Gramsci or Lukács. This is another example of the too frequent practice of oversimplified classifications.
2. Alex Kern, 'The Sociology of Knowledge in the Study of Literature', *The Sewanee Review*, Vol. 50, 1942, p. 513.
3. It should also be noted that I. Watt, like G. Thomson, is not of American but of English background (Cambridge). See Thomson's publications: *Marrism and Poetry*, New York, 1946, and *Aeschylus and Athens. A Study in the Social Origin of Drama*, London, 1941.
4. L. Löwenthal, *Literature and the Image of Man. Sociological Studies of the European Drama and Novel, 1600-1900*, Boston, Mass., The Boston Press, 1957, p. 125.

personal philosophy, K. Burke proposes to undertake a study of literary language in the widest sense of the term, i.e., in the form given to it in everyday life: 'In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them.'¹

The same is true of proverbs, which are the most sophisticated form of literary art, the product of complex civilizations, for use in rhetorical contexts. Unfortunately, Burke's theory suffers from a systematic dramatization of human relationships through which he wishes to explain language as the strategy of communication: 'What would such sociological categories be like? They would consider works of art, I think as strategies for selecting enemies and allies, for socializing losses, for warding off the evil eye, for purification, appropriation. Art forms like "tragedy" or "comedy" or "satire" would be treated as equipments for living, that size up situations in various ways and in keeping with correspondingly various attitudes.'²

This constant tendency to philosophize is very detrimental to Burke's work, which reflects very great insight.

We have often distinguished the situation of sociological criticism in Germany from that in other countries. What exactly is this situation?³ In Germany we find a philosophical and sociological tradition which is directed to a much greater extent towards the sociology of literature. In this country, the heritage of Hegel and Marx has lasted for generations, and it would be impossible to name all those who have been influenced by it. Certain Marxian writers, like F. Mehring, may be mentioned in this connexion. Mehring defines his conception of the relationships between social structures and literary works as follows: 'The ideological heritage also exercises an influence, which has never been denied by historical materialism; but its effect is simply like that of the sun, the rain and the wind on a tree which is rooted in the rough soil of material conditions, modes of economic production and social situation'.⁴

Taking this idea as his starting-point, Mehring in his major work, *Die Lessing Legende*, tries to destroy the 'legend' according to which Lessing was truly attached to the kingdom of Frederick II of Prussia. In his analysis, he stresses Lessing's opposition to the Prussian Court and interprets the 'legend' as an unconscious falsification, an ideological superstructure of an economic and political development: the alliance of the German middle

1. Quoted by H. D. Duncan, *Language, Literature and Society*, op. cit., p. 84.

2. K. Burke, *The Philosophy of Literature Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*, Baton Rouge, La., Louisiana State University Press, 1941, p. 293. Quoted by H. D. Duncan, *Language, Literature and Society*, op. cit., p. 266. See also K. Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, New York, Prentice-Hall Book Co., 1945.

3. Although 'the father of Russian Marxism', G. V. Plekhanov had a certain influence throughout the whole of Europe; his work on literature, *Dramatic Literature and Painting in Eighteenth-century France considered from the Sociological Standpoint*, 1905, is unfortunately harmed by a rather narrow sociological outlook which considerably diminishes its importance. See also *L'Art et la Vie Sociale*, Éditions Sociales, 1949.

4. F. Mehring, 'Ästhetische Streichzüge', *Neue Zeit* XVII, I 1898-1899, *Zur Literaturgeschichte*, Vol. II, pp. 254-5.

classes with the Prussian State during the nineteenth century and the desire to 'reconcile its actual present with its idealized past by making the era of classical culture an era of Frederick the Great'.¹

This approach to a sociological study of literature is not the only one. Since Dilthey and through the Kantian tradition, another approach has revealed itself: the use of the concept of form as applied to society and its cultural productions.

G. Lukács adopts an intermediate approach: his work, Kantian at the start, then Hegelian and Marxian, represents the corpus of the most complete sociology of literature yet produced by a single author. We shall mention only two typical works belonging to the first period of his abundant production: *The Soul and Forms* and the *Theory of the Novel*.² It is in these works that Lukács seems to use the most flexible method, even if now and again, especially in the first part of the *Theory of the Novel*, he is rather prone to adopt a definitely philosophical attitude. The important point, however, as far as the sociology of literature is concerned, is that Lukács had, even at this stage, defined the concept of 'forms', of 'significant structure'. These 'forms' represent for him the privileged modes of meeting between the human soul and the absolute. They are non-temporal forms, 'essences' such as, for example, the tragic outlook which he regarded at that time as the only true and authentic one.

In his view the tragic outlook is an attempt to live in accordance with the principle of all or nothing. Tragic characters are unaware of the fact that there is no complete correspondence between thought and action; they are conscious of their will-power and of its limits. If their actions did not coincide with their words, they would seem ridiculous.

Ever in quest of a new world outlook, Lukács studied a literary *genre*: the essay. He wonders how far this form, intermediate between literature and philosophy, corresponds to a particular world outlook. Like philosophy, the essay studies the problem of the absolute, the whole, values in general, independently of phenomena. On the other hand, like literature, the essay deals with specific cases, in respect of which it seems tempted to offer an explanation. What, then, is the nature of the essay, situated as it is between the general and the particular? Lukács shows that the essay, always written 'on the occasion of', represents essentially a problematic form, by means of which the author seeks answers to the major problems of life, but always in connexion with specific cases.

In the *Theory of the Novel*, Lukács quits the domain of pure forms in order to relate them to the world. He abandons his Kantian attitude and adopts a Hegelian approach. He regards the novel as the characteristic literary form of a world in which man never feels entirely a part (as he did in the Middle Ages and in Ancient Greece, which Lukács wrongly considers

1. F. Mehring, *Die Lessing Legende*, Stuttgart, Dietz, 1893. Quoted by M. Löwy in the Dietz edition, Berlin, 1926, p. 8.

2. G. Lukács, *Die Seele und die Formen*, Berlin, Fleischel, 1911; *La Théorie du Roman*, Paris, Gonthier, 1963.

a kind of golden age of the community) nor entirely a stranger. There is a community in the novel, as in all epics, but unlike the *epopee*, the novel also takes into account the radical opposition between man and the world, between the individual and society.

Karl Mannheim, whose original ideas are very similar to those of Lukács, from whose friendship he derived great profit, is perhaps the writer whose name is most closely linked in the public mind with the sociology of knowledge. For many years he directed a collection, 'The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction', of which he was the founder and in which he published his own *Essays on Sociology of Knowledge*¹ as well as works by S. Ossowski, G. Misch, H. A. Hodges, A. Belgame, etc.; but he is known mainly for his chief work, *Ideologie und Utopie*.² In this now classic study, Mannheim draws an interesting distinction between the progressist form of false consciousness, Utopia, and its conservative form, ideology. He goes on to distinguish the liberal Utopias—those of the eighteenth-century enlightenment, for example,—from chiliasm, these Utopias usually being peculiar to the *Lumpenproletariat*. As opposed to these two progressist forms, the conservative ideology emphasizes the real, in so far as it is, as compared with what ought to be.

However, with regard to literature proper, Mannheim cannot be credited with concrete research comparable to that carried out by Lukács.

Following Lukács' return to Hungary after a long stay in the U.S.S.R. and Mannheim's emigration to England, it is mainly around the Frankfurt school that the sociology of literature developed in the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War.

The writings of Th. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer influenced the first generation of research workers who found in the Marxian-Hegelian method a flexible and efficient instrument for their research. Special mention must be made of their joint work, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, which was published in the Netherlands in 1947 and in which they analyse the process of auto-destruction of the ideals of the enlightenment up to the establishment of the fascist régime: 'For us there is no doubt—therein resides our *petitio principii*—that freedom inside the community is inseparable from enlightened thinking. However, we feel we have just as clearly perceived that the concept of this enlightened thinking, no less than the concrete historical forms—the social institutions—in which it is embodied, already contains the seeds of the regression which is taking place everywhere today.'³

1. K. Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology of Knowledge*, London, 1952. (The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.)

2. K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York and London, 1936.

3. 'Wir hegen keinen Zweifel—und darin liegt unsere *petitio principii*—dass die Freiheit in der Gesellschaft von aufklärenden Denken unabtrennbar ist. Jedoch glauben wir genau so deutlich erkannt zu haben, dass der Begriff eben dieses Denkens, nicht weniger als die konkreten historischen Formen, die Institutionen der Gesellschaft, in die es verflochten ist, schon den Keim zu jenem Rückschritt enthalten, der heute überall sich ereignet.' Th. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, Amsterdam, Querido, 1947, p. 7.

The part of Th. W. Adorno's work which deals with the sociology of literature largely comprises numerous short essays published mainly in the three volumes of *Noten zur Literatur* and in *Prismen: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft*.¹ His essay 'Aldous Huxley und die Utopie' is in the second of these works. Dealing with the Utopian ideas of *Brave New World*, Adorno writes: '(Huxley's) attitude is in spite of itself akin to an upper-middle-class attitude which loudly proclaims that its support of a profit economy owes nothing to self-interest but is based on love of mankind.'²

For Adorno, men are not yet ready for socialism, being unable to make use of the liberty to be accorded them. In his view, however, such truths are compromised, not so much by the use that may be made of them, but because they are empty truths inasmuch as they deify what they call 'man', treating him as a 'datum', hypostatizing moreover the person who sets out to observe him: 'This coldness lies at the very roots of Huxley's system.'³

At the basis of Huxley's attitude, in spite of his indignation against evil, there is a construct of history which has time. Huxley's novel lays the guilt for the present upon that which does not yet exist. His upper-middle-class ideology has time and makes the present endure through a fictional future.

Close to Adorno in thought, if not in style, W. Benjamin, in spite of a literary career tragically interrupted by the war, wrote a certain amount of historical, social and aesthetic criticism, including *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*, in which he puts forward some original ideas on the changes undergone by art since it became subject to mechanical reproduction. What was once a unique object has ended by becoming standardized: 'Thus is affirmed, in the domain of intuition, a phenomenon analogous to that represented on the theoretical plane by the importance of statistics. The alignment of reality with the masses and the related alignment of the masses with reality constitute a process with infinite bearings as much upon thought as upon intuition.'⁴

So the sociological problem expands to allow room to the material conditions in which works of culture develop and reach their public in so far as these conditions themselves modify creators' modes of thought.

But to pursue this further would be to pass beyond the strict limits of this article to a study of the public, public tastes and the forms of cultural circulation such as has been undertaken in the Federal Republic of Germany notably by L. Schücking in *Die Soziologie der literarischen Geschmackbildung*⁵

1. Th. W. Adorno, *Noten zur Literatur*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 3 vols., 1958-65; *Prismen: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft*, Munich, D.T.V. GmbH Co. K.G., 1963.

2. 'Die Haltung (Huxley's) bleibt unwillentlich jener grossbürgerlichen verwandt, die souverän versichert, keineswegs aus eigenem Interesse den Fortbestand der Profitwirtschaft zu befürworten, sondern um der Menschen willen.' Th. W. Adorno, *Prismen: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft*, op. cit., p. 116.

3. 'Solche Kälte wohnt im Innersten von Huxley's Gefüge.'

4. W. Benjamin, *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1963.

5. L. Schücking, *Die Soziologie der Literarischen Geschmackbildung*, Leipzig, Teubner, 1931.



or E. Auerbach in *Das französische Publikum des 17. Jahrhunderts*.¹ Auerbach does not, however, keep to this aspect of 'sociological' analysis. In his major work *Mimesis*,² he paints a huge fresco of realism in Western literature from Homer to Virginia Woolf, and more especially in French literature. He endeavours to trace the law of evolution operating here and brings a rich harvest of new ideas to an already classic project. His work, however, goes further than this in that he puts forward a very detailed critical analysis showing how the transformations of social reality and of the ways of thinking and feeling that go with them have repercussions not only upon the content of literary works, but also upon their style and even syntax. In so doing, Auerbach has cleared the way for research into the problem of forms in all their social manifestations—research which will be a future project of the sociology of literature.

The more recent and more strictly sociological and deductive studies of E. Köhler, assembled in part in his book *Trobadorlyrik und höfischer Roman*, consider in detail French literature of the Middle Ages. A constant exchange can be noted between literature and society in the twelfth century, the one throwing light on the other, which latter serves, however, as its foundation. It was an age of upheaval, with society in search of a new order—the courtly ideal, an age which saw the last of the *chanson de geste*, 'whose conception of life is still homogeneous and in which truth, one and immutable, has always an obligatory character'.³

The *chanson de geste* had had a meaning for the people of the Middle Ages, united as they were in the bosom of the Church and in consequence seeing everything in terms of salvation. Towards 1160 the court romance novel makes its appearance with the legend of King Arthur, thus giving the feudal society the 'historical' justification of its existence. But to guarantee its stability, the new society needed a common ideal, one, however, that concealed the factual cleavage between the upper and the lower aristocracy, a cleavage based essentially upon wealth. This conjuncture, which was to ensure a certain cohesion between hierarchically separated elements, finds expression, according to Köhler, in the poetic paradox of the 'renunciation of full realization' in courtly love, a renunciation to be understood as 'the sublimated projection of the lower nobility's lack of possessions and of a consequent lack of concrete social and economic relationships'.⁴

To conclude with a summary of the sociology of literature in the Federal Republic of Germany, we can therefore say that it progressed far more

1. E. Auerbach, *Das französische Publikum des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Munich, 1933. (Münchener Romanistische Arbeiten, No. 3).

2. E. Auerbach, *Mimesis. Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen Literatur*, Berne, Francke, 1946.

3. 'Dessen Lebensverständnis noch homogen und für welches noch ein und dieselbe Wahrheit verbindlich ist.' E. Köhler, *Trobadorlyrik und höfischer Roman*, Berlin, Rütten & Loening, 1962, p. 9.

4. 'Die sublimierte Projektion der Besitzlosigkeit des Kleinadels, also konkreter gesellschaftlich-ökonomischer Verhältnisse.' *ibid.*, p. 7. See also M. Waltz, *Rolandslied, Wilhelmlied-Alexiuslied. Zur Struktur und geschichtlichen Bedeutung*, Heidelberg, C. Winter, 1965.

quickly and especially that it opened up far wider perspectives, armed as it was for its task with the concepts of a native philosophical tradition.

The French sociological tradition took a very different turn under the influence of Comte and Durkheim. It has, however, a precursor whom the sociology of literature could well rescue from the oblivion that has overtaken him, J. M. Guyau. Guyau's so-called aesthetico-ethical doctrine has been rightly condemned, but the methodological interest of some of the chapters preceding his concrete analyses in *L'Art du Point de Vue Sociologique* have gone unnoticed. Guyau found himself faced by two opposed theoretical standpoints, the historicist naturalism of Taine and romantic idealism.

Choosing an original approach he avoids the Tainian impasse, which consists of relating each fragment of a work to a historical fact presumed to be its cause. He proposes on the contrary to consider the work as a whole, as a system, and to 'discover the significant facts expressive of a law, those which, among the confused mass of phenomena, constitute points of reference and form a link, a pattern, a figure, a system'.¹

Having thus affirmed since 1889 the structuralist nature of criticism, Guyau indicates cautiously to the sociologist that his work is itself partly creative of its object, because it makes an arbitrary selection related to his system of values. The famous *Wertfreiheit*, which caused so much ink to flow at the beginning of the century, could not be more openly challenged. But this fundamental statement implies another, more directly concerned with the sociology of literature.

If, in fact, the intellectual process of criticism is always linked to a system of values, then *a fortiori* so is that of the writer. The problem of values therefore leads of necessity to that of action and Guyau defines very precisely what links the two: 'The genius of art and the genius of contemplation have the same role (as that of action), for what is called contemplation is only action reduced to its first stage, maintained in the domain of thought and imagination.'²

Genius is therefore defined by its capacity to anticipate this action, to offer the reader 'a sort of inner vision of possible forms of life'.³ It follows naturally from this conception of the work that it is not outside it that the means of understanding it must be sought but within itself inasmuch as it expresses this possible life by a system; here Guyau is very evidently criticizing the lack of nuances in Taine's explanation by means of the 'environment' as well as the psychology of it. For him society is important before everything, but inasmuch as it appears in the structure of the work, as a system of points of reference: 'Taine postulates the earlier environment as producing individual genius; one must therefore suppose that individual genius produces a new environment or a modification of the environment. These two doctrines are two essential parts of the truth; but Taine's doctrine is more applicable to mere talent than to genius, that is to say to

1. J. M. Guyau, *L'Art du Point de Vue Sociologique*, 7th ed., F. Alcan, 1906, p. 65.

2. *ibid.*, p. 44.

3. *ibid.*, p. xiii.

initiative. Once again we do not mean by these words an absolute initiative or invention, an invention which would be a creation out of nothing; but a new synthesis of pre-existing elements, like the combination of images in a kaleidoscope.¹

This does not alter the fact that Guyau was completely incapable of applying his theory to a concrete critical investigation. His studies of Hugo and Lamartine are based far more on his personal philosophy than on sociological criticism, which explains of course the oblivion into which he has fallen. However, it is not uninteresting to examine the theoretical approach of a sociologist of literature, and within these limits Guyau's theory can still be of value.

Far removed from Guyau's theories, which unfortunately bore no fruit, an analysis was drawn up in the early part of the century which was to revolutionize the historical study of mediaeval literature, J. Bédier's *Les Légendes Épiques*.² Bédier set out to uproot a firmly held prejudice according to which the French *chansons de geste* dated from the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth centuries, being written therefore at the same time as the events they describe. In opposition to Grimm's arbitrary constructs, Bédier showed that the *chansons de geste* date from the eleventh century, the date of the oldest manuscripts in our possession, that they emanated from sanctuaries, places of pilgrimage and fairs and that finally, so far as they are legends having a historical basis, they imply the participation of scholars. Thanks to concordant geographical references, he showed that the descriptions of scenery were based on the pilgrim routes and that, apart from these very specific routes, the countries traversed remained unknown. But pilgrims, clerks and *jongleurs* do not suffice to explain the *chansons de geste*; it is in the time of the Crusades, in eleventh-century Spain, in the Holy Land and in the outpouring of ideas and sentiments which formed the framework of feudal and chivalrous society that the artisans of epic poetry have their place—pilgrims, scholars, *jongleurs*, knights, villeins and poets.

Bédier also shows brilliantly the progress that can be made if, instead of its customary rather abstract approach to literature, literary history studies the actual conditions in which these works saw the light.

G. Lanson is far removed from Bédier in thought and approach, and it may cause surprise to find him mentioned among the forerunners of the sociology of literature. It must not be forgotten, however, that he not only gave theoretical pledges of his interest in sociology and its use in literary criticism, but also formed some useful hypotheses which have not yet been fully explored. In an article on 'History and Sociology' he wrote: 'The ego of the poet is the ego of a group, a wider ego when it is Musset who sings, more restricted in the case of Vigny, a religious group when it is d'Aubigné, a political group when it is the Victor Hugo of *Les Châtiments*.'³

1. *ibid.*, p. 42.

2. J. Bédier, *Les Légendes Épiques. Recherche sur la Formation des Chansons de Geste*, 2nd ed., H. Champion, 1917.

3. G. Lanson in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1904, pp. 627-8.

Fully aware of the relationships between creative work and groups, Lanson even outlines a sociology of literary criticism: 'At the basis of Boileau's judgements on Homer or Ronsard, what do we find but the picture of Homer or Ronsard in the collective mind, in the consciousness of a French seventeenth-century group? Dogmatism can in fact escape the charge of universalizing its individual impressions only provided it has socialized its thought.'¹

Here it is important to see how Lanson by implication justifies the method he in fact practised, basing it in the last resort on sociological knowledge. If his quest was biography, he was to find, though biography, relationships of participation in a collective consciousness: 'We have reduced this personality to being—partially (so as not to let our affirmation go beyond our knowledge)—a focal point for rays emanating from the collective life around it.'²

With L. Febvre, we again leave the literary specialists and find literature at the heart of the preoccupations of a historian who more than any other wanted 'to pose, with regard to a man of singular vitality, the problem of the relationship of the individual to the collectivity, of personal initiative and social necessity which is perhaps the chief problem of history'.³

Such is Febvre's plan as stated in the preface to *Un Destin: Martin Luther*, even if there remains a certain gap between the plan and its realization, at least on the strictly sociological plane.

The case of *Autour de l'Heptaméron* is a little different. Here L. Febvre still purposes to go beyond the false evidence accumulated by critics against Marguerite de Navarre with their use of epithets as hasty as they are superficial, such as 'hypocrite'—a term more suggestive of 'the mentality of a second-rate newspaper' than of historical analysis.⁴ He sets out to show that the incompatibility between the broadly Gallic and the profoundly Christian aspects of the *Heptaméron* cannot be explained either by an alleged internal dialectic of the work or by the ambivalent personality of Marguerite de Navarre, but by the difficulties of coexistence between the Christian religion and court morality under François I.

The key to the question of the *Heptaméron* must therefore be sought in the 'relationship of religious beliefs to the ideas, institutions and morals of a period; a problem outside the field of literary history'.⁵ One cannot but subscribe to this comment, even if the analysis itself does not fully qualify as sociological, L. Febvre being primarily an historian.

The same applies to *Le Problème de l'Incroyance au XVI^e Siècle. La Religion de Rabelais*,⁶ Febvre's most famous work, which we only mention

1. *ibid.*, p. 269.

2. *ibid.*, pp. 630-1.

3. L. Febvre, *Un Destin: Martin Luther*, Rieder, 1928, p. 7.

4. L. Febvre, *Autour de l'Heptaméron. Amour Sacré, Amour Profane*, 3rd ed., Gallimard, 1944, p. 223.

5. *ibid.*, p. 14.

6. L. Febvre, *Le Problème de l'Incroyance au XVI^e Siècle. La Religion de Rabelais*, Albin Michel, 1962.

here, although it, too, is of direct interest to the sociologist of literature.

Nevertheless there has not been, since Taine, any major research in France into the sociology of literature. Many men of letters have put forward interesting ideas on the subject but have not followed this through thoroughly in their work. As for the sociologists, one is tempted to mention Halbwachs, so fitted did he seem to be to produce a sociological study of literature, but the subject remained outside the field of his actual preoccupations. So it is once again Germany which produced the writer B. Groethuysen, who in the 1920s brought out in French the first work written in the sociological spirit. This was not exactly a study of literature but of the *esprit bourgeois*.¹ Groethuysen promptly established a relationship between this type of mentality and that historical monument, the *Encyclopédie*. What could be more suggestive, in this context, than the few pages of *Mythes et Portraits*? By the term *l'avoir scientifique*, B. Groethuysen very accurately labelled the advent of the appropriation of knowledge at the turning point between the Renaissance and modern times: 'It is the spirit of possession which essentially distinguishes the "Encyclopédie" from the *Orbis pictus* in which the Renaissance travellers used to note the curious and interesting things they had seen on their journeys. "Renaissance Man" had remained an adventurer, a wanderer without property. Thus he was not yet able to say "the knowledge we have . . .". With the arrival of the *bourgeois*, and the establishment of his predominance in the domains of law and science, a change was brought about. He began by making a careful distinction "with a comparison of opinions at all levels", and "weighing up his reasons" between what he knew and what he did not know, counting only as really possessed that which he was sure he knew and which he could situate in "the order and train of human knowledge".²

P. Bénichou's *Morales du Grand Siècle* must not be underestimated. The author set out first of all to show the links between morality in the spirit of Corneille and court nobility under Louis XIV. This morality, he tells us, did not demand the suppression of nature before all else; it must rather be understood in the context of the *tradition noble* inherited from feudalism. The only duty is to be worthy of oneself, to expel self-doubt, to become conscious of one's own identity. But such heroism implies recognition by someone else. Yet the people of Rome and Bithynia, who might have been possible witnesses, do not appear on the stage. So it is in the audience that the hero finds his necessary interrogator and witness. Bénichou, in an analysis breaking with long tradition, shows that Descartes, in his *Traité des Passions*, does not look for the means of crushing desire by voluntary effort, but seeks far more the conditions of a harmony between the impulse and what

1. B. Groethuysen, *Les Origines de l'Esprit Bourgeois en France*. I: *L'Église et la Bourgeoisie*, Gallimard, 1927. 7th ed., 1956.

2. B. Groethuysen, *Mythes et Portraits*, 3rd ed., Gallimard, 1947, pp. 91-3.

is good. The harmony is attained at the level of that nature which transcends nature, known as *l'homme généreux*.¹

With Racine, the position is different. The depreciated legacy of chivalry imposed upon him limits within which his genius could find expression. The age of aristocratic rebellion was over, the triumph of absolutism having rendered it obsolete. So in Racine's work the proud and voluble heroine gives way to the heroine who bewails her lot in secret. The aristocratic ideal still fascinates him, but it is too late to give it embodiment. The whole of Racine's genius developed within the context of this contradiction.

In Molière's *Dom Juan*, Bénichou sees the divorce of the 'noble' mentality from religion. Moral libertinage, cynical disavowal of the old idea of *noblesse oblige*, vainly and persistently opposed to Dom Juan by his father, has the effect of placing its adepts outside any tenable social position and, consequently, outside all solid and effective sovereignty. Dom Juan, *grand seigneur*, is at the same time a fallen being, in his right place in this period of the ultimate political decay of the nobility. Rodrigue and Nicomède are valid human models, Dom Juan is not. From the *importants* to the *roués*, this type of scandalous gentleman bestrides the centuries of monarchy, great because of his scorn for the cringing stupidity of men, and because of his ability to put pleasure before interest. Dom Juan is a revolutionary, although he embodies values that are past.

Finally, the sociology of literature, as considered in this article, has found its most coherent expression in L. Goldmann, that is to say, once again in a mind trained in traditions different from ours. This repeated finding of ours should have its issue in a sociology of French sociological epistemology, but the question lies outside our present subject.

For Goldmann, the sociology of literature has in view the understanding of the meaning of a work. To him this means clarifying the total network of meanings which internal analysis of a work reveals by an explanation, by the insertion of this network in a whole of wider significance: the social group. *Le Dieu Caché* is based on this approach.² We shall not give an analysis of this work here, elements of which are dealt with by the author in the present number of the *Journal*.

In *Pour une Sociologie du Roman*, Goldmann develops the problem of a sociological study of the novel at two levels. At the most general level he

1. P. Bénichou, *Morales du Grand Siècle*, Gallimard, 1948, p. 25.

See also S. Doubrovsky, *Corneille et la Dialectique du Héros*, Gallimard, 1963, a work in which the author adopts a more differentiated position by showing the transition of a purely aristocratic hero (*Le Cid*) to a 'mercantilist' attitude: 'emulation is transformed into bargaining, thus itself becoming merchandise' (p. 191). This is what Doubrovsky calls the 'passage from aristocratic ontology (autonomy of the monads) to monarchic ontology (being, by participation with the one)' (p. 208).

On this evolution towards 'mercantilism' in human relations in Corneille's plays, see also J. Ehrmann's article 'Les Structures de l'Échange dans *Cinna*', *Les Temps Modernes*, No. 246, 1966, pp. 929-60.

2. L. Goldmann, *Le Dieu Caché. Étude de la Vision Tragique dans Les Pensées de Pascal et les tragédies de Racine*, Gallimard, 1956. English translation by P. Thody, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964.

affirms that 'the problem of the novel is therefore to make that which in the mind of the writer is abstract and ethical (the values) the essence of a work in which this reality could not exist except in the form of a thematized absence . . . or, which is the same thing, a depreciated presence'.¹

This book also contains a long study of the novels of Malraux. The study is in two parts: first, a concrete analysis which brings to light the very coherent structure of Malraux's novelistic universe; second, an analysis of a historical and sociological type showing the transformations that Western society and particularly Western capitalism underwent before 1912 and 1945, as well as—and this is a major event after the continual succession of crises—the appearance of mechanisms of intervention and of State regulation within Western capitalism. These profound changes have had, according to Goldmann, particular importance for Western society as a whole and particularly for the ideological evolution of Malraux, who to a large extent personified them in the field of the novel. Goldmann characterizes these changes as follows: 'Fading of revolutionary hopes and prospects: birth of a world in which all important acts are reserved for a specialist *élite*; reduction of the majority of men to mere instruments of the acts of this *élite*, having no real function in cultural creation or in social economic and political decisions; the difficulty of pursuing imaginative creation in a world in which it can refer to no universal human values—all these being problems which bear as obviously upon the last stage of Malraux's work as upon the developing evolution of our societies.'²

At the end of this rapid survey of the history of the sociology of literature, we are again faced with the initial question, Madame de Staël's question: what are the relationships of literature to society?

It will have been observed that, throughout our survey, we have not been able to make good the initial theoretical lack to which we have drawn attention. To try to bind the scattered fragments together would be beyond the scope of this article, for it would more or less amount to constructing an entire theory.³ But we could, on the other hand, loosen a few threads, and, by way of conclusion, propose the beginnings of a programme of study.

By what they say, and still more by what they do not say, the books we have mentioned seem to indicate two directions for research. The first consists of a microsociological study of groups which comprise a world vision. An example is given in this number of the *Journal* in connexion with Stendhal. The essential aim of this empirical and strictly sociological research must be the study of the actual conditions operating between creative groups and individuals. These mediations obviously have two aspects, sociological and psychological. They derive therefore, at a certain level, from a genetic psychology which alone permits an escape from the

1. L. Goldmann, *Pour une Sociologie du Roman*, Gallimard, 1964, p. 22.

2. *ibid.*, pp. 179-80.

3. We refrain only because L. Goldmann develops the elements of such a theory elsewhere in this issue of the *Journal*.

dichotomies of the social and the psychological. Probably the studies of J. Piaget would supply the point of departure for this building up of theory which is so gravely lacking at present.

The second direction that research should take would lead to a more scrupulous reading of texts. Until now, with the exception of Auerbach, analysis has dealt only with the over-all meaning of a work. An attempt might be made to show the possibilities of adopting the technique perfected by the symptomatologists of literature and upon what bases it would be possible to enter into a fruitful critical dialogue with them.

When these two fundamental aspects of research into the sociology of literature have been sufficiently illustrated by precise study, we will have attained a satisfactory measure of strictures, to the extent that the hypothesis represented by the first reading of a text will be verified, on the one hand, by its insertion in a larger reality (the group and its mental structures or visions of the world) and, on the other hand, by the possibility of including, in that reading, the symptomatological structures of the text.

[*Translated from the French.*]

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Literature and sociology

G. N. Pospelov

The relationship between literature and the other arts

What is the relationship between literature and sociology? Literature is an art that develops in human society throughout the ages quite independently of sociology, whereas sociology is a science whose purpose is to discover the objective laws of social life in all its manifestations including creative art.

Literature obviously lends itself to sociological study more than any other form of art; not, of course, to any kind of sociological study, but only to that kind which, through the general conclusions it reaches, enables us to grapple with the problems of art and grasp the fundamental characteristics of its development and the laws which govern it.

Literature is the art of verbal expression, in which meaning is linked with the sound of words only by association. It therefore yields precedence to the other figurative arts—painting, sculpture and miming—as regards power to give a direct impression of the object portrayed, and to the expressive arts—music and dancing—as regards the direct expression of emotion.

On the other hand, the words that make up human speech have a universal meaning, and its sounds have power to move us; literature therefore excels all the other arts owing to the variety and richness of its subject-matter. Literature alone can speak to us on any subject within the artist's ken, on all the varied social and historical aspects of human life and on all aspects of nature, which is closely linked with human life, whereas the other arts can portray only certain aspects.

The figures represented by sculptors, *genre* painters and portraitists are silent and motionless; those mimed are silent, too, but they express themselves in gestures. The characters in epic literature, however, not only move, act and gesticulate in changing circumstances, but they also speak, expressing in words their relationship to each other and to the world around them and revealing their inner world and their general outlook.

Landscape painting depicts the motionless aspects of nature and the

emotional impressions they create. Lyrical poetry describing landscapes shows us the various aspects of nature as they move and change; the poet can penetrate its outward forms thanks to his feelings and desires as well as to his reflections about life. A poem describing a landscape is successful if it reflects the poet's thoughts and emotions as he tries to fathom appearances.

Music and dancing convey emotions and sentiments and changing impressions, music by the power of sound, dancing by that of bodily movement; but these feelings and impressions, for all their spontaneity, lack the power of thought, and it is only by association that they can evoke the phenomena of the external world which gave rise to them. Music which reproduces the intonation of thought or imitates the sounds of the external world is bad music. Meditative, lyric poetry reproduces the poet's subjective emotional process as directly related to his ideas of the objective world and integrated with his thought, which embraces both the emotional process and the world.

In other words, the main difference between literature and the other arts is that the subject of literature is syncretic.

All the other arts can be placed in one of two categories. Painting, sculpture and miming are figurative arts; music, dancing and architecture are expressive arts. (The numerous twentieth-century artists—the so-called 'abstract' painters—who have tried to make painting expressive as well as figurative, or even purely expressive, have not yet produced anything to be compared with classical painting.) Literature, however, is both figurative (the epic) and expressive (the lyric), and there is also a variety of combinations of both these forms.

Moreover, literature can be combined with the other arts in various ways. Literary texts can be mimed, if they are suitably adapted in dialogue form—a combination which, long ago, gave rise to a third form of art, the drama, which itself occupies a place of honour in the history of literature. Through lyric poems, which in ancient times were isolated from their 'original syncretism' with vocal music and the dance, literature has again been united, especially in recent years, though 'artificially' this time, with vocal and instrumental music, in the form of songs of everyday life, ballads, and oratorios. All this adds to the variety of literary forms.

Another distinguishing characteristic of literature is that the content of each of the various *genres* is different from that of the others. Whereas in painting the *genres* obviously differ principally in their subjects, in what they actually represent (scenes of civic or everyday life, portraits, landscapes, still life), and whereas in music they differ mainly in the means of execution (vocal, instrumental, chamber music or symphonic music) or in the formal principles underlying their structure (allegro movements in sonatas, variations, etc.), in literature—particularly in epic literature and the drama—the difference between the *genres* lies in the nature of their content as a whole. Songs about heroes, poems and tales, satire and idylls, fables and ballads, novels and short stories, tragedies and comedies, odes,

elegies, etc., differ not only in their themes or forms but also, indeed principally, in the particular problems they deal with and the source of their inspiration. There has been a succession of different literary *genres* throughout the history of literature. Each important stage in the development of a nation's literature has its own correlation of *genres*.

Literature also differs from the other arts in the intellectual nature of its content. As human society develops and social relationships, ideas and intellectual pursuits become more complex, the intellectual content of life becomes richer, broader and deeper. We have only to compare ancient myths and animal fables with the novels of Balzac, Dickens, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Hemingway and Böll, or ancient songs of working life and ritual songs with the lyrics of Heine, Verhaeren and Mayakovsky, to see that this is so.

Literature, as it developed, gradually severed its ties with religion and drew ever nearer to the progressive spheres of mankind's consciousness—ethics and philosophy, social theory and science. Writers and poets, more than other creative artists, have gradually come to concentrate on fundamental questions and to take a keen interest in social matters and in the burning questions of their day. They have very often played an active part in the social movements of their time and have very carefully expressed their convictions in their correspondence and in their diaries and frequently also in press articles. Writing is a much more intellectual process than the other arts. When a writer dies, he often leaves behind him a considerable amount of draft material which throws light on the way in which he worked in his intellectual laboratory, so to speak.

During the last three centuries, the intellectual nature of literature, after developing throughout the history of mankind, has produced a very special result—the birth and development of literary movements. The latter are not merely historical events, which express the continuity of the content of art and of the forms that correspond to it; they reflect the continuity of literary creation itself; writers themselves and critics are aware of them, and expound the theory behind them in programmes and manifestoes, treatises and articles. Their interpretation is usually accompanied by a precise definition of the literary qualities that the writers think most important; this provides them with a name and a watchword, and unites them under the same literary banner. The history of literature is full of such designations—'isms' of all sorts, including 'classicism', 'romanticism', 'realism' and many others.

These terms, moreover, have increasingly come to represent particular conceptions of the various types of literature. From the outset, literary critics began to examine and define these conceptions, arousing more or less heated discussion about them. A good example of this from the past is the programme of the romantic movement drawn up by the Schlegel brothers for the writers of the Iena school, the development of these ideas for French writers in Madame de Staël's *De l'Allemagne*, which led to Victor Hugo's manifesto on romanticism, and the adoption of these ideas

by Russian theoreticians of romanticism in the 1820s. An equally clear example in our own day is to be found in the present bitter controversy concerning the origin, essence and development of 'socialist realism' in Soviet literature. No other art attracts such constant public attention, or arouses such persistent and ever-increasing interest on the part of the critics.

Some of the guiding concepts that were originally the watchwords of literary programmes and some of the literary movements that adopted these watchwords subsequently led people to reflect about the history of literature, and became basic concepts for literary critics engaged in research on the distinguishing characteristics of the literatures of various countries and periods, and even on literature in general. In this connexion, the terms 'romanticism', 'realism' and 'naturalism' acquired exceptional importance. These terms, which were once coined by writers in order to explain important trends in their own work, are now the subjects of careful historical research and acrimonious theoretical controversy between literary critics and the authors of general conceptions concerning art. Thus a new concept relating to the theory of literature and art appeared in the nineteenth century—that of the cognitive principles of artistic creation, of 'creative methods', and particularly of realism as a 'creative method'.

It must be admitted that the general conceptions of art are based essentially on literature and literary history, and to a much lesser extent on the history of the other arts. This, of course, is a sign of a certain narrowness and weakness in modern conceptions of art. This narrowness is no accident, however. Literature undoubtedly provides the best basis for a general theory of art.

Lastly, in comparison with other forms of art, literature usually reflects the author's imagination and his ideas on art with exceptional clarity and precision. Because of the specific nature of its verbal structure, literature is particularly fitted to reveal the characteristics of its content in the process of critical analysis. It is easier in a literary work than in other works of art to discover the characteristic aspects of the life reflected in it, particularly its ideological basis, the emotional inspiration underlying its images, the particular 'creative method' employed in it and the characteristics of the *genre* to which it belongs. It is difficult—sometimes impossible—to formulate verbal concepts and judgements about the content of musical works or even about that of innumerable paintings. Literary critics very often achieve this more successfully in their own sphere. This explains why literary criticism has developed to a greater extent and become more important than criticism in the other fields of art. Literary criticism, moreover, often proves to be an invaluable weapon in the ideological warfare being waged in a particular period, while progressive criticism usually contains in itself the seeds of a sociology of literature.

Literature, therefore, lends itself more than any other art to sociological study. Literary works are limpid pools of creative thought *par excellence* and the springs' of social life that gush from the bottom and feed these works can usually be quite clearly seen, provided one wants to see them.

Good-will and good intentions, however, are obviously not enough; whoever wishes to make a serious study of problems relating to the sociology of literature and examine the manifold relations between literature and the life of society at the various stages of its history must have a knowledge of the relevant theoretical principles. He must try to solve the general problems concerning the nature of literature as an art and its place in the historical development of society.

What general method should be used by the sociologist in order to resolve these problems? This will depend on his own particular outlook and consequently on the extent to which he makes use of all the knowledge which mankind has accumulated in respect of these problems.

Science and experimental research having reached such an advanced stage, the old metaphysical, objective-idealistic 'sociology' has long been bereft of all meaning. Today, we have a choice between two different methods of solving sociological problems. The first is based on the principles of 'positivism', which rejects broad philosophico-historical generalizations, placing its faith solely in the assembling of facts, in statistics based on them and in personal inductive conclusions concerning particular questions. The second method is based on broad philosophico-historical concepts, applies inductive and deductive principles in research, and selects and examines the facts in accordance with these principles. It is obvious that only the latter method can lead to a satisfactory solution of the complex problems of the relationship between verbal art and society, particularly the problem of the social nature of art.

Literature and the general laws of art

Which of the general laws of artistic creation can best explain literary works? The traditional answer to this question is that the principal distinctive feature of literary works is their use of imagery. This, however, is not an adequate answer, although it is true that art reproduces life in the forms of life itself, in its individual phenomena, in the unity of their general and individual features, and that this kind of reproduction cannot use abstract concepts, but only images, especially visual and auditory ones. It is not sufficient, however, to say that art is essentially a matter of imagery, for imagery is not found only in art. There are other kinds of imagery, which are often related to art. In W. Manchester's recently published book *Death of a President*, John Kennedy's last days and his tragic death are portrayed in great detail and from various angles. This is an example of graphic description of life by means of words. The images it contains, however, are not artistic images; they are 'factographic' images, images which were created for the purpose of informing the public about an event that really happened, and which preserve the latter's unique individual character as far as it was in the author's power to render this possible. They reveal no interest in what is typical in life, no creative invention.

There is still another category of images which are not directly related to

art; nor are they designed to give information about some unique event; their purpose is to illustrate various general concepts. They may be images illustrative of some aspect of public life, images that are used as concrete examples from which generalizations may be made about events and circumstances frequently found in public life. Such, for instance, are the descriptions, often published in current newspapers and magazines, of the war in Viet-Nam. Or they may be images illustrative of some scientific truth, which scientists use as examples in order to elucidate their general reasoning and conclusions. Such, for instance, are the tales told by travellers of their encounters with backward tribes, tales that confirm the ethnographer's views concerning certain features of the life of such tribes.

Those who create illustrative images, like those who create factographic images, should not make any substantial change in the facts they describe in order not to mislead the public. Nor may they exaggerate or indulge in creative invention. Unlike the creators of factographic images, however, they do not portray anything which is of general interest, but compare a number of phenomena of the same kind and choose the most typical of them. Moreover, they do not try to depict things as being more typical than they really are.

Images used in art are of quite a different nature, since their purpose is entirely different. Only 'naturalists' confine themselves, in their works, to what they have actually experienced, and do not go beyond their documentary observations. But 'naturalists' are not good artists. Real, authentic art, including the art of the writer and the poet, is always creative. Real artists always transform the phenomena of life, thus revealing the range of their imagination and fantasy, and they are not afraid that the play of their imagination will lower the value of their work, or that they will be accused of misrepresenting facts. In fact, no one accuses them of doing so. On the contrary, those who read or listen to their works greatly appreciate their power to soar beyond what is ordinary, banal, stereotyped, their ability to exaggerate, their liking for the extraordinary and exceptional and even for the fantastic.

The creative work of the true artist, however, has nothing in common with idle, dull and hazy reverie. Although intuitive and far removed from reasoning and calculation, its content is always well defined, its understanding of what it is expressing always clear, and its perception always penetrating.

The transformation of life as it is portrayed in art has a twofold meaning. In art in general, when real artists, particularly writers, depict human life and the life of nature, which is related to it (from the socio-historical and not from the biological standpoint), they are never satisfied with the degree of typicality actually possessed by phenomena. This is the difference between real artists and those who merely use images as illustrations.

Artists intensify the characteristic aspects of life. They observe individual phenomena as they actually exist in everyday life and in human consciousness—their own personal experience often serves them as a basis—and

they then imagine new individual phenomena, the socio-historical aspects of which can be seen more clearly, more forcefully and more fully than is possible in real life; for in real life it often happens that what is essential is seen only in glimpses, and is obscured by the extraneous and the accidental; it never has inner consistency or perfection.

It thus happens that the artist accentuates those aspects of the typical in life that interest him, exaggerates them, develops and elaborates them by means of images, and portrays what is general and normal in the form of what is particular and exceptional, rarely if ever found in real life. This is sometimes called the 'graphic nature' of artistic images.

But the creation of new individual phenomena, with the fresh choice and combination of the properties and details relating to them—a process that is necessary mainly because it enables the artist to give full emphasis to what is typical and to single out and stress those aspects of it that he considers essential—has other important implications in art. Every detail of an artistic image, while it accentuates what is typical in the object portrayed, also has an emotional expressiveness. The whole complex of images constituted by a work of art reflects not only the artist's interpretation of the life he depicts, but also his emotional attitude towards it and his source of inspiration. Works of art that are the fruit of a creative imagination are remarkable both for the marked typicality of the subjects they deal with and for their vivid expressiveness. Art, therefore, has its own specific form of imagery.

This, however, is only a statement of fact and does not explain the latter. It is important to grasp the specific nature of art, but it is even more important to understand its origin. The philosophical, psychological and formalistic theories of art have either failed to raise this question or have been unable to answer it satisfactorily. A socio-historical study of art, a sociology based on concrete historical facts, will be more likely to provide an answer.

The ideological essence of art

Literature, like other arts, is a special form of intellectual creation. The element it uses is not abstract thought, as in science or philosophy, but a special form of imagination which creates images that transform human life in a specific and expressive manner, both in the relations of its objective social being, as in epic literature, and in the subjective world of its social consciousness, as is usually the case in lyric poetry.

Why does this specific transformation of life by means of imagery take place? What causes it? And what is its purpose? We already know part of the answer to these questions. Artists transform life and portray it graphically and expressively in order to give, as vividly and completely as possible, their emotional interpretation of the social aspects of life. They do this, not by calculation or with any conscious, preconceived intention, but directly and spontaneously.

What prompts them to this? It is often said that it is talent, an exceptional inborn ability, which does so; but this explains nothing. All works of material and intellectual culture are the products of talent, but each is produced by a different sort of talent according to the objective purpose for which the work is intended. People live in houses, work with machines, use the means of transport. Can it be said that these different objects of material culture were created solely because the corresponding inborn talents existed? On the contrary, certain social needs are felt, and the talents needed to satisfy them are adapted, developed and perfected.

It is the same with art. Artists are not the only people who have an emotional understanding of the social aspects of life; many other people also do as members of society. Talent, however, is essential if what they understand is to be conveyed in the graphic and expressive images that are produced by a creative imagination; without talent, there would be no art.

An artist, however, needs more than talent. He must experience certain profound needs and aspirations before he can express them appropriately and artistically. Talent always manifests itself in the execution of some project. What is the nature of an artist's project? Why do artists strive so ardently to carry out their projects and make them part of the cultural heritage of a particular country or period?

This, of course, is not to be explained by external factors, such as the thirst for recognition, glory or money. All such factors can but add to the force of deeper incentives, if these exist. Such incentives derive from the artist's own particular kind of emotional interpretation of the social aspects of life, from the fundamentally important fact that this interpretation always has, in one form or another, an ideological meaning and direction.

This statement may seem puzzling at first. Art, it may be said, is a very delicate instrument for expressing human emotions. What has it to do with 'ideology', which is always a matter of intellectual convictions, usually expressed in conceptual—even theoretical—systems?

Ideology, however, does not simply represent people's intellectual convictions or their ideas about life, it also embraces the feelings and aspirations engendered by those convictions and ideas. Most important of all, ideology is found not only in the form of theories (philosophical, political, ethical or legal), it is primarily a direct, emotional and total awareness of the different manifestations of social life. This primary stage in a person's ideological awareness is often called his 'outlook'.

When a man who has been living in the country is suddenly obliged to work in a big city, amid the feverish noise of a factory or in the icy silence of an administrative office, he dislikes the new state of affairs and, returning home in the evening, thinks regretfully of his past life in the village or on his farm—which, he now realizes, was tranquil and peaceful—and of his former companions; his dissatisfaction and his regrets are manifestations of his ideological 'outlook'. When a business man, who is aware that he is on the verge of bankruptcy and is visited in his office by the representatives

of a bigger firm which is trying to take over his own firm, conceals his dismay, fear and hostility, the latter are manifestations of his ideological 'outlook', which radically changes with the alteration in his social situation. When a chauffeur, who admiringly and enviously observes the success of his employer, obsequiously opens the door of the limousine for the latter and his family, his admiration and his obsequiousness are part of his philosophy of life. Thousands of similar examples could be given.

Let us analyse the foregoing examples. The impressions, thoughts and feelings of the three persons concerned do not stem from their abstract, theoretical convictions—moral principles, political outlook, religious or philosophical ideas—indeed, they may even run counter to them. Their impressions, thoughts and feelings are the direct consequence of the social conditions in which they live and act. In each case, the subject of their thoughts and feelings is a number of factors which manifestly embody a particular type of social life and the processes that take place in it (i.e., the 'social aspect of life'), although they may not understand this. In other words, their thoughts and feelings have (a) a cognitive and generalizing content and (b) an emotional and evaluating significance. Thoughts and feelings, therefore, represent a special sphere of ideological consciousness, his social 'outlook', which permeates and governs his whole psychology and the whole process of his mental life.

In the examples given we have mentioned only a few main aspects of the ideological 'outlook' of the individuals concerned; there may, however, be branches leading off from them in all directions. If the person in the first example lives in the suburbs of a big city, such as Paris or London, he will long for the quietest, wildest spots, and when he thinks of them he will be in a certain frame of mind. When the person in the third example is at home, among his neighbours, who unlike himself, are not familiar with the life of the social *élite*, he will begin to show off when he is with them, stressing his familiarity with the *élite* by the clothes he wears, his bearing and expression; he may even try to imitate his employer, to some extent. This sort of thing is the sphere of life in which art, particularly verbal art, very often finds its source of inspiration.

A person's social 'outlook' is always more complete, more vivid and more forceful in its ideological aspect than his abstract ideas and theoretical views. His spontaneous propensities, predilections and dreams concerning social matters and his social dislikes, antipathies and animosities, as well as the resulting ideas and emotions, are often very deep and real, and sometimes even enslave him although he may not realize their social significance. Of course, there are always persons with the necessary talent who are creatively inspired and stimulated by such feelings, and raise their ideological 'outlook' to a higher level by embodying it in works of art. This has always been so, and we need only mention as examples Balzac, Tolstoy, Joyce and Kafka.

Thus, all creative artists, especially writers and poets, strive to express their emotional interpretation of life in graphic and expressive images in

their works because it is their ideological interpretation of life, imbued with emotion and 'pathos'. It is the latter which spurs them to create. The artist's abstract convictions, his ideological views, can also play a more or less important part in stimulating his creative activity.

It is clear therefore that the artist's source of inspiration is always of a social nature, although the artist himself is usually unaware of this. Consequently, the social substructure of artistic creation can explain the peculiarities of the content and form of certain works and also the history of the development of all types of art throughout the world.

The sociology of a literary work

If literature is the art which most lends itself to sociological study, great epic works and particularly novels and romantic narratives are the types of literature that are most suited to this. Like great frescoes depicting the objective world of the social relations between people of a particular country and period, as well as the subjective world of their experiences, these works show us their personages in all their social aspects and also the incidents, events and circumstances that constitute the framework in which they evolve.

These great frescoes usually fascinate the reader, but they may also mislead him. A naïve and inexperienced reader is only too ready to think that all the details of the life of the different personages—their actions, relations, experiences, remarks, appearance and circumstances—constitute the essence of the work. He thinks that all this is what the writer 'wanted to say, and he regards the personages as living beings responsible for their actions, and judges them, their actions and their attitudes from the standpoint of his own views, social likes and dislikes.

The naïve reader, however, is wrong for the author of an epic work does not consider that the details concerning the life of each personage are of fundamental importance in themselves. He imagines them, first in order to depict as graphically and as completely as possible, certain general and essential features of social life, a certain type of social character, and secondly in order to express through all these details concerning the life of each personage, his own ideological and emotional interpretation of this social character. This interpretation of the social character of the personages, which stems from the author's ideological 'outlook', is the real subject of the work. The individual characteristics of each personage, everything the reader sees or hears about them, everything that is directly portrayed, these are all so many details making up a concrete picture which serves as a means of expressing the ideological content of a work. This is the fundamental aspect of its artistic form, which is further developed and accentuated by the narrative devices employed and by the reasoning and composition of the work, and which can be seen throughout its verbal structure. The composition and verbal structure of a work, however, do not simply embody the original features of its concrete descriptions; they are also

significant in themselves. They, too, express in their own way the ideological content of the work, the ideological and emotional interpretation of the social character of each of the personages portrayed.

The artistic style of a work is essentially a union of the three aspects of form in their ideological and emotional expressiveness; this style is determined by the characteristics of the subject-matter, which, in its turn, depends on the characteristic features of the writer's ideological 'outlook' and his general views on life. The literary historian and critic must therefore make a functional study of all the imaginative details that make up the style of the work, especially the details of its concrete descriptions; he must study them in relation to the characteristics of the subject-matter, rather than from a naïve, realistic standpoint. As to the reader, he must try to apprehend directly and aesthetically and appreciate the expressive, emotional aspects of life as it is portrayed in an epic work.

Thus, for instance, Dostoevsky chose as the protagonist of *Crime and Punishment* a representative of the democratic youth of the 1860s—the student Raskolnikov, who, weighed down by the oppressive atmosphere of the *bourgeois*, bureaucratic city of Saint Petersburg, expressed his inner protest against it in the form of an abstract historico-juridical concept, which reflected the rationalistic and individualistic nature of his thinking. The author chose such a hero because he wanted the style of his novel to express his ideological and moral rejection of the rationalistic views of the democratic movement of his day and of all the trends towards economical and utilitarian thinking in the new, *bourgeois* society which was then taking shape in Russia.

In order that his rejection should be as vivid and telling as possible, Dostoevsky portrayed Raskolnikov as a member of a very poor family, a man who was on the verge of destitution, desperately intent on procuring the wherewithal to save his sister, even if it meant committing a crime in order to get it, and who for this reason, as well as in order to test his theory that exceptional persons were entitled to shed blood, committed the greatest of all crimes—murder. This is the culminating point of the conflict which constitutes the centre of the novel and around which the author, concentrating events within narrow spatial and temporal limits, develops a number of highly dramatic and effective episodes, full of the most profound psychology. The chief purpose of these episodes is to show the reader the moral torments of a man who thinks that the shedding of blood is theoretically justified, even after committing the crime—mainly for the sake of money—and to reveal how these moral torments lead him to reject his own theory and his crime and then find moral salvation.

The author uses the whole subject of the novel as a very powerful and hyperbolic means of expressing his moral criticism of the way in which the society of his time was evolving. The internal laws of the novel's structure and style can be seen from an analysis of its general literary conception, which is based on Dostoevsky's ideological 'outlook', permeated with his

philosophical and historical theory of *počvenničestvo*,¹ which he worked out as a basis for his ideal—a patriarchal type of democracy. This ideal itself was historically determined by the special way in which Russian social relations developed in the middle of the nineteenth century. The explanation of all this must be sought in a practical and historical sociology on which the study of individual works or of the complete works of different writers should be based.

A sociological analysis of great epic works is therefore an extremely complex and difficult task. An analysis of lyrical works, which are the artistic expression of a poet's emotions and impressions, is, in its way, complex and difficult also. One way of analysing them might be to group together various poems according to their subject, the problem they deal with, or their *genre*, within the various periods of the poet's creative activity.

The sociology of literature, however, cannot be a separate science. It can only be a method for use in a separate and special science, namely the history of national literatures and of world literature as a whole.

The sociology of the history of literature

Various principles have been elaborated as a basis for the sociological study of the history of literature, but nearly all have been characterized by philosophical and idealistic abstractness or by positivistic eclecticism. As a method of literary history, an historical and concrete monistic sociology is free from these shortcomings, but it has others of its own, which it is overcoming as it develops.

In the first stage of its development (1900-29), particularly among Russian literary historians, the interpretation of the social origin of literary works was based mainly on an abstract theory of a class spirit. In their enthusiasm for the idea of a class spirit, Russian literary historians and critics of that period explained peculiarities of the work of different writers by their particular class psychology, which was determined mainly by the economic processes in the life of the social environment to which they belonged by birth or by upbringing. Such critics elaborated a static formula in which a writers' work was isolated from the general trends of national development and from the atmosphere of political and ideological conflict of the writer's period.

This sociological theory was rejected in the 1930s, but it was replaced by theories that went to the other extreme. According to these new theories, the great thing in literature was not a class spirit, but a national spirit, the contribution made by the works of the leading writers to the emancipation and education of the workers; but, since many great writers had no democratic view or ideals, it was explained that their works were of value to the people because of the profundity of their realistic general conclusions,

1. From the Russian word *pocva* (soil); this theory advocated the return to popular principles rooted in the soil.

which were reached 'despite' the writers' intentions. Realism became the fundamental concept of historico-literary research; its scope was constantly increased and its content enlarged. Whereas the abstract theory of a class spirit had decomposed the literary process into static 'cells', the abstract theory of a national spirit represented it as a 'single current' of literature that was of a progressive character, a current in which the peculiarities of the work of different writers stemmed from their individuality.

In fact, the class origin and national importance of literature are two closely related aspects of its national and historical development. There are no classes outside national life, and there are no class interests or ideals outside the limits of the historical evolution of the national society.

This evolution takes place in stages. The transition from one stage to another is always conditioned by profound changes in the social life of the nation and, at every stage in the historical development of the national spirit, its intellectual life is directed by certain ideological forces which represent a particular social movement or current of ideas. The ideological content of such a current is by no means always intentionally and on principle democratic. In the early stages of the development of a class society, it is usually a current which, to some extent, reflects the social interests of a particular section of the politically dominant class, and which, as far as it can, produces its own literature. If the ideology of the literary works it produces is historically accurate and if they are of a sufficiently high aesthetic standard (in such works realism is not essential), they may, despite the limitations of their class origin, help to foster a progressive spirit in the nation as a whole. They may correspond to the interests of all the progressive forces in the national community and, in particular, contribute to the education and emancipation of the masses.

At this relatively early stage in the life of a class society, the democratic sections of the population have, as a rule, not yet reached a high ideological level, nor do the literary works they produce deal with the fundamental questions relating to the national life. It is not till a much later stage in the national development, when the privileged classes gradually lose their leadership in the intellectual life of the community as a whole, that democracy begins to develop, consolidates its position both outwardly and inwardly and more or less convincingly shows that it can play a decisive role as an ideological force in the national development. Its literature then begins to deal with the fundamental problems of the day and, providing there are writers with the necessary creative ability, may contribute to the progress of the nation as a whole.

The representatives of the most advanced ideological trends in a country's intellectual life at a particular stage of its development are not the only people who participate in the production of the nation's literature at that time; writers who come from the old ruling classes and their conservative groups or from intermediate sections of the community usually participate in it also, and their works sometimes play a very important or even decisive role. Their ideology having been shattered by the decline of the old social

classes, they often seek an outlet in the creation of highly significant but extremely abstract social, ethical and sometimes ethico-religious ideals, that usually reflect a yearning after the past. On the basis of these ideals, such writers, if they are highly gifted, can with great penetration and power reveal and criticize antagonisms and contradictions whose objective ideological implications concern the nation as a whole. Dostoevsky, Gogol and Tolstoy were such writers in Russia, Balzac in France, Walter Scott and Dickens in England.

The literary works produced at each stage in the national development are therefore characterized by their own particular ideology, which is peculiar to that historical period and which has its own laws, and by artistic forms, which correspond to this ideology. Great literary masterpieces are always the artistic and aesthetic embodiment of what is unique and original in the national intellectual life of their day. They become part of the national heritage and sometimes also of the world heritage, the heritage of the whole of mankind.

The literary 'heritage'

Literature, however, may be only a potential heritage. If it is to be a heritage, there must be an heir, and the heir must be worthy of what is left to him.

The heir to literary works created in previous stages in the development of a national community can only be the national community at a later stage in its development. How can it become a worthy heir, that is, an heir that does not passively keep the heritage, but actively puts it to use? It can do so on one condition only: its ideological leadership must be provided by a social and intellectual movement, whose members subscribe to a progressive national ideology, have a knowledge and understanding of history, as well as a highly developed and genuine feeling for it, and are aware of the fact that they are deeply rooted in the whole of their country's historical past and of their great responsibility, as citizens, for its present and its future.

When society which is led by such a social movement and is inspired by its civic ideals reaches a new stage in its national development, it can become a worthy heir to all the literary and other artistic wealth created in the past and recreated in the present—a true repository of its national culture. It will be able not only to preserve manuscripts, republish important works, produce more profound and more accurate commentaries on them, celebrate anniversaries and organize special discussions, but also to keep the literary works of the past in its heart and reinterpret them in the light of contemporary problems, make them part of its everyday consciousness, and through them realize that it is indissolubly bound up with the entire historical destiny of its people. Such a nation will be a great nation playing an important and worthy role in the intellectual development of the whole of mankind.

Sometimes, however, ideological movements which are not inspired by the national history and which repudiate the artistic heritage acquire considerable importance in the community. An example of this is to be found in the declarations of the theoreticians of the French 'new novel'. By maintaining that it is impossible today to write novels in the same way as Balzac did and that Balzac is therefore outmoded, they are confusing two quite different questions: the possibility of continuing Balzac's ideological and literary tradition at the present new stage in the development of society (which of course is impossible, as the clock cannot be put back) and the evaluation of the work of this writer as a great and unique phenomenon of his day. Balzac is all the greater as he can never have a successor.

Nations and national cultures, however, cannot be isolated from one another. They have contacts with one another and these contacts become ever closer throughout their history. In the course of the national development of the various peoples, there have always been and there still are tendencies which are opposed in one way or another to cultural contacts between the peoples and which hinder such contacts, thus fostering chauvinism, national arrogance and exclusiveness. On the other hand, there have always been, and there still are, tendencies which promote intellectual contacts between nations and thus favour the mutual assimilation and appreciation of national intellectual values, especially artistic values.

The progressive nature of a nation's culture and its importance in the world's history can be judged not only from the extent to which, under the guidance of its most advanced ideologists, it progresses and develops its own artistic heritage, especially its literary heritage, but also from the extent to which it assimilates and appreciates the masterpieces of art which are produced by other nations and which embody their history. Nations of this kind are the spearhead of the culture of the whole of mankind at a particular stage of its development.

Such are the basic principles of a concrete historical sociology as applied to literature, although they may also be applied to any other form of art. If they were put into practice, the combined efforts of the numerous historians and theoreticians of literature of various countries would gradually be able to produce an impressive picture of the concrete historical development of world literature, which would be one of the most important pages in the history of human culture.

Concrete historical sociology itself, however, is always an essential part of national culture and exercises an influence on other parts of the latter. Its creation and development represent the most fruitful stage in the intellectual development of the advanced nations in the field of the social sciences. The extent to which it has been developed in a particular national community is a very reliable indication of the progressiveness of this community at the present stage in the development of mankind.

The success of concrete historical sociology can greatly facilitate the

consolidation of the new principles of the humanitarian culture that mankind so urgently needs, especially today when thought is becoming increasingly mechanized under the influence of the rapid growth of technology and of the exact sciences related to it.

[*Translated from the Russian.*]

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Studies

Rhetoric and ideology in Sue's *Les Mystères de Paris*

Umberto Eco

Terms like 'the sociological study of literature' or 'the sociology of literature' often serve, and have served in the past, to indicate sometimes quite opposite lines of research. One can take a literary work simply as documentary evidence of an historical period; one can consider the social element as the explanatory cause of the aesthetic solution adopted for a literary work; finally, one may invent a dialectic between two points of view (the work as an aesthetic phenomenon and society as its explanatory context) in which, on the one hand, the social element explains each aesthetic choice that has been made, and, on the other, a study of the work and of its structural features leads to a clearer understanding of the state of a society.¹

Of what use, in this third method we envisage, is the kind of semiological research which examines those prime structures of communication, the elements of the plot? If the description of the work as a system of signs helped us to shed an absolutely neutral and objective light on its semantic structures (leaving aside the complex of meanings that history continually attributes to the work-with-a-message) then even the social context would be excluded—if only temporarily—from this semiological study. And with it would go that ideological nucleus which the whole work, considered in its entirety as a symbol, implies. But this singleness of approach to the research only appears feasible. In point of fact, we cannot select and isolate (or, in other words, emphasize or make prominent) any meaning without attributing to it—at least implicitly—further significance. If in a given work one singles out certain semantic structures, this is an indication that one has recognized them as being the most relevant to the purpose of the particular dissertation one intends to make on the work. 'The particular dissertation' suggests at once that one contemplates making an interpretation of the work; we approach a work on the descriptive level, according

1. Cf. the research done by Lucien Goldmann in *Pour une Sociologie du Roman*, Paris, Gallimard, 1964; and a few later studies, such as his essay on *Genêt* (included in the Italian edition of the above work).

to a hypothesis of totality (that is of the whole body of ideas to which the work refers) which the subsequent description of its structures should corroborate. In so far as the description claims to be objective (by revealing structures that exist within the work), the structures which are brought to light are those that seem relevant only if we consider the work from a certain point of view. In this way, any examination of the sign structures of the work becomes *ipso facto* the corroboration of both historical and sociological hypotheses—and this happens even when the person analysing the work neither knows it is happening nor wants it to. It is better then to be aware of it, in order to correct as far as possible the distortion produced by the angle of perspective, and to take the greatest possible advantage of such distortion as cannot be corrected.

So the structural analysis of the work describes a circular motion¹ apparently typical of all research into acts of communication. The method is scientific in so far as it admits this conditioning of the research undertaken, instead of ignoring it, and in so far as it gives it a critical basis and uses it as an opportunity for a better understanding of the work.

Once these basic principles of the method to be employed have been admitted, the semiological description of the structures of the work shows itself to be one of the most rewarding ways in which to bring out the connexions between a work and its socio-historical context. In other words, it appears highly desirable that any sociological study of literature worthy of the name should resort to semiology for its corroboration. The circular character of our method consists in moving then from the external social context to the internal structural context of the work under analysis; in building up the description of both contexts (or of other facts which play a part in the interpretation) by using uniform instruments of definition in each case; and in revealing, next, structural correspondences between the structural context of the work, its socio-historical context and any other contexts which may come under examination. Thus one perceives that the way in which the work 'reflects' the social context, if we may be allowed once again to use the classic theme of reflection, may be characterized in structural terms, by building up complementary systems (or series) which since it was possible to describe them by homogeneous means, appear structurally homologous. As the circular method takes its course, the social context will appear no more of a determining factor than do the aesthetic structures with regard to the culture (or the social relations) they give rise to; and even if in one's dissertation on a work one has sometimes to avail oneself of hypotheses and terminology of cause and effect, the aim of the investigation will still be to reveal correspondences and not causal relations. This does not mean that causal relations should not be introduced in an historical examination of wider scope; but at this stage of the research,

1. Cf. two critical theories which stress the circular movement of this method: Leo Spitzer, *Essays in Stylistics*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1948, pp. 1-39; and Erwin Panofsky, 'The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline', in *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, New York, Doubleday, 1955.

it would be inappropriate and rash to demonstrate them. Our examination is only to bring out parallelisms. It will be the work of other types of dissertation to explain wherein lies the significance of these parallelisms. The first goal in a work of research like the present is to reveal correspondences between two systems, one of rhetoric and one of ideology.¹

The above details of a method of analysis may be illustrated by the results of a study of the narrative structures of *Les Mystères de Paris* by Eugène Sue. In the pages that follow we shall describe the results of a reading of this work embarked on initially in an attempt to separate the 'series' or 'systems' which play a part in the work, and which are: (a) the author's ideology; (b) the market conditions which determined or favoured the conception, the writing and the circulation of the book; (c) the narrative structures (whether plot structures or rhetorical 'figures' or 'locutions', use of language, or stylistic devices such as can be observed in the construction of phrase or sentence). It would be incorrect, however, to say that the interpretation of the work in semiological terms, whose purpose is to shed light on the structures of the plot or other figures of style (the 'stylisms'), could have been carried out entirely without reference to what the reader knew of the author's ideological opinions. However much the study might aim at a kind of semiological *epoché*, it would be impossible for the reader to forget what he knew. So the research has been carried out in an attempt to prove all the hypotheses that sprang to mind with regard to the meaning during our reading, with recourse to the semantic structures; and vice versa. There were many ways of furthering this *epoché* to the utmost; for example, the knowledge that there exist recurrent structures in the narrative,² and in popular narrative in general, makes it possible to isolate such structures in the work under examination, leaving aside the personality of the author and the characteristics of the historical period in which the work was written. But in reality by resorting to 'recurrent' or 'constant' structures (these also taken as hypotheses and not as semiological dogma) it was possible from time to time to observe how the constant structures in the work in question underwent modification and were distorted; this being true, for the sake of the semiological description, it was indispensable to ask: Why are these structures distorted in this way and precisely in this work? The answer to this question could be found by turning to the socio-historical context, which then led to another question: What phenomena foreign to the work present homologous structural characteristics of a kind which allows us to infer, by a study of the correspondences and parallelisms, a connexion of some kind (not necessarily a one-way deterministic connexion, but rather a dialectical one) between the different orders of phenomena?

1. We have in mind the meaning that Roland Barthes attributes to these two terms in 'Rhétorique de l'Image', *Communications*, No. 4.
2. Here we have in mind W. J. Propp's study, *Morfologia Skazki*, Leningrad, 1928, and the suggestions for research culled from this work by the following: Lévi-Strauss, *passim*; Claude Brémont, 'Le Message Narratif', *Communications*, No. 4; A. Greimas, *Sémantique Structurale*, Paris, Larousse, 1966.

The analysis which follows supplies the answer to these questions and is the result of applying these methods of study. It aims to shed light on the relations between a work (its plot structures and 'stylisms'), the ideology of its author and the state of the market on which it was placed and for which it was produced. Naturally our research is described in the terms indicated above because we consider that a semiological analysis should not start out from several different works in order to arrive at the recognition of universal constants in the field of communication, but rather begin with the hypothesis of one or two possible constants of behaviour in that field, in order to define the socio-historical differentiations of such constants, under pressure from concomitant phenomena, which interact with the author's work of structure building. (This too is a phenomenon limited to an historical period and not a permanent one.) This is the same as saying that the motives for a structural analysis which make it appear important and productive in our eyes are not metaphysical motives (such as the search for the identity of the human spirit through its various modes of expression) but historical and sociological ones; it is an investigation of the ways in which the possible forms in which identity can be expressed are modified historically and socially, thereby giving rise to different modes of expression. An investigation, therefore, into the reciprocal implications of a rhetoric and an ideology (both seen as 'cultural' phenomena and so limited by historical and social considerations).

Eugène Sue : an ideological standpoint

In order to understand Sue's ideological attitude at the time when he wrote *Les Mystères* it is necessary to make a brief résumé of his intellectual evolution—a subject which has already been treated fully and very ably elsewhere.¹ Sue himself gives a short summary of the story of this evolution in a work composed towards the end of his life: 'I began to write sea stories because I had seen the sea; these early novels have a political and philosophical side to them (*La Salamandre*, *Atar-Gull*, *La Vigie de Koat-Ven* and others) which is radically opposed to the convictions I held from 1844 onwards (*Les Mystères de Paris*); it would perhaps be interesting to trace by what successive transformations in my intellect, studies, ideas, tastes and the liaisons I formed—after having believed firmly in the religious and absolutist doctrine embodied in the works of Bonald, de Maistre and Lamennais (*De l'Indifférence en Matière de Religion*), my masters at the time—I came, guided only by justice, truth and virtue, to a direct recognition of the supremacy of democratic and social republicanism.'²

1. For these and other biographical data, the reader is referred to Jean-Louis Bory's excellent work, *Eugène Sue—Le Roi du Roman Populaire*, Paris, Hachette, 1962. Cf. also, by the same author, the 'Présentation' to the Pauvert edition of *Les Mystères*, Paris, 1963, and the 'Introduction', chronology and notes to the anthology *Les Plus Belles Pages—Eugène Sue*, Paris, Mercure de France, 1963.

2. Quoted by A. Parménie and C. Bonnier de la Chapelle, *Histoire d'un Éditeur et de ses Auteurs*.

By way of political legitimism, and of dandyism both in public and private life, Sue arrived at a profession of faith in socialism. Of what kind was his socialism? A brief glimpse at his biography tells us that at first he was moved by occasional fits of enthusiasm, the result of meeting a cultured and politically mature member of the working class, whose class consciousness, rectitude, simple behaviour, and revolutionary ardour drove Sue to a confession of faith that was purely emotional. There is reason to believe that at first socialism represented for Sue merely a new and exciting way of displaying his eccentric dandyism. At the beginning of *Les Mystères* a taste for the diabolical, for morbid situations, for the horrific and the grotesque is predominant in his narrative. He loves to describe the sordid *tapis-francs* of the Ile de la Cité and to reproduce the thieves' slang used in the Paris underworld, yet continually begs his readers' forgiveness for the horrors and miseries of which he speaks; an indication that he still imagined himself addressing an aristocratic and *bourgeois* public, eager for emotions but having nothing to do with the protagonists of his novel. But, as the novel advances and one instalment follows another, in the 'Journal des Débats', Sue gradually succumbs to public approbation. The classes of whom he writes become the classes for whom he writes; the author is suddenly promoted to the rank of poet of the proletariat, the same proletariat he describes in his book. As public approval mounts ever higher, Sue is gradually won over by the very sentiments he has himself invoked. As Bory has remarked: 'The popular novel (popular in its aim) as it becomes popular (in terms of its success) soon becomes popular in its ideas and its form'.¹

In the third part of the work Sue is already proposing models of social reform (the farm at Bouquival); in the fifth, the action is slowed down and gives place to long moralizing lectures and 'revolutionary' propositions (though, as will be seen, these are really only reformist). And as the work draws to a close, the tirades become more and more frequent, almost intolerably so.

As the action and the 'sage-like' perorations develop, Sue's new ideological position becomes clear: *Les Mystères* is revealed to the reader as the iniquitous social conditions which out of poverty produce crime—a mystery with the veil torn away. If this misery can be alleviated, if the prisoner can be re-educated, the virtuous girl rescued from the wealthy seducer, the honest workman from the debtors' prison, if all can be given a chance of redemption and helped in a spirit of Christian brotherhood towards reform, then the world will become a better place. Evil is only a social ill. The book, which might at first have been entitled *The Gangsters' Epic*, ends up as the *Epic of the Unfortunate Workman and A Manual of Redemption*. It is clear that this outlook does not appear 'revolutionary' in the sense in which we

P. J. Hetzel, Paris, Albin Michel, 1963. Cf. J.-L. Bory, *Eugène Sue—Le Roi du Roman Populaire*, op. cit., p. 370 etc.

1. Cf. J.-L. Bory, *Eugène Sue—Le Roi du Roman Populaire*, op. cit., p. 248.

understand that word since the advent of Marxism; but even so these views aroused scandalized reactions in the conservative press in Paris, though other more malicious critics perceived the *bourgeois* limits of Sue's supposed socialism.

In one of his *Marginalia*, written after *Les Mystères* had been translated into English, Edgar Allan Poe notes that: 'The philosophical motives ascribed to Sue are in the highest degree absurd. His first and really his only care was to write an exciting and therefore saleable story. His tirades (implicit and explicit) to improve society, etc., are a mere stratagem, very common in authors who hope to impart a note of dignity or utilitarianism to their pages by gilding the pill of their licentiousness.'¹ Poe's criticism cannot be called 'leftist'; the American poet confines himself to pointing out a falseness in the tone of the book and to attributing to its author intentions which remain unconfessed (or are obscured by the ideological superstructure). A far more penetrating, and ideologically more apposite criticism was made of Sue in the same year by Belinskij. After a rapid survey of lower-class conditions in Western industrial civilization, Belinskij opens fire: Eugène Sue was a man of fortune whose first and foremost intention was the very lucrative one of speculating, quite literally, at the expense of the people. A respectable *bourgeois* in the full sense of the term, and a *petit-bourgeois* constitutional philistine; if he could have become a deputy, he would have been one such as we find today all over the place. When in his novel he describes the French people, he considers them as a real *bourgeois* does, over-simplifying everything; in his eyes they are the starving masses, doomed to crime through ignorance and poverty. He ignores the true virtues and vices of the people; nor does he suspect that the people may have a future which the party at present triumphantly in power will never see, because the people have faith, enthusiasm and moral strength. Eugène Sue has compassion for the sufferings of the people; why refuse him the noble faculty of compassion—particularly when it brings in such sure profits. But what sort of compassion is it? That is another question entirely. Sue hopes that the people will one day be freed from poverty, that they will cease to be starving masses driven to crime against their will, to become instead a fully satisfied community that is presentable and behaves as it should, while the *bourgeoisie* and the present law-givers are still the masters of France, a race of highly cultivated speculators. Sue demonstrates in his novel how French laws offer an involuntary protection to crime and debauchery, and it must be said his argument is exact and plausible. But what he does not realize is that the evil is not inherent only in certain laws, but in the entire system of French legislation, in the organization of society as a whole.²

The charge made against him is clear: Sue's attitude is typical of the reformer who aims at changing something in order that in the end everything

1. *Editor's note*: Free translation from the Italian.

2. V. Belinskij, *Textes Philosophiques Choisis*, Moscow, 1951; the review of Sue, p. 394 et seq.

will stay the same. Politically speaking he is a social democrat; from a literary point of view, he is a sensation-monger who speculates on human misery.

If at this point we turn back and re-read the pages of Marx's and Engels' *Die Heilige Familie*,¹ we shall find the same polemical elements. The work aims at the systematic satirization of the young Hegelians of the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*; and in particular of Szeliga, who presented *Les Mystères* as the epic of the straits which divide the ephemeral from the immortal and which are continually being narrowed. It is Szeliga, not Sue, who is the central target. But in order to succeed and to be convincing, Marx's and Engels' dissertation must discredit Sue's work by showing it up as a kind of ideological hoax that could look like a message of salvation only to Bruno Bauer and his associates. The reformist and *petit-bourgeois* character of the work is vividly illustrated in the words spoken by the unfortunate Morel at the height of his financial misfortunes: 'Oh, if only the rich knew of it!' The moral of the book is that the rich can know of it and can intervene to heal by their munificence the wounds of society. Marx and Engels go farther: not content with stressing Sue's reformist roots (they are not satisfied, for example, with judging the value of the idea of a paupers' bank, as suggested by Prince Rodolfo, on purely economic grounds), they point to the reactionary spirit inherent in the whole ethic of the work. Rodolfo's executioner's revenge is an act of hypocrisy; hypocritical, too, is the description of the social regeneration of The Ripper; Sue's new penal theory is entirely vitiated by religious hypocrisy, as the punishment of the Schoolmaster shows; finally, the redemption of Fleur-de-Marie is not only hypocritical, but a typical example of religious alienation in Feuerbach's sense of the term. Thus Sue is branded not as a naive social democrat, but as a reactionary, a legitimist and a follower of de Maistre, at least in youth, when he wrote in praise of slave-trading colonialism.

If we wanted to trace the personality of Sue along the curve formed by his life, we should have to modify the negative judgement passed on him by Marx and Engels. Already in 1845, when *Le Juif Errant* was published, the languid easy-going humanitarianism of the former dandy had given place to a clearer, sterner vision of the struggle between the working-class world and officialdom. And if, in the above-mentioned book, this dissension still wears the imaginative disguise of a symbolic struggle between the characters of the novel (the wicked, intriguing Jesuit and the virtuous and heroic priest), if it is expressed in terms of a Fourierist Utopia, in his next long, unshapely but revealing work, *Les Mystères du Peuple*, Sue shows that he has seen to the bottom of the class conflict. The period of composition of this book extends from the time when he first threw himself body and soul into the political struggle, as a candidate for the socialist republican party, when he opposed Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état*, until he went to wear out

1. H. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Die Heilige Familie oder Kritik der Kritischen Kritik. Gegen Bruno Bauer und Consorten*, Frankfurt, 1945. (English translation: *The Holy Family*.)

the last years of his life in exile at Annecy, by then the universally recognized laureate of the proletarian revolution.¹

Marx's and Engels' verdict is limited to *Les Mystères*, however; our study of the text should likewise leave aside other earlier and later writings and concentrate on expounding the plot structures and stylistic devices which correspond to selected ideological structures.

The 'consolatory' structure

The author of a popular novel never expresses his own problems of composition to himself in purely structural terms (How to write a narrative work?) but in terms of social psychology (What sort of problems must I solve in order to write a narrative which I intend shall appeal to a large public, and arouse both the concern of the masses and the curiosity of the well-to-do?).

We suggest a possible solution: let us suppose an existing everyday situation in which are to be found elements of unresolved tension (Paris and its poverty); then let us suppose a factor capable of resolving this tension, a factor in contrast with the initial reality and opposing it by offering an immediate and consolatory solution to the initial contradictions. If the initial reality is authentic and the conditions necessary for the resolution of its contradictions do not already exist within it, then the resolute factor must be fictitious. In so far as it is fictitious, it can be readily created in the mind, and presented from the beginning as already in being: so it can go into action straightway, without having to pass through the restrictive intermediary of concrete events. Such an element is Rodolfo de Gerolstein. He is endowed with all the traits required by fable: he is a prince (and a sovereign one, even if Marx and Engels ridicule this little German Serene Highness, treated like a king by Sue; but it is well known that no one is a prophet in his own country); he rules according to the dictates of prudence and virtue.² He is very rich. He is stricken with incurable remorse and a fatal nostalgia (his unhappy love for the adventuress Sarah MacGregor; the supposed death of the daughter born of this union; the fact that he raised his arm against his father). Though good natured, this character has connotations of the romantic hero popularized by Sue himself in earlier books: an adept of vengeance, he does not shrink from violent solutions; he delights, if only in the cause of justice, in the most horrible cruelty (he puts out the Schoolmaster's eyes and causes Jacques Ferrand to die of unassuaged lust). Being put forward as the immediate solution to the evils of society, he cannot simply obey its laws, which in any case are defective enough; so he invents his own. Rodolfo, judge and executioner, benefactor and reformer without the law, is a superman. A direct descen-

1. See also Umberto Eco's 'E. Sue, il Socialismo e la Consolazione', in the preface to *I Misteri di Parigi*, Milan, Sugar, 1965.

2. 'These good people enjoyed such profound happiness and were so entirely satisfied with their lot, that the Grand Duke, in his enlightened solicitude, had no trouble preserving them from the craze for constitutional innovations.' (IInd part, Chapter XII.)

dant of the satanic hero of the romantic period, he is perhaps the first superman in the history of the serial story, the prototype for Monte Cristo, a contemporary of Vautrin (who though created earlier only came to full development at that time), and in any case the forerunner of the Nietzschean model.

Antonio Gramsci had already noted with insight and irony that the superman, having been moulded from the clay of the serial novel, proceeded thence to philosophy.¹ Some other prototypes can also be discerned in the composition of this particular superman, as Bory observes: Rodolfo is a kind of God the Father (those who benefit from his goodness never tire of repeating this), who takes human form and enters the world disguised as a workman. God becomes The Worker. Marx and Engels had not considered quite thoroughly enough the problem of a superman in action, and thus they complain that Rodolfo, whom they take to be a model of humanity, is not at all guided by disinterested and charitable motives, but by a predilection for vengeance and prevarication. This is true: Rodolfo is a cruel and vindictive God, a Christ with the spirit of Jehovah.

In order to solve by imaginative means the real dramas of the poverty-stricken Parisian underworld, Rodolfo had to: (a) convert 'The Ripper'; (b) punish The Owl and the Schoolmaster; (c) redeem Fleur-de-Marie; (d) console Madame d'Harville by giving her life a new purpose; (e) save the Morels from despair; (f) overthrow the sinister power of Jacques Ferrand and restore what he has taken from the weak and helpless; (g) find his lost daughter who had fled from the wiles of Sarah MacGregor. Then come various tasks of less moment, though connected with the main ones, such as punishing of evil-doers of secondary importance, like Polidori, the Martials and the young Saint-Rémy; redeeming those who have started on the downward path, like The Wolf and the good Martial; and rescuing a few good people, like the young Germain, the young Ferment, and so on.

The element of reality (Paris and its poor) and the element of fantasy (Rodolfo's solutions) must strike the reader at each step, gripping his attention and torturing his sensibilities. The plot must be so arranged, therefore, as to present climaxes of disclosure, that is, surprises. Since the

1. 'In any case, it seems possible to assert that the prototype and pattern for many Nietzschean "supermen" is not Zarathustra, but the Count of Monte Cristo, by Alexandre Dumas', notes Gramsci. He does not take into account here that Rodolfo as a prototype precedes Monte Cristo (like the Three Musketeers, in which the second superman in Gramsci's theory, Athos, appears, while the third, Joseph Balsamo, dates from '49), though he is certainly thinking of Sue's work, and makes several analyses of it: 'Perhaps the popular superman of the Dumas type is properly to be understood as a democratic reaction to the concept of racialism which is of feudal origin, and to be linked with the glorification of "Gallicism" to be found in the novels of Eugène Sue (while in Nietzsche one should also see those influences which later culminate in Gobineau and the Pangermanism of Treitschke).' Cf. *Letteratura e Vita Nazionale*. III: *Letteratura popolare*. 'The serial story replaces and, at the same time, encourages the day dreams of the man in the street; it is really a dream dreamt with one's eyes open. . . . In this case it can be said that, among the people, fancy is the result of a (social) inferiority complex that gives birth to lengthy fantasies built around the idea of revenge, or the punishment of those guilty of inflicting the evils suffered, etc.' (Gramsci, op. cit. p. 108).

reader may identify himself either with the characters and situations of the initial circumstances, that is before the *dénouement*, or with those present at the end of the book, after the *dénouement*, the features which characterize them must be reiterated so as to make this identification possible. Long stretches of redundant material must therefore be inserted in the plot; in other words, the author must dwell at length on the unexpected in order to render it familiar.

He must of necessity rely on *coups de théâtre* to further his task of disclosing information; and the need for repetition leads perforce to the reiteration of these *coups de théâtre* at regular intervals. It is in this way that *Les Mystères* is related not to those narrative works which we may define as showing a *constant curve* (where the various elements of the plot are woven more and more closely together until a climax of tension is reached—at which point the *dénouement* intervenes to break and resolve this tension) but to those we may describe as of sinusoidal structure: tension, resolution, renewed tension, further resolution, and so on.

In point of fact, *Les Mystères* abounds in minor dramas, set in motion, partially resolved, and then abandoned so that we may return to the windings of the main narrative. It is as though the story were a large tree, whose trunk is Rodolfo's search for his lost daughter, and the different branches the story of The Ripper, the story of Saint-Rémy, the relationship of Clémence d'Harville to her husband, to her old father and to her step-mother, the episode of Germain and Rigoletto, and the vicissitudes of the Morels. It is now time to ask whether this sinusoidal structure corresponds to an explicit narrative programme or depends on external circumstances. If we read what was said by the young Sue on the subject of composition, it would appear that the structure is intentional: early on, when writing of his sea adventure-stories (from *Kernok* to *Atar-Gull* and *La Salamandre*), he propounds a theory of the episodic novel: 'Instead of keeping strictly to a unity of interest shared out among a chosen number of characters who, starting out at the beginning of the book, must all willy-nilly reach the end to contribute their mite to the *dénouement* . . .', it would be better not to fix the characters too firmly in the story, since 'as they are not an essential accompaniment of the abstract moral idea upon which the work turns, they may be abandoned half-way, as the opportunity offers itself or the logical sequence of events demands'.¹ Hence the author is free to switch the reader's attention and to transfer the main thread of the story from one character to another. Bory calls this type of novel (which shows a multiplicity, rather than a unity, of time, place and action) centrifugal, and sees it as a typical example of the serial novel, which by reason of its piecemeal publication, is forced to keep the reader's interest alive from week to week or from day to day. But it is not only a question of a natural adaptation of the novel structure to the conditions peculiar to a particular *genre* (within which differentiations might also be made according

1. E. Sue, preface to *Atar-Gull*. Cf. J. L. Bory, *Eugène-Sue—Le Roi du Roman Populaire*, op. cit., p. 102.

to the particular type of serial publication adopted). The determining influence of the market goes deeper than this. As Bory also observed, 'success prolongs the novels'. New episodes are invented one after another, because the public claims that it cannot bear to say good-bye to its characters. A dialectic is established between market demands and the plot's structure is so important that at a certain point even fundamental laws of plot construction, which might have been thought inviolate for any commercial novel, are transgressed,

Whether the plot describes a constant curve or shows a sinusoidal structure, the essential features of a story as enumerated by Aristotle in the *Poetics* remain unchanged: beginning, tension, climax, dénouement, catharsis. The most one can say of the sinusoidal structure is that it is the product of an amalgamation of several plots, a problem which had already been discussed by the theorists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the first masters of French structural criticism.¹ So strong is the psychological need felt by the reader for this tension-resolution dialectic that the worst kind of serial story ends by producing false tensions and false dénouements. In *Le Forgeron de la Cour-Dieu* by Ponson du Terrail, for instance, there are some ten cases of fictitious recognitions, in the sense that the reader's expectations are built up only to reveal to him facts he already knew but which were unknown to one particular character. By contrast, in *Les Mystères* something else happens—something quite staggering: Rodolfo, lamenting his lost daughter, meets the prostitute Fleur-de-Marie and saves her from the clutches of The Owl. He leads her back into the right way and offers her a refuge at the model farm of Bouquenal. At this point in the reader's subconscious an idea takes shape: what if Fleur-de-Marie were Rodolfo's daughter?²—an excellent theme on which to ring the changes for page after page, and a subject which Sue himself must have considered the mainspring of his whole book. But abruptly, in Chapter XV of the second part, scarcely a fifth of the way through the whole book, Sue comes to a decision and announces: now let us leave this theme aside, to be resumed later, seeing that the reader will have guessed that Fleur-de-Marie is Rodolfo's daughter. It is so clear that a good story has been thrown away, and that a kind of totally inexplicable narrative suicide has been committed, that the present-day reader is left utterly bewildered. Things must have been different. however, when the book was being published in instalments. Sue must have been suddenly obliged to prolong his narrative; the machine had been geared for a much shorter journey and the tension could not have been maintained to the end; the public was clamouring to be told. So he threw them this revelation as a sop and went on to explore other paths. The public is satisfied, but the plot as an organism has broken down. The kind of commercial distribution which can in some cases provide the serial story with good rules will at other times prevaricate, and the author in his capacity as artist must submit to this. *Les Mystères de Paris*

1. Cf. E. Faral, *Les Arts Poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e Siècle*, Paris, 1958. It is not by chance that the writings of these theorists are being dug up again by the structuralists.

is no longer a novel but a series of montages designed for the continual and renewable gratification of its readers. From here on Sue is no longer concerned with obeying the laws of good narration and, as the story advances, introduces into it certain convenient artifices, of which the great nineteenth century narrative was mercifully ignorant. They are to be found curiously enough in certain comic strip publications, such as the story of Superman.¹

For example, the writer starts explaining what he can no longer express by means of the plot alone, in footnotes. Part IX, chapter IX: the note tells us that Madame d'Harville asks this particular question because, having only arrived the night before, she could not know that Rodolfo had recognized Fleur-de-Marie as his daughter. Epilogue, chapter I: the note explains that Fleur-de-Marie is here called Amelia, because her father had changed her name a few days earlier. Part IX, Chapter II: the note points out that: 'The reader will not have forgotten that the instant before he struck Sarah, The Owl believed and had told her that . . .' Part II, Chapter XVII: a note reminds us that the youthful passion of Rodolfo and Sarah is unknown in Paris. And so on. The author records what has already been said, for fear his audience may have forgotten it by then, and establishes late in the day facts he has not been able to tell us because it is impossible to say everything; his book is a macrocosm in which there are too many characters and Sue can no longer manage to keep track of them all. It may be observed that all these notes occur after the revelation of the identity of Fleur-de-Marie; it is here that the plot breaks down.

Thus it happens that Sue behaves sometimes like a mere observer who has no power over a world that escapes him, whereas at other times he lays claim to the divine right of the novelist to be omniscient and to make luscious advance disclosures to the reader. Poe had already noted that he was entirely unable to obey the maxim of *ars celare artem*, and that he never missed an opportunity of saying to the reader: 'Now, in a moment you will see what you will see. I am going to give you a most extraordinary surprise. Prepare yourselves, for it will work strongly on your imagination and exite your pity.' A criticism that is unkind, but pertinent. Sue behaves like this because one of the principal aims of the 'novel of reassurance' is to produce a dramatic effect. This effect can be obtained in two ways, and one—the easier of the two—is this: 'look out for what is going to happen next'. The other involves recourse to Kitsch.²

Les Mystères de Paris is clearly dripping with Kitsch. The author asks himself: What will be certain of producing an effect because it has already been tested? The answer is: The literary 'locution' which has already proved itself in another context. A 'locution' duly 'quoted' is not only successful, but confers dignity on its context. It habituates the aesthetic thrill, made inseparable from it now by repetition. For the use of this device, too, there

1. Cf. my 'The Myth of the Superman', *Apocalittici e Integrati*, Milan, Bompiani, 1964.

2. On the structural definition of Kitsch, see Umberto Eco, 'The Structure of Bad Taste', *Apolittici e integrati*, op. cit.

are two possible solutions. First, one can directly evoke a sensation that others have tried and described. In Chapter XIV of Part VII, we read: 'To complete the effect of this picture, the reader should recall the mysterious, almost fantastic appearance of a room where the flame in the grate strives to conquer the great black shadows that flicker on ceiling and walls . . .' The writer dispenses with direct evocation by dint of simple representation and enlists the reader's help by referring him to the *déjà vu*. Secondly one can introduce already acknowledged commonplaces. The whole character of Cécily, the beauty and the perfidy of the mulatto girl, are part of an exotic-erotic paraphernalia of romantic origin. Briefly her portrait is a typological oleograph: 'Everyone has heard of those coloured girls, fatal to Europeans, of those enchanting vampires, who by their fearful powers of seduction intoxicate their victim and drain his gold or his blood to the last drop, leaving him, as that telling native phrase has it, nought but his tears to drink or his heart to fret away.' Here it is perhaps worse, for it is not a literary locution that is taken at secondhand, but quite simply a popular commonplace; and in this Sue shows great ingenuity, inventing so to speak a Kitsch for the poor. In other words he does not make his oleograph by setting on the canvas the constituent elements of this art, but merely by making a mosaic of various oleographs—what in fact would today be called a work of 'pop' art, and would then be intentionally ironic.

Even a feature which some critics, Bory among them, consider as the basic and powerful interplay of archetypes, is reduced to this kind of stylistic pastiche: the wicked characters are related back to animal prototypes after the manner of Lavater, and often even bear their names (The Owl, the cross between Harpagon and Tartuffe to be seen in Jacques Ferrand, the couple formed by the Schoolmaster once he is blinded, and the abominable monster Tortillard, a vile reversal of the Oedipus-Antigone motif; and finally, Fleur-de-Marie, the 'sullied virgin' a genuine 'type' of romantic derivation. Sue certainly makes use of archetypes and in so doing reveals his culture and inventive genius. But he does not thereby make of his novel a journey through myth towards knowledge, as we might say Mann did; it is really in order to have 'models' which he knows will produce a desired effect. Kitsch is thus an imaginative device which provides solutions to a real situation according to a pre-determined plan.

A last device that allows the reiteration of an effect, and guarantees its effectiveness, is the undue drawing out of certain scenes. The death of Jacques Ferrand, victim of satyriasis, is described with the precision of a clinical manual and the exactitude of a tape-recording. Instead of giving an imaginative synthesis of the event, he records it 'live'; he makes it last as long as it would in reality, he has his character saying lines over and over again as often as a dying man would repeat them in real life. But this repetition does not resolve itself into any pattern. Sue quite simply records everything, and does not stop until every reader, even the dullest, is up to his neck in the drama, and feels suffocated along with the fictional character.

Within narrative structures of this type the ideological choices which, as we have already shown, Sue makes in *Les Mystères* cannot but make themselves felt. If the method of solving the problem of narration by frequent disclosures is suddenly to be lost in a morass of moving and conciliatory redundancy, solutions for the description of events must likewise be found which will channel them in obedience to the reader's wishes, without divorcing them from their origins. We do not, however, need to ask ourselves whether in Sue the ideological argument precedes the invention of the story, or whether the kind of story he invented as he yielded to public demand imposed on him a certain ideological attitude. In reality the different factors in question are often interactive and the only *raison d'être* of an investigation is given us by the book itself as it is. It would similarly be quite incorrect to say that the choice of the *roman-feuilleton* as one's medium necessarily entails the adoption of a conservative and blandly reformist ideology; or that a conservative and reformist ideology must of necessity produce a *roman-feuilleton*. All that we can say is that the various ingredients of the mixture are blended in such and such a way.

If we consider the education of Fleur-de-Marie, we find ourselves face to face with a problem that presents itself in the same way on the ideological as on the narrative level: (a) we have a prostitute (a 'type' that *bourgeois* society has firmly established according to certain canonical rules); (b) this prostitute has been reduced to this level by the force of circumstances (she is innocent), but she has nevertheless prostituted herself (and bears the mark of this); (c) Rodolfo convinces her that she can rise above her condition, and the prostitute is redeemed; (d) Rodolfo discovers that she is his daughter, a princess of royal blood.

The reader is stunned by a series of *coups de théâtre* which correspond to so many moments of disclosure. As narrative, this is successful, but from the viewpoint of the public's moral code, it oversteps the limits. One could not stand another such shock. It would be too much that Fleur-de-Marie should also reign happy and contented. Every possible identification with the novel situation as a whole would break down. So Fleur-de-Marie dies, worn out by remorse. It is what every respectable reader should expect in accordance with divine justice and his own sense of what is right. What new ideas we have acquired fade away as a few choice principles of custom and polite behaviour are quietly reiterated and wisely corroborated. After having surprised the reader by telling him what he did not yet know, the author reassures him by repeating what he knows already. The machinery of the novel demands that Fleur-de-Marie should end as she in fact does. It is Sue's own ideological training, then, which, in order to articulate these episodes, causes him to resort to a religious solution.

Here Marx's and Engels' analysis appears to us in all its perfection. Fleur-de-Marie has discovered that regeneration is possible, and thanks to the resources of youth begins to enjoy real, human happiness. When Rodolfo tells her that she is going to live on the farm at Bouquenal she goes almost mad with joy. But gradually under the influence of the pious

insinuations of Madame Georges and the curate, the girl's 'natural' happiness is turned into a 'supernatural' anxiety; the idea that her sin cannot be wiped out; that God's mercy must be extended to her 'in spite of' the enormity, the heinousness of her crime; and the certainty that full remission will be denied her on this earth, draw the unhappy 'Goualeuse' slowly down into the depths of despair. 'From this moment Marie is enslaved by the consciousness of her sin. And whereas in a far less happy situation she knew how to make herself lovable and human, and though outwardly disgraced was conscious of her real human self, now the stain of modern society, which has touched her outwardly, attaches to her most intimate self, and she torments herself unceasingly with this stain, imagining an illness that is not hers, the stain becomes a burden to be borne, a life-mission allotted her by God Himself.'¹

The conversion of The Ripper follows the same pattern. He has killed and, though fundamentally honest, is an outcast from society. Rodolfo saves him by telling him he still has courage and honour. He shakes hands with him. *Coup de théâtre*. Now the discrepancy must be attenuated, and the tale be brought down to earth again. We can ignore Marx's and Engels' first remark that Rodolfo turns him into an *agent-provocateur* and uses him to entrap the Schoolmaster; we have already accepted the conduct of the superman as legitimate at the outset. The fact remains that he makes of him a 'dog', a slave who is from then on incapable of living except under the protection of his new master and idol, for whom he dies. 'The Ripper' is redeemed by his acceptance of Rodolfo's fatherly beneficence, not by acquiring a new independent conscience that can plan life for itself.

Madame d'Harville's education requires a subtler solution: Rodolfo urges her on to social activity, but this choice must appear credible in the eyes of the general public. So Clémence is made to give herself to the poor because charity constitutes for her a pleasure, a noble and subtle kind of joy. It can be enjoyable to do good.² The poor are to become the rich man's diversion.

Ferrand's punishment, too, turns out to be just what is expected. After licentious living, it is of lust unappeased that he dies. He stole money from widows and orphans, only to see this money restored to them by the will Rodolfo forces him to make, bequeathing his goods for the founding of a pauper's bank.

Here we see the main features of Sue-alias-Rodolfo's social doctrine. Its chief manifestation is the model farm at Bouquenal, the perfect example of successful paternalism. The reader has only to look again at the sixth

1. H. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Holy Family*, op. cit., Chapter VIII.2.

2. 'The expressions that Rodolfo uses in his conversation with Clémence, "to make attractive", "use one's natural taste", "direct the intrigue", "make use of one's penchants towards cunning and dissimulation", "sublimate imperious and inexorable instincts to generous impulses", etc.; these expressions, like the instincts that are by preference attributed to women, betray the secret source of Rodolfo's wisdom: Fourier. He must have been reading a popular interpretation of Fourier's doctrine.' H. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Holy Family*, op. cit., Chapter VIII.5.

chapter of the third part. The farm is an ideal phalanstery that nevertheless functions according to the decrees of a master who comes to the aid of all who find themselves without work. The paupers' bank, with related theories on the reform of pawnbrokers, is similarly inspired: seeing that poverty exists and that the workman can find himself out of work, we must set up systems of providential help to supply him with money in times of unemployment. When he gets work he will pay this back. 'During the times he has work'—as the authors of *The Holy Family* say in their commentary—'he gives back to me what he had from me during his unemployment.' Sue's plans for the prevention of crime, and for the reduction of legal costs for the indigent, proceed along the same lines. So, too, does his project for an honest citizen's police force, which, just as the law keeps the wicked under observation, arrests them and brings them to judgment, would keep a close watch on the good, 'denounce' them to the community for their virtuous actions and summon them to the public courts where their good deeds would receive due recognition and reward. The basis of Sue's ideology is this: to try to discover what we can do for the humble (by means of brotherly collaboration between classes) whilst leaving the present structure of society unchanged.

That this ideology has a right to be considered for its political merits quite outside the sphere of the serial novel is both obvious and well known. Whether this has anything to do with the pleasure the novel affords us is a question that should be looked into more closely, and we have already supplied the means of doing so. Once again it is a question of reassuring the reader by showing him that the dramatic situation is both posed and capable of solution, yet in such a way that he does not cease to identify himself with the situation described in the novel as a whole. The society operated on by Rodolfo in the guise of a miraculous healer remains the same society as at the beginning of the book. If it were otherwise the reader would lose his bearings, and the purely factitious solution would lack verisimilitude. Or at any rate, the reader would feel he could not participate in it.¹ At all events, none of these reforms provides for a new autonomy to be placed in the hands of the 'people', whether considered as 'labouring classes' or 'dangerous classes'. Faced with the honesty of Morel, Sue exclaims: 'Is it not uplifting and consoling to think that it is not force or

1. It should be mentioned that it is difficult to make Sue's strange theories on prison reform and penal reform in general fit into this scheme of things. Here we are witnessing a free improvisation by the author on the theme of 'reform' and an elaboration of his own political and humanitarian ideals outside the context of the novel itself; the flights of fancy that break up the action of the 'melodrama' develop quite independent themes. Yet even here the mechanism of arousing tension coupled with immediate reassurance is still active. It is a provocation to demand the abolition of the death penalty; but in its place the punishment of being blinded is suggested (the culprit would have before him years of sheer, unrelieved introspection in which to repent and find his true self); it is a provocation to write that prisons harm far more than they cure, and that to herd together scores of criminals in one big room, in a state of enforced idleness, can only make the wicked worse and even corrupt the good; but the reader's anxiety is allayed by the proposal of segregation in individual cells as an alternative (analogous to blinding as an alternative to the death penalty).

terrorization, but sound moral sense which alone restrains this formidable human ocean, whose overflow might drown the whole of society, making light of its laws and its power, as the sea in its rage scorns dikes and ramparts!' Thus reform is to be used to strengthen and encourage the common-sense and foresight of the working masses. This is to be achieved by an act of enlightened intelligence on the part of the rich, who recognize their role as depositaries of wealth to be used for the common good; 'by the salutary example of capital associated with hard work . . . an honest, intelligent and just pooling of resources which would ensure the well-being of the artisan without danger to the fortune of the rich man . . . and which, by creating bonds of affection between these two classes, would permanently safeguard the peace of the State'.

Peace, in the commercial novel, takes the form of reassurance by reiteration of what the reader expects, and when expressed in ideological terms it assumes the aspect of a reform which changes something so that everything will remain the same. That is, the system of order that grows out of the constant repetition of the same things and out of the stability of acknowledged values. Ideology and rhetoric here fuse perfectly.

This is borne out by a particular technical feature of Sue's novel, a narrative device that is very obvious to the reader and that we cannot do better than describe as the mechanism of 'Oh Lord, how thirsty I am!'

The reference is to an old joke about a man in a railway carriage who was irritating his travelling companions by incessantly repeating 'Oh Lord, how thirsty I am!' Driven crazy by this refrain, at the first stop the other travellers rushed to the windows to get the poor creature drinks of all kinds. When the train set off again there was a moment's silence and then the wretched man began again, repeating endlessly 'Lord, how thirsty I was!' A typical scene in Sue's novel is the following: a group of unfortunate characters (the Morels, The Wolf in prison, or Fleur-de-Marie on at least two or three occasions) weep and wail for pages and pages describing the most painful and distressing situations. When the reader's tension has reached its limit, Rodolfo arrives, or someone in his place, and sets things right for everyone. Immediately the doleful story starts up again, while for page after page the same actors retail their woes to each other or to new arrivals, describing how badly off they were the moment before and how Rodolfo saved them from the blackest despair.

Now it is true that Sue's public loved to have events repeated and confirmed over and over again, and that every female reader who wept over a character's misfortunes would in similar circumstances have behaved in the same way. But the true reason for the 'Lord, how thirsty I was!' trick is apparently something else: it is that this device allows the author to put the clock back so that the situation returns exactly to the *status quo* just before the change occurred. The transformation unties a knot, but removes nothing essential (the rope is not changed so to speak). Balance and order are disturbed by the informative violence of the *coup de théâtre*, but are re-established on the same emotional bases as before.

Above all, the characters do not 'evolve'. No one 'evolves' in *Les Mystères*. The character who undergoes conversion was basically good to begin with; the villain dies impenitent. Nothing happens that could possibly cause anyone any anxiety. The reader is comforted either because hundreds of marvellous things happen, or because these events do not alter the up-and-down course of things. The sea continues to ebb and flow, except that for an instant there has been weeping, joy, suffering or pleasure. The narrative sets in motion a series of devices for gratifying the reader, the most completely satisfactory and reassuring of which is that all remains in order; even those changes that take place in the realm of the imagination: Marie ascends the throne, Cinderella leaves her hearth. Nevertheless she dies, from excess of scruple.

Within this mechanism one is free to dream: Rodolfo is at the corner of the street for every reader—it is enough to stand and wait. It has already been noticed that the year of Sue's death was the same that saw the publication of *Madame Bovary*. And *Madame Bovary* is the critical account of the life of a woman who read 'consolatory novels' in the style of Sue, from which she learnt to wait for something that would never happen. It would be unfair to regard Sue the man and Sue the writer only in the symbolic light of this merciless dialectic. But it is useful to see the problem of the commercial novel, from Sue to our own day, threatened by the obscurantist shadow of 'consolation'.

Conclusion

In conclusion a few observations should be made which would need to be more fully developed elsewhere.

The whole of the foregoing examination represents simply a method of study employed by one particular reader with a few cultural aids at his command, which, with the help of a cultural sign language, enable him to throw light on the total implications of the work, tested along the curve on which we have travelled historically since the time of Sue. We know perfectly well that other readers in Sue's day did not use this key to decipher the book. They did not grasp its reformist implications, and from the total message only certain more obvious meanings filtered through to them (the dramatic situation of the working classes, the depravity of some of those in power, the necessity for change of no matter what kind, etc.). Hence the influence, which seems proven, of *Les Mystères* on the popular uprising of 1848. As Bory remarks: 'It cannot be denied that Sue is certainly in part responsible for the revolution of February 1848. February 1848 was like an irresistible saturnalia celebrated by Sue's heroes, the labouring classes and the dangerous classes in the Paris of *Les Mystères*.¹ For this reason we must keep in mind a principle, characteristic of any examination of mass communication media (of which the

1. 'Présentation' to *Les Mystères de Paris*, Paris, Pauvert, 1963.

popular novel is one of the most spectacular examples): the message which has been evolved by an educated *élite* (in a cultural group or a kind of communications headquarters, which takes its lead from the political or economic group in power) is expressed at the outset in terms of a fixed code or cipher of emission, but it is caught by divers groups of receivers and deciphered on the basis of other codes, ciphers of reception. The sense of the message often undergoes a kind of filtration or distortion in the process, which completely alters its 'pragmatic' function. This means that every semiological study of a work of art must be complemented by checks made so to speak in the field. The semiological examination reveals the implications of the message at the moment of emission; the check on the spot should establish what new meanings have been attributed to the message, defined as a semantic structure, at the moment of reception.

Our research has been carried out on a work of popular entertainment which made copious use of standard solutions and has no pretensions to the formal complexity of a work of art in the specific sense of the term. In this work the relations between ideology and semantic structure (or between ideology and rhetoric) were already clear on a first reading, and the study of the narrative structures has served only to make somewhat clearer certain hypotheses within reach of any attentive reader. Undoubtedly research of this kind carried out on a more complex work would appear considerably more difficult—so much more difficult as to lead some to think that the techniques of structural description are only applicable to 'simple' works (that is stereotyped or clearly determined by collective motives) and not to 'complex' works where the individual and novel solution created by the author's 'genius' plays a greater part.

Our answer is: (a) a definitive reply can be given only when analyses of this kind have been carried out more systematically and on a larger scale at all levels; but for this it is best to start at the level of something simple where it is easier to check one's work; (b) the objection would be valid if the structural analysis of the works only aimed at revealing universal constants in the narrative. Effectively, if this were true, structural analysis would be of no use for explaining examples of individual or radical innovation. But if the analysis sets out to discover, as we have tried to do, how the hypothetical constants change in particular socio-historical situations (that is to say, how the patterns evolve or are modified even in works which make use of stereotypes), then the method, even if used to begin with only on standardized works, should provide us with useful pointers for the understanding of every kind of narrative message.

[*Translated from the Italian.*]

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Lessing's *Minna von Barnhelm*¹

George Lukács

This essay, long planned, was finally written in the summer of 1963 as an introduction to my Goethe essays, then being published. Their readers will remember the stress they laid on Goethe's spiritual affinity with the *Aufklärung*; challenging throughout the traditionally irrational German view that the *Sturm und Drang*, Goethe's work and outlook as a young man, were a reaction against the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*). And not only Goethe's attitude to Voltaire and Diderot, but also to Lessing; in my correspondence with Anna Seghers I challenged the literary legend that Lessing's withering criticism of *Götz von Berlichingen* and *Werter* could support that view. The essay on *Minna von Barnhelm* with its pointedness, its emphasis on the Mozartean features of this comedy—we all know what Mozart meant for Goethe—could, I thought, show this relationship in its true light. Mozart, artistic high point of the *Aufklärung*, of the period before the contradictions of *bourgeois* society emerged in acute form, quite clearly shows the filiation—all the more so as the Mozartean atmosphere, flavour and shape of *Minna von Barnhelm* did not spring from artistic intention but quite spontaneously from Lessing's deepest and most characteristic aesthetic and social feelings.

It has often been said—and not without reason—that the greatest period of German literature and philosophy, as the eighteenth century turned into the nineteenth, was a kind of battle in the clouds, as in the legend of the fallen warriors of Attila and Aetius who continued the battle of Châlons as spirits in the air. In the case of the Enlightenment, the comparison holds true even more obviously. In England, the Puritan-inspired *bourgeois* revolution triumphed; and the Enlightenment tried to drive economically progressive capitalism (thus liberated though riddled with left-overs from feudalism) ideologically forward towards rationality. In France, the more determined and, theoretically, more consistent Enlight-

1. First published in German in *Aksente, Zeitschrift für Dichtung*, Munich, Carl Hanser, April 1964.

enment pursued the same aim under an absolute monarchy when economic development had long since destroyed the temporarily progressive equilibrium of feudal and *bourgeois* forces and revolutionary pressure was becoming irresistible. In both countries, the Enlightenment was inextricably associated with political and social progress. The German *Aufklärung* possessed no such clearly determining social basis: the German experience in the eighteenth century was of an awakening consciousness and conscience. Because of backwardness for which there historic reasons, it was at best possible to imagine a real social upheaval but not to prepare men's minds for it; hence the *Aufklärung* inevitably fell short of France's advanced materialism and atheism, its transition from revolutionary thinking to a practical plebeian social system, accompanied by prophetic rumblings of its own internal problems and contradictions. It has been shown many times—by me among others—that these undoubted weaknesses of the *Aufklärung* carried within them much that was to bear real fruit later, such as the beginnings of the renaissance of dialectic thought, or the anticipation in artistic terms of many nineteenth-century problems.

Consequently, despite all the great historic figures that the *Aufklärung* produced, the music of Mozart was its purest and richest, its deepest and most perfect expression. If we confine ourselves strictly to thought and literature, there is no irresistible organic growth as there was in France from Bayle and Fontenelle to Diderot and Rousseau; Lessing, misunderstood in his lifetime and after by Left and Right alike, from Nicolai and Mendelssohn to Jacobi, Friedrich Schlegel and Kierkegaard, is the only true personification of the *Aufklärung*. Before Lessing, the *Aufklärung*, despite contrary intentions, remained bogged down, constricted, half-hearted, like Germany itself. Immediately after, even during Lessing's own lifetime, the transition set in, with Hamann and Herder, *Sturm und Drang*, Jacobi, and so on, which, most incongruously, led to the second ideological flowering of the new German culture. Lessing's isolation and uniqueness, which were due to the society in which he lived, therefore show in the content and style of all he wrote and thought. Hence he stands out in such sharp contrast to every former stage—still very ready to compromise as compared with him—of the international Enlightenment; e.g., to Voltaire (in Germany only Heine, seeing things in better historical perspective, was to grasp the positive dialectics of Voltaire's compromises). Lessing sees himself as a counterpart to Diderot and, accordingly, has not much interest in specifically Rousseauist problems, or in acquainting himself with the problems of Rameau's world.

All these facets of his historical personality, which can be individually described as limits only subject to careful dialectic consideration, point to his affinity of position with that of Mozart. Both left the timid beginnings of *Aufklärung* ideas far behind; in both, courage and confidence are no longer checked by any feeling of inner weakness; there is still no dimming of bright prospects by reason's own internal contradictions, now looming on the horizon. How similar tendencies develop from this very general

similarity of historic standpoint in such different media as music and literature we shall see presently.

If Lessing's position in the *Aufklärung* is half-way between 'not yet' and 'no longer', so too his career had a highly characteristic middle point in the Breslau period in which *Minna von Barnhelm* was created. This was not half-way between early life and his gloom towards the end. He had reached maturity before the Breslau period, and afterwards, too, there was more than once a reasonable chance of a pleasant and meaningful life, a hopeful struggle, as befitted him. But Lessing—and here again his social position is very close to that of Diderot—was the first major German author who really wanted to write as he pleased. Breslau, in the middle of the Seven Years War, with Lessing working as the secretary of Colonel Tauentzien, represented—paradoxical as this may seem—the period in his life in which he felt comparatively most free. It was Mehring who first pointed out that in Germany at that time an officer *élite* was far less narrow-minded than most civilians, including scholars and writers. It is not only in Lessing that we find officers like Tellheim and old Galotti: there is also Schiller's Ferdinand. Without going into a detailed analysis of the favourable circumstances, it can be pointed out that the result, *Minna von Barnhelm*, radiates a confident assurance, which, in this respect, was not achieved again in Lessing's later works, neither in the tragedy of *Emilia Galotti*, nor in the so prematurely resigned and serene wisdom of old age of *Nathan*.

Against this background, which reflects its mood, the musical and moral design of *Minna von Barnhelm* were conceived. From some of the important situations and their dialogue it is clear that the composition is highly complex, and nowhere due simply, for example, to a social hierarchy of superiors and inferiors. When the two girls are told that Tellheim is at the inn, Minna rejoices at having found him, while Franzisca feels, above all, sympathy at his misfortune. Minna herself says that: 'I am only loved, but you are good.' Tellheim's honour forbids him, penniless and suspect, to marry a rich woman. When Minna wants to lead him to true love and pretends to be poor and disinherited, Franzisca says to her: 'That must be incredibly flattering to one's self-esteem.'

It is very much the same with the Tellheim-Werner situation. Here, again, there is no rigid higher and lower morality, but a very stimulating up and down. True, Tellheim rightly rebukes Werner for his frivolous jesting about the relationship of officers and men to women, but Werner immediately realizes that he is in the wrong. When, however, Tellheim, out of an exaggerated sense of honour, declines Werner's offers to lend him money because he does not want to be in his debt, Werner reminds him with righteous indignation that he is indebted to him anyway, as he has saved his life in battle several times. The moral balance is definitely on Werner's side here. This alternation of moral right and wrong seems to me to be the guiding compositional principle in this comedy. It lies in continually focusing on the moral ambiguity of abstract moral principles, rules and taboos in real situations that call for decisions.

The whole extremely unusual composition of *Minna von Barnhelm* is based on continuous, sudden shifts from abstract morality to human, individual moral issues arising from practical situations.

The dialectics of morality and ethics provide the age-old basis of all great drama, in fact of any great literary writing, and the foundation of all genuine conflict. A conflict can arise only when general moral precepts and prohibitions clash. (One of the main limitations to Kant's moral philosophy is that it denies the existence and even the intellectual possibility of such conflicts.) They are a central problem in all human life in society that cannot be ignored. Every class society spontaneously produces different rules and prohibitions for the different classes, so making conflict an inevitable ingredient of everyday life. Society develops as its economic structure is superseded, new relations develop between people and an old moral order gives way to a new, and this can come about only through the conflict of socio-historic alternatives, in human life—fully and consciously expressed in the *Oresteia*, and taken as a matter of course in *Antigone*. The conflict becomes acute only when human beings face a choice between rival moral systems, and are obliged and prepared to make a choice and accept all the consequences. Thus, in the actual conflict, the moral sphere is neutralized. Although it seems a matter of course to follow the precepts of a moral system while historically it reigns supreme, in a situation of conflict man is faced with having to choose that alternative which he is prepared to recognize as necessary, imperative for him individually, involving a specifically binding obligation for his particular personality. Thus Antigone elects to bury her brother, although it is forbidden; and her own personal destiny is fulfilled in consequence of this choice. Ethical behaviour results from conflicting moral duties.

Of course, in the historical development of human society, conflicts change not only in content but also in form. The moral philosophy of the Renaissance already goes beyond the objective alternatives the *polis* offered between moral systems in which ethical subjectivity is confined to the act of decision and its consequences; the development of society even allows evil to be adopted as an alternative (cf. Edmund, in *King Richard III*). The form and content of the reciprocal relationship of morals and ethics have thereby naturally changed a great deal, though without fundamentally upsetting the basic pattern of the conflict. Lessing's deep historical understanding here is shown in the fact that, despite the radical differences in form, he recognized the aesthetic affinity of Sophocles and Shakespeare and, what is more, on the basis of Aristotle's theory, which implicitly means the recognition of a constant element in the historic changes in the forms and content of conflicts.

Despite this affirmation of constancy within change, Lessing's aesthetic and ethical approach is an innovation, even compared with Shakespeare. The novelty does not lie in setting the conflict in the mental world of comedy although, as will be seen presently, there are factors that link it to that form. In one of his important analyses of comedy, Lessing takes issue with

Rousseau, who criticizes Molière's *Le Misanthrope* for holding up a virtuous man to ridicule. As to the object of the laughter, Lessing first distinguishes between virtue and its exaggeration in the person of Alceste and then, in what is actually comical, he goes on to contrast laughter with ridicule—a movement away from morality towards ethics. While ridicule is directed against exaggerated virtue, as in Molière, it is not immoral as Rousseau suggests, but a preservative of genuine morality. Laughter, apparently less specific as to object than ridicule, can, on the other hand, encompass all human conduct and, accordingly, as the supreme arbiter of our inner nature, provide a new catharsis. Elsewhere, Lessing sees catharsis completely in the *Aufklärung* manner, as passions transmuted into virtuous accomplishment. The universality of laughter as compared with ridicule, which is directed against very specific targets, makes it a factor of enlightening catharsis. 'The true universal benefit lies in the laughter itself, in the exercise of our ability to perceive what is laughable, to perceive it easily and quickly, however disguised by passion and fashion, mingled with worse qualities and with good, and even in the wrinkles of a deadly solemn face.'

What social and moral needs impelled Lessing so strongly to emphasize this cathartic function of laughter? The new factor that brought to the surface this new view, this new creative problem, is the danger (which survived the Renaissance) that, in the decision to be taken in cases of conflict, not only may evil be chosen, but a morally correct, virtuous decision may conceal a principle of inhumanity. For the Renaissance, Machiavelli's discovery of politics as a world with its own logic and dialectics of motives and consequences meant that the new, Shakespearean source of conflict, i.e., the possibility of a morally evil principle in life itself, had to be recognized. The new problem broached by Lessing arises from the great class struggles that filled the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and culminated in the French Revolution. The Enlightenment secularized the originally religious colouring—as, for example, in revolutionary Puritanism—of this movement's axioms by a new, revolutionary interpretation of stoic philosophy that superseded revolutionary Calvinism and its attempted Catholic equivalents. A comparison with Shakespeare graphically illustrates the innovation. Shakespeare's dialectics of action in society sprang from the real structures discovered by Machiavelli. Thus, in *Julius Caesar* it is not the stoic Brutus but the epicurean Cassius who becomes the mouthpiece of Machiavelli's *Realpolitik* (after the murder of Caesar, should Antonio also be eliminated?). It is the secularization of religio-revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary) ideologies which first sets a politico-moral stoicism at the centre of Enlightenment morality. It is therefore certainly no coincidence that Diderot engages in a theoretical discussion with Seneca; that the contradictions bound up with these questions greatly preoccupy Rousseau; that, in Alfieri, the next generation later produced a tragic poet of political stoicism.

Lessing's inner debate with these problems started even before the

Breslau period. His *Philotas* personifies the fusion of Machiavellian *Realpolitik* and moral stoicism—here, unconditional self-sacrifice; the suicide of the prince is an act of stoic morality that results from the ruthless pursuit of patriotic and political advantages. Lessing presents a young hero who is completely pure and convinced of his rightness, but he makes no secret of his own opinion regarding the inhumanity of a heroism that rejects all compromise as a matter of principle. We are certainly not far from his own inner beliefs when King Aridäus says to Philotas: 'You that destiny marked out for the throne—you! To you will it entrust the well-being of a powerful and noble nation. You! What a terrible future this forebodes. On your people you will heap laurels, and misery, and number more victories than happy subjects.'

Many successors, in Germany as elsewhere, were to follow this dramatic line—although Lessing himself did so only episodically, as, for example, when Nathan says to the Knight Templar: 'Great! Great and abominable!' The youthful Schiller wrestled even more energetically with the problem in his unresolved dilemma about Brutus or Catilina as leader of a revolution. In the major confrontation with his own youthful development he experiments, in *Don Carlos*, with a whole series of possible variations on the theme of political stoicism, dialectically analysing its moral tendency, and the way in which noble and unselfish virtue can suddenly transform itself into inhumanity.

Here, unquestionably, already appear the inner problems of Jacobinism, reflected in a German morality that, of course, has both positively and negatively outstripped the Enlightenment.

In Lessing himself, this galaxy of moral problems appears in an altogether different form. He observed conditions in Germany far too soberly to see more in a revolution than a necessarily abstract future ideal. The same sober eye, however, discerned the deplorable suppression of all humanity by the absolutism of the small German States and the view led automatically to the question: in the extreme situations that these conditions daily produce, how can one rescue the human dignity of the objectively powerless? *Emilia Galotti* shows how much, in this context, stoicism meant for Lessing, although a very marked differentiation is introduced in this very play. The convinced stoics Appiani and Odoardo Galotti try to keep clear of the powerful and corrupting reach of absolutism. The play shows the limitations of this possibility in practice. The fate of Emilia reveals stoic suicide as the only escape for those who are otherwise at the mercy of amoral arbitrariness. For our question—the relations of stoic morality to human ethics—it is particularly important here that the emotional world of Emilia herself is not in the least stoic. In the last dialogue with her father, when he says that innocence is beyond the reach of force, she replies: 'But not beyond temptation.' When the stoic father stabs her at the end of this dialogue, the other philosophic meaning of stoicism as a desperate way out of an otherwise morally inextricable situation becomes clear.

This second function of stoic morality, its function in everyday life at the time, shows that a universal problem is involved. It was indispensable in the difficult life of the time but, if pursued consistently, produced a whole series of internal contradictions that reflect the inner struggle to prevent morality from suddenly turning into inhumanity. In political morality this comes out clearly—from Philotas to Marquis Posa. But it is important to know that the dialectics of this sudden change are also potentially present all the time in the danger of responding to external inhumanity with inner inhumanity, of letting one's own heart turn to stone in defending one's own human integrity, which underlies the moral fabric of an everyday life which merely passively defends individual integrity against the baseness of social conditions. In an earlier observation from yet another angle of some of the moral facets in *Minna von Barnhelm*, we noted contradictions of this kind. These now come to the fore, because, as we shall attempt to show, the composition, dialogue, and so on, of *Minna von Barnhelm* revolve around these contradictions of stoic morality, its central theme being precisely the ethical overcoming of these moral conflicts.

In approaching such questions, we must first examine the basis of Tellheim's existence. We earlier noted how Tellheim rebukes Werner for wanting to continue his military career as a mercenary. What he says about the fatherland and the 'good cause' sounds well enough, but in the Prussia of that time, what real moral basis could this have for the Balt Tellheim? When Tellheim later talks to Minna about his own life, he uses no such grand words, but very simply describes how he came to be a soldier and how he sees his future, real life: 'I became a soldier because that was what I wanted, though I do not know myself for what political principles, and because I fancied that it was fitting for every honourable man to try his hand at this profession for a time and to become acquainted with every kind of danger, to learn to keep a cool head and to develop strength of purpose. Only the direst necessity could have compelled me to make this experiment my vocation, to make this temporary occupation my trade. But now that I am under no compulsion any more, my only ambition again is to lead a life of peace and content.' There is not a word about the fatherland, and if there is a distant reference to the 'good cause', it can have been at best only a youthful illusion that has long been left behind or, more likely still, merely an excuse for the self-imposed trial and discipline about which he speaks in such detail and with such honesty. But what moral right has Tellheim to judge Werner's taste for adventure so severely? The really 'good cause' on which Tellheim's easy conscience is at present justifiably based is that of levying contributions humanely, against the will of his superiors and at his own risk. For Werner of course, it is simply adventure, but, for Tellheim, it is inner adventure and involves the risks of moral self-education. But, comparing their positions and intellectual and moral backgrounds, there are many reasons to acquit Werner.

We must examine in somewhat greater detail the motive for Tellheim's choice of an army career if we are properly to understand his mental and

moral reactions at the time of his cashiering and the suspicions directed against him. With him there is no question of 'My country, right or wrong', any more than of a 'good cause' for which he might be obliged to sacrifice everything, even his honour under certain circumstances. Just before the passage quoted above, he makes his views quite clear: 'Serving the great is dangerous, and not worth the trouble, constraint and humiliation it entails.' He needs his stoicism to give him the human strength to hold out in situations which, objectively, are foreseeable and even to be expected—an ideology of self-defence for the defenceless, delivered up to more powerful forces. Tellheim can maintain this ideology against the stresses and strains of an unknown and hostile world, but as soon as he is confronted with Minna and through her is forced at last to be honest with himself, his stoicism fails and the long-suppressed powerless feelings of outrage at the wrong that he has been done burst forth. He laughs at his fate, and this horrifies Minna: 'I have never heard curses more dreadful than your laughter; it is the terrible laughter of an misanthropist!' but Minna is far too sensible and ethically well balanced to let this horror get the better of her. Half jokingly, she refers to Othello, but then continues with despairing earnestness: 'Oh these harsh, unyielding men with their eyes forever fixed on this myth of honour and who harden their hearts to all other feelings! Look at me, Tellheim!' He is deeply affected: it is the catharsis. In confusion, he replies: 'Yes, but tell me, how did the Moor come to serve the Venetians? Had he no homeland? Why did he place his sword and his life in the service of a foreign power?'

Here tragedy could start for Tellheim. In fact it remains only on the horizon, but gives the whole play a completely new flavour. This has a double significance. It reminds us that this is a comedy, although it could turn into tragedy. At the same time it recalls that the episodic character of this outbreak of tragedy ultimately springs from the inherent logic of things, that it would not really be in accordance with the nature of people, who here come face to face with their fate in this way, if everything were taken to its logical conclusion, as formally would be possible. Layers of different depths underlie this truth. It is immediately obvious that a man's undoing through the contradictions inherent in the conditions within which he has somewhat pedantically chosen to let his character develop provides only the external trappings of tragedy. He could be crushed by the circumstances in which he lives, but would not recognize his real self again in his tragic downfall and (in the creative work of art) let it become something meaningful. That there were many such tragedies in his day could never be a reason for Lessing to add one more. Indeed we know he had very mixed feelings about tragedy. He was one of its most outstanding theorists; he knew well that the socio-historic background of life at the time was pregnant with tragedy. As soon as he turned his attention directly to these conditions, he saw and created tragedies. But deeper down he felt—even if he did not say so straight out in his theoretical writings—that forces exist in man that get beyond such tragedies. In *Nathan*—his farewell to life and

literature—he represented wisdom on the stage as one such spiritual force. In a play whose plot is a chain of romantic and improbable collisions that would be highly dangerous in practice, it showed in poetic terms that common sense and genuine wisdom can always blunt the dangerous edges in such collisions and handle them, without moral compromise, by thoughtfulness and true humanity.

This is Minna's function. She too has a wisdom of her own, but not one which transcends and is therefore remote from life, no philosophical superiority; as in Nathan's case, no abstract, dead thing but wisdom drawn from a profound and deeply assimilated experience of life. If we look closely at it, Minna's wisdom is not wisdom at all, just a real human being's unbroken longing for a sensible existence that is possible only in companionship and love. Her wisdom, therefore, is always this compulsion to see real people as, humanly, they really are, to grasp their problems but at the same time see what is best in them at a glance and thereby help them to find themselves and realize their potentialities. These positive qualities never add up to an idealized abstraction. Minna can be wrong, she can be mistaken about people and situations but, despite mistakes, her judgement and ethical decency constantly reassert themselves, turning her misconceptions into truth as often as Tellheim's rigid stoic obsessions put him in the wrong even when, objectively, he is in the right. She has a deep unbroken and unbreakable courage and, charming, fragile, and determined, she can take the most tragic situations in her stride without show or fuss—the embodiment of the best produced by the German Enlightenment in human terms.

The kindred and the contrast in Minna and Tellheim add another strand to the comedy; the foil which does not simply dispose of and neutralize Tellheim's propensity for tragedy but does so in such a way that it preserves and enhances its role in the break-up of his rigid morality; stoic morality is destroyed when it faces a world—embodied by Minna—in which virtue no longer requires a clumsy and rigid code of duty, but is ruled by ethics that historical morality was intended to safeguard in a still corrupt world. It is this intermingling of both strands that really gives the external plot inner meaning and spiritual weight. The happy outcome obligatory for a comedy is here no happy ending; and even less a glorification of the régime of Frederick the Great: it is the '*Aufklärung*' myth of reason, now become elegant, necessarily triumphing in the end. This is what Lessing most deeply felt; despite all present discord, he was unshakably convinced of the ultimate harmony of the universe, and retained this conviction through every misfortune. Here, mid-way through life, during its most congenial period, it took this form of a highly down-to-earth and earthily resplendent fairy-tale that comes true.

This view of life is Lessing's link with Mozart, a deep and universal affinity. Purely philosophically, this is perhaps even more apparent in other works—compare the *Magic Flute* with *Nathan der Weise*, for example. In *Minna von Barnhelm*, with its formally intellectual approach to dialogue

so typical of Lessing, the contrast to music, and especially Mozart's, seems to be sharpest. The whole dramatic framework, with its perpetual intellectual posing of moral problems and their continually repeated ethical disintegration, does create a light and carefree poetic atmosphere, but at first sight would seem to form the greatest contrast imaginable to a musical composition in the spirit of Mozart.

Yet it is here that the affinity lies. The intellectual flavour of the language and dialogue in *Minna von Barnhelm* is not basically intended as a way of driving home an intellectual argument, as is the dramatic verse of *Nathan der Weise*. On the contrary; as the animated ups and downs of the play as a whole aim at employing a humane system of ethics to break down (in the threefold Hegelian sense) the false moralizing views and rigid attitudes of stoic morality, no single intellectual concept can be caught, fixed and perfected purely as such. It is either swallowed up in the human and ethical give-and-take that produce the lively underlying human behaviour or, if it does reappear as a result of other human conflicts and not by its own immanent logic, it has become something different in the here and now of ordinary life. Formally, of course, it too has been broken down and dominated, but in practical terms it has become something else. The resulting, frankly intellectual dialogue, heightened by the bright, clear transparency (so typical of Lessing) of every speech and the personalities that come across more through what they are and do than in any characterized mode of expression, accordingly tends to cancel out its own intellectualism. This epigrammatic style is used only to remove any trace of the ponderous in the actual language and speed the action on its way towards a definite but unformulated goal.

This effect is enhanced by using dialogue not as in *Nathan* to unfold a philosophy embodied in the characters and their relationships with one another, but for a humorous interplay of actions whose internal dynamics are determined by the human problems depicted; hence discussion—thesis competing with antithesis—rises from life as it is lived and is absorbed back into it, only to be raised again by other problems of life, to reappear directly on the stage as dialogue, and again suffer the same fate. The moral criticism and the breakdown of stoic, rigid morality into individual human, dynamic ethics thus follows a totally different principle of composition—right down to the dialogue—from *Nathan* with its philosophy, and the practical, social drama of *Emilia Galotti*. Such dialogue is possible only if the plot does not inherently depend on the linking up of facts as in *Emilia Galotti*, but has a wider underlying philosophical basis which helps to raise all the 'improbabilities' in situations, their linking up and disposal, to the status of higher (almost historico-philosophic) necessity. In *Nathan*, the mode is directly philosophical, but in *Minna* a philosophically inspired vitality—which, though it does not enter directly into any of the dialogue, determines its whole character—provides the basis of the play's composition. These dialogues can thus generate a Mozartean musicality. However little Mozart's texts may leave the historico-

philosophical effect of his music to chance, the ultimate basis of that cheerful belief in the triumph of reason is in the end something different, and goes incomparably deeper; indeed, is rooted in the music itself. *Minna von Barnhelm* is unique in the literature of the *Aufklärung* in that here Lessing succeeds, purely with words, with genuinely intellectual and epigrammatic dialogue, in creating a mood that, artistically and evocatively, allows us to believe in this conviction about the future despite all its attendant difficulties and obstacles; and to believe also, as something perceptible and manifest that can be experienced in the possibilities of this optimistic future, suddenly ending in tragic failure, as it seriously threatens to do before the possibilities are pushed to one side of the irresistible stream.

An attempt was made earlier to show the philosophical basis of the genuinely literary means by which Lessing brings his art of words so close ideally to Mozart's music. This poetic transformation takes place by stating the moral problems that arise from painful human situations in epigrammatic language that gives them a firm outline without pomposity; then, hardly have they been expressed when they become problems of individual ethics and merge into the dramatic movement of the play. It is these transformations of clearly defined ideas into flowering, floating emotional fragments carried irresistibly on towards reason that produces the remarkable parallel with 'melody' and 'accompaniment', in plot and dialogue, although the sharpness of the language is never lost, even when it seems to be submerged in the general mood. On the contrary, both continually draw from and homogenize each other, and then continue enriched. The result is immediacy. The sharp outlines sharpen, deepen and enrich the atmosphere into a fitting, a soaring 'accompaniment'; the emotional fragments continually rise to the level of the clearly defined 'melodies', in which they are themselves intensified, deepened and enriched, and find their natural place.

The buoyant ease with which all the menacing dangers and all the dark threats are overcome without any attenuation of their reality as powerful forces at work in life, and elegant common sense as an irresistible force in the course of life, are the—far from symbolic—basis of the Mozartean spirit of this comedy. What is greatest and most fascinating in the *Aufklärung* provides a parallel to what is greatest and most exciting in Mozart.

[Translated from the German.]

George Lukács, the very widely influential Hungarian literary sociologist and critic, published his early works before the First World War. His interests have ranged extensively, especially over German, French and Russian literature. He has worked in Berlin, Budapest and Moscow. Amongst his major works may be mentioned German Literature in the Age of Imperialism (1946); Goethe and his Time (1947); The Young Hegel (1948). A selection of his essays was brought out in English in 1950, under the title of Studies in European Realism and another, more extensive collection, edited by Peter Ludz, appeared in 1961 entitled Schriften zur Literatursoziologie.

The sociology of Stendhal's novels: preliminary research

Geneviève Mouillaud

This article contains the first results of sociological research on Stendhal's novels, starting from a structural examination of his first two works:¹ *Armance* and *Le Rouge et le Noir*. It will suffice to indicate the general outline of these results.

The action of these novels takes place in France and in a 'present time' explicitly described as a moment in history. There is no next world and more especially no religious 'beyond'.

The general mass of society, the 'common herd', are ignorant of values other than those of money and social status in degraded forms (vanity, convention, fashion, 'love-vanity', role-playing, social position, etc.). Other values, more particularly feelings of love and friendship, political convictions, religious faith, love of art and nature, are for them hollow pretexts. It is the reign of conscious hypocrisy or semi-conscious affectation.

The character of the hero is exceptional by his yearning for something different. He is 'made to experience happiness other than that provided by money and vanity'.² He dreams of naturalness, heroism, glory and 'perfect intimacy' in love, that is to say, of a direct and genuine relationship with himself, with reality, with the community and with another being. But this aspiration also is a part of society as it is, and is subject to its laws, although in a manner different from that of the common herd. It cannot find embodiment in a form that is both genuine and tangible. The two novels mentioned above present two variants of this type of hero. The first, Octave in *Armance*, is innocent of any concern for money, almost free of vanity and sufficiently clear-minded to see the impossibility of realizing his aspirations. These retain therefore an abstract quality, inclining towards

1. *La Chartreuse de Parme* and two unfinished novels, *Lucien Leuwen* and *Lamiel*, pose another question which cannot be attempted in this article: the development of the romantic structure and its connexion with social change. The three novels were written after the political and social turning-point characterized by the days of 1832 even more than by 1830.

2. *Romans de Stendhal*, Paris, Pléiade, 1959, p. 75.

a 'remote happiness' which can be fancied but not described. Stendhal expresses this by making Octave ineffectual. Julien Sorel, on the other hand, can act because he is neither wholly innocent nor entirely clear minded. He is anchored to reality by necessity (he must have money to live) and by illusion. For him, the Napoleonic legend represents an ideal of authentic action and fame, but experienced in a manner which is doubly spurious because it is merely a pattern to be imitated, and because action in France after the Restoration calls for qualities contrary to those of the pattern, hypocrisy instead of courage, and provides only a caricature of action and glory. Julien's success, viewed objectively, is that of the common herd: money, a title, rank and marrying well. When he becomes aware of this, on reading Madame de Rénal's letter, he feels 'outraged'¹ and finally demolishes his success by crime and a sentence of death, 'the only thing which is not to be bought'. During his last meditation in prison, he, too, is seen to be seeking a remote happiness, a human communion (a 'point of contact between sensitive souls'² which would be represented by God if He existed) and authentic action (and he now discovers 'charlatanism'² even in Napoleon).

The gulf between the hero and the rest of society, which represents reality, is emphasized by the author's irony. In the first novel, this irony is expressed not directly but ambiguously: the reader constantly suspects, without ever being sure, that Octave's moral impotence is really physical impotence, which is ridiculous and according to the standards of the age, grotesque. In *Le Rouge et le Noir*, the irony is no longer ambiguous but contradictory: what renders the hero ridiculous is precisely what makes him a better man, his difference from other people. The irony thus expresses an impossible requirement: that the hero shall be both different and adjusted, and that, in a world where these qualities are sundered, reality and worth shall go together.

This structure falls strictly within the definition of the romantic *genre* which George Lukács gives in *La Théorie du Roman*:³ an 'epic genre', meaning a *genre* in which there is a relative communion between the hero and the world. There is also an insurmountable barrier between them, however: the hero is in search of authenticity (the 'distant homeland', which resembles 'remote happiness') in a spurious world, and his quest is itself spurious, although in another way, and ends in final disillusionment. The author's irony secures the aesthetic unity of the work by underlining the contradiction which pervades it.

I could have made this the starting-point of my account of Stendhal's novels, but the reverse procedure emphasizes better a correspondence which is the more remarkable because Lukács was not thinking of Stendhal at all (he even refers to this oversight in the preface to the recent French

1. *ibid.*, p. 648: 'J'ai été offensé d'une manière atroce, j'ai tué...'

2. *ibid.*, p. 69.

3. French translation published in the collection 'Mediations', Gonthier, Paris, 1964.

edition as a regrettable omission); L. Goldmann had, moreover, pointed to the possibility of including *Le Rouge et le Noir* in the romantic *genre* defined by Lukács and had compared *La Théorie du Roman* with R. Girard's book, *Mensonge Romantique et Vérité Romanesque*.¹ R. Girard throws much light on Stendhal's works, stressing the role of the 'intermediate' and of the 'triangular' passion which is an imitation of another person and is not in reality aimed at its stated target but at the price which the other places upon it. I have followed R. Girard in his analysis of vanity as a form of intermediacy, making one essential addition: the role of money (at least as obsessive as that of vanity) which in the novel is inseparable from it and which, more particularly, has exactly the same structure. The intermediate value, the 'price', replaces the direct passion for persons and for things.

Here let it be made clear that the analyses by Lukács, Girard and Goldmann are only concerned with one line of works among those which are normally referred to as novels. The line ranges from *Don Quixote* to Proust according to R. Girard, from *Don Quixote* to Tolstoy (who is no longer altogether a part of it) according to Lukács and, according to Goldmann, from *Don Quixote* to Malraux, with considerable structural modifications before the change to the 'new novel'. Inclusions and exclusions are a simple matter of concrete analysis, once the group definition has been given. On the other hand, the question of its validity may be raised: would it be better to follow the existing custom and try to categorize all stories generally called novels? This is an impossible undertaking or rather one that is possible only in the most general terms, those of the laws that govern all stories, and thus may be of anthropological interest but is valueless in sociology. On the other hand, successfully to isolate a strictly defined *genre* from this confused mass was the first step towards a knowledge of the whole. When other types of 'novels' also have been isolated and studied, it will be interesting to seek the reasons for their co-existence and their grouping under the same name and, in particular, to analyse the relationship between the problem-hero and all the forms of novel with a positive hero with whom the reader can identify himself. In the meantime, a preliminary classification is already a considerable advance, and I shall continue in this article to call the *genre* defined above 'novels'. Let us note, moreover, that it includes some works generally recognized as the greatest and that is an index of its sociological importance.

Within this genre, *Le Rouge et le Noir* has special features. They can be summarized by saying that it is the most positive of the problem-hero novels.² The degradation of the world and the disillusionment of the hero are limited by several factors.

1. R. Girard, *Mensonge Romantique et Vérité Romanesque*, Paris, Grasset, 1961.

2. The case of *Don Quixote* must be considered separately; not only because the reality in it is solid and the irony gay, but because *Don Quixote* embodies genuine modern values which are interwoven with the legend of chivalry, as Leo Löwenthal has shown. In fact, in this sentence I am thinking of novels later than Stendhal's.

The values of action and energy imply an inner consistency on the part of the individual, a solidity of reality and a possible contact between the two, which will not be found to the same extent in novels later than *Le Rouge*. These values exist in themselves although their content may not be genuine. Julien, who acts, is worth more than the fine ineffectual soul which is Octave, and incidentally, at the point of death, he does not regret his acts. By sacrificing his achieved success, he was able by this very act to link value with reality. For a passing moment it is true, for value and reality can only subsist as alternatives to one another, but the point of contact exists: once at least, before his judges, Julien speaks on behalf of a community; for a few days at least he knows perfect intimacy with Madame de Rénal, and his last moments in the sunshine and the open air are a happy contact with the universe. An epigraph of *Le Rouge* presents this final 'wisdom'¹ as a result of his past 'madness'.

Between the hero and the common herd there are intermediate persons standing for illusory or partial values, but values genuinely experienced: the sincere believers, and primarily Madame de Rénal; the liberal under sentence of death, Altamira; the singer Geronimo, who lives for music and for the moment; the epicurean, St. Giraud; and two representatives of the old nobility, Monsieur de la Mole and Mathilde. In different degrees of authenticity and lucidity (and in inverse proportions: Madame de Rénal is more genuine and less lucid than Mathilde) they are so many indications of possible orientation surrounding the hero. We have only to think of Flaubert to measure the difference from a world in which the characters will be 'all made of the same clay'.

Finally, even though the liberal values are problematic in themselves, they retain an undeniable polemical strength against the strivings of political and religious reaction (see the Secret Note episode and the description of the seminary). The long sentences passed upon the extremists raise no doubts; they appear desirable, moreover. Within the work there is historical movement and partial harmony with this movement.

This inner study prompted me to take the general hypotheses formulated by L. Goldmann as a basis for sociological work proper. In the first place, he establishes a correspondence between the novel's structure and that of the economy of a society which essentially produced for the market: 'In economic life, which is the most important part of modern social life, any true relationship with the qualitative aspect of things and persons tends to disappear—relationships between men and things as well as inter-human relations—and to be replaced by a mediatized and depreciated relationship: a relationship with purely quantitative values in exchange.

'Values in use, of course, continue to exist and even to regulate, in the final account, economic life as a whole; but their effect is of an implied

1. This is contained in Chapter XL: 'It is because I was mad that today I am wise. Oh, Philosopher, who seest only the instantaneous, how short-sighted thou art.'

nature, exactly like that of genuine values in the romantic world.¹

Here there is a point to be made. Although the reign of the intermediate is presented in Stendhal's novels in its most visible form, that of money, and at the same time in the more complex form of vanity, the same thing by no means applies in all novels. In Proust, for instance, the intermediate is expressed in various forms, ranging from jealousy to snobbery, and money plays only a secondary role. It is not a matter of comparing the anecdotal content of the novel with sociological reality, but the structure of the world and of human relations which gives it indissoluble form and meaning. What led me to lay bare the very important role of money in Stendhal's work (a role expressed, for instance, by the hitherto unnoticed fact² that *Armance* begins with the arrival of 2 million francs and the reactions of each character to this sudden fortune) was not an *a priori* prepossession for economics but a question concerning the structure of the novel: What is it that distinguishes the hero from the 'common herd'? and *Armance's* reply, already quoted, that he is 'made to feel other kinds of happiness than those provided by money and vanity'.

The second correspondence concerns the parallel evolution of romantic structures and of economic and social structures. From Cervantes to Stendhal, from Flaubert to Proust, the reign of the intermediate becomes more and more universal within the novel, at the same time that on the sociological plane the relics of feudalism are giving way before the industrial revolution, and capitalism is becoming the only reality. The major crises at the beginning of the twentieth century and the transformation of liberal capitalism into monopoly capitalism where the individual plays an even smaller role are contemporary with the crisis³ of the individual hero, with attempts to link the hero with a community (between the two wars) and then with the present 'new novel', which has no hero.

Here must be indicated, a little in advance of the sociological investigation, the place of Stendhal in this revolution. Relatively authentic characters who had not yet learnt of the death of the ancient gods, or who could not believe it, were still possible in Restoration France which remained archaic in many aspects. Perhaps it was not by chance that Stendhal, to recover the same romantic gaiety ten years after *Le Rouge* and after the social changes of the thirties, made Italy, which evolved more slowly, the scene of his last novel.

Moreover, the evidence of energy and action (this will be true again of Balzac) coincides with the period in which very great possibilities are still open to individual initiative. It is the harsh reign of 'every man for himself'

1. L. Goldmann, *Pour une Sociologie du Roman*, Paris, Gallimard, 1964, p. 38. (Collection 'Idées'.)
2. M. Bardèche has noted it, and sees in it a 'blunder' by Stendhal. Bardèche decided that since the subject was impotence, it was superfluous to make so much of money. See 'Stendhal Romancier', *La Table Ronde*, 1947, p. 154 et seq.
3. In one sense, the novel experiences a permanent crisis, the *genre* itself being problematical and incessantly challenged throughout its history. Here, however, the changes are more deeply marked.

but 'every man' has still a strong meaning. Finally, although liberalism under the Restoration did not inspire any great non-problematic work, it still had an existence vigorous enough to provide values, both present and absent, for a romantic universe.

After these very general findings, we enter the field of hypothesis: From what sociological basis did the romantic novel spring? It could not be from a whole social class: the *bourgeoisie* has its liberalist ideology in various forms, but this is simply an ideology and not a critical point of view. L. Goldmann had in mind a vague and perhaps non-conceptualized resistance by individuals interested chiefly in value in use and viewing the reign of exchange value with distaste. Were there just a few individuals, creators in all fields (art, science and thought) whose work, by its very nature, remained dominated by regard for quality, or had 'this affective discontent' spread particularly in certain social strata? That was the question.

To give a definite answer in the case of Stendhal, I have tried to devise a working instrument as independent of hypotheses as is possible, and first to settle a very simple preliminary question: Did Stendhal live in a *milieu* under the Restoration, during the years when he was beginning his novels?¹ In other words, did the people with whom he regularly consorted form a single group? Did they know each other? A study of Stendhal's associates and of their mutual relationships gives an affirmative reply: out of a total of about sixty people, thirty were related to each other through more than ten families; a little more than fifty (including the foregoing of course) were related through more than five families, and there remain only a few borderline cases (childhood friends, fellow guests at table, for instance). As a basis, I have taken the group of those related through five families, which I shall call Stendhal's *milieu* until it can be placed in relation with possible larger groups. Its internal structure, however, is not that of a circle with Stendhal at the centre, for he is neither a leader nor a collector of people. He is to be found rather at the point where several groups meet: in the drawing-rooms of La Fayette, Aubernon, de Tracy, Cuvier, the painter Gérard, Madame Ancelot, friends of La Pasta, Delécluze's 'garret', the editorial staff of *The Globe*, etc. As a whole, however, this group is sufficiently homogeneous to establish a few sociological findings.

The first, though negative, is all the more important because it occurs at all levels—social, political and ideological: it is the absence of links with adherents of the *ancien régime*. Scarcely any contact with the Faubourg Saint-Germain; no titled persons even, save those who had placed themselves socially and politically outside their class, the de Tracys and the La Fayettees (the one notable exception is A. de Mareste, a close friend of Stendhal and of noble origin; but he had also been a civil servant of the Empire). No contact with the extremists: his political span extends from the left of the liberal party to the middle-leftist theorists, apart from a few

1. The reference dates are as follows: 1821, return from Italy; 1826, writing of *Armance*.

ministerialists more attached to their posts than to their convictions. No contact with traditional Catholicism: the confessed atheism of a few 'ideologists'¹ and of Stendhal, the lightly-borne deism of *The Globe* and V. Cousin's eclecticism complete the list of religious discussions on a basis of general anti-Jesuitry. A few positive corollaries begin to locate the *milieu*; it consists solely of liberal *bourgeois* and, to use an out-of-date but reasonably adequate word, laymen.

Second finding: banking, commercial and industrial circles are missing; this absence also is nearly complete. The exceptions, such as the former foreign exchange agent, Aubernon, also a writer and a politician, or Santelet, the bookseller, remain marginal. This absence, however, is different in kind from the first. It is a near absence, one might say, and in two different senses. In the first place, the heads of the liberal party, like La Fayette, the members of parliament, like V. de Tracy, the highly political liberals, like Aubernon, associate with the big liberal industrialists and, moreover, they have a political solidarity and a minimum of ideological kinship with them; La Fayette and Benjamin Constant had the same fundamental liberal principles as Ternaux. Within the *milieu*, the 'industrial' ideologies are upheld by journalists like Dunoyer or Cercllet. Moreover, the careers of business man, manufacturer, engineer (likely to turn into that of manufacturer) are offered to several as a possibility, frequently chosen by friends or relatives. They refused it, aware that they were foregoing the earning of a great deal of money but preferring an occupation which in their opinion was more worthy.² From these many individual attitudes a complex over-all situation results; sociologically, a *de facto* remoteness from, and a potential proximity to, careers linked directly with money and production; politically and ideologically, solidarity and rejection.

Third over-all finding: the very large predominance of intellectual and artistic activities. More than thirty full-time or part-time writers and journalists: teachers of history, philosophy, literature, and economics (these, moreover, sometimes duplicate with the foregoing; it was easy to pass from journalism to a free—and liberal—university like the Athénée; conversely, teachers of the State university suspended for their liberalism, like V. Cousin, became writers or journalists). Scholars, chiefly naturalists, around Cuvier; actors, painters and musicians, at Gérard's and la Pasta's; one or two lawyers, one or two physicians. Such activities form the whole professional range of the *milieu* with the exception of a few administrators.

But the administration mainly plays the role of a second occupation, or of thwarted ambition, for confessed liberals could not hope to obtain important posts under the Restoration. Some of them formed the ruling

1. In the historical sense of the word: the philosophers who gathered round Destutt de Tracy, author of *L'Idéologie*.

2. See J. J. Ampère's letter on the choice of a career (*Correspondance*, Paris, Hetzel, 1875, Vol. I, p. 131) and that by V. Jacquemont, (*Correspondance Inédite*, Paris, Lévy, 1869, p. 237).

political class of 1830—only for a short time be it said, since they stood as ‘progressives’ and those who were not willing to sober down were to be eliminated fairly rapidly. In the period with which we are dealing, however, politics and the administration were the only possibilities contemplated outside the intellectual or artistic callings.

Very few of these writers and journalists lived solely on what they produced. Nearly all of them had another source of income: property, private means or a second occupation. It was considered normal to be able to live on private means. Stendhal, after his father’s near-ruin and the loss of his post in 1814, had not enough income to live on; the selling of his articles was a necessity and that was generally considered as a stroke of ill-luck¹ which was not in any way, however, derogatory. There were no young people in immediate material want; on the other hand, there were few large fortunes, no large-scale speculation and no ostentatious luxury. It was a middle layer of society, in which nobody was without monetary problems, but which did not know the fascination *à la* Balzac which money has for both poorer and richer people.

These preliminary remarks do not solve everything nor, more particularly, the question whether the ‘intellectuals’ and artists formed an independent social layer at that time, and, if so, the question of the relationship between the ‘microsociological’ *milieu* here described and the layer as a whole. It is already important to know, however, that we are concerned almost entirely in the first place with intellectuals and artists and, in the second place, with liberals, and that they are in the political movement and remote from manufacturing and business. Here there is a possible basis for a dual attitude towards the modern world, integration and non-integration, accession and challenge; in short, for the ‘yes and no’ of the novels.

It remains to determine whether this possible attitude was effective, whether there was in fact an awareness of these problems. The truth is that the ‘no’ is harder to lay hold of than the ‘yes’ and is only expressed indirectly, or remains localized in private writings, letters and personal diaries. As is natural, works published under the Restoration express rather the standpoint of official liberalism. Such is the case with Stendhal, who is closer to official liberalism in his articles for the English newspapers than in his correspondence, and the same is true of many of his friends. It is therefore necessary to examine all the documents, individual by individual.

I began this examination *du côté de chez Delécluze*, that is to say from the side where literary and artistic preoccupations outweigh concern for politics (at the other extreme is La Fayette). Many of these pertinent documents have already been published and studied and research has profited by the remarkable work carried on by generations of Stendhal enthusiasts. It is not enough, however, to rely on the results thus obtained and this research has another aim in view. When the biographical and

1. Delécluze, *Souvenirs de 60 Années*, Paris, Lévy, 1862, p. 231.

psychological activities centred upon Stendhal are placed in parenthesis, well-known facts take on a new arrangement and reveal sociological realities which have so far remained almost unnoticed. Reciprocally, the work itself is seen in a new light. Thus, three problems which from my first documents appear crucial are also at the heart of three of Stendhal's pre-novel works: those of naturalism, romanticism and money. *De l'Amour, Racine et Shakespeare, D'un Nouveau Complot* are tentative replies to these problems, works of transition towards the novel.

The question of naturalism is never posed in theoretical form but it emerges from a series of findings. Stendhal's affectation, well known and so far considered as a psychological trait, is pointed out by many of his friends; Jacquemont calls it *Je-moi*¹, Mérimée notices his tendency to 'exaggerate the importance of his acts and words,² and Delécluze is irritated by his 'affectation of naturalism'.³ It is also known that Stendhal returned these criticisms: sometimes applying them to the same persons who levelled them at him, like Jacquemont whom he also called *Je-moi*, sometimes to others, and sometimes to the French as a whole. Questions have been asked about these various comments, taken separately. Were Stendhal's judgements objective? Had he a private obsession? Who was right, he or his friends? Actually it is enough to compare all passages of this kind, to whomsoever they were addressed, to find that there was nothing peculiar to Stendhal in this and that all his friends spent their time accusing each other of affectation or its equivalents: vanity, pride, pretentiousness, acting, imitation, pedantry, regard for conventions of fashions, ready-made opinions taken from a newspaper or a party, etc. The fact is that everyone was pursuing a dream of originality, ingenuousness, naturalness, in short, of personal independence. It is not surprising that the commonest accusation was precisely an affected naturalism: when naturalness is a virtue, everyone practises it, and it is no longer possible for anyone to live it directly. The most clear minded feel it and perceive this impossibility in themselves (J. J. Ampère, tired of 'seeing himself acting', plans 'to be what I am')⁴ or in their contemporaries (Albert Stapfer, after begging the public to show simplicity of judgement concerning literature, writes as a note: 'When I reread these words, I wonder if it is not simple-minded to expect this from men of the nineteenth century').⁵ They look for naturalism in past ages, or in countries that are still backward, Greece (Fauriel), Spain (Mérimée), Italy (Jacquemont, Delécluze) and note its absence in the more advanced countries: French vanity, British cant, American conformity. They never abandoned their quest, however, and probably the most revealing passage is the chapter of *De l'Amour* on naturalism, in which every

1. *Letters to A. Chaper*, p. 65.

2. *Correspondance Générale*, Vol. I, Paris, Le Divan, 1946, p. 246.

3. *Journal*, Paris, Grasset, 1948, p. 177.

4. *Journal*, Paris, L. de Launay, 1927, p. 167.

5. Note on Goethe, at the beginning of the translation of *Œuvres Dramatiques*, Paris, Sautélet, 1825, p. 10.

paragraph gives a recipe for achieving it, while the whole chapter shows with striking clarity the inevitable failure of all these attempts, the impossibility of a transparent and direct relationship between two beings. What these seekers after nature do not see is that their dream is inevitably inseparable from the impossibility of realizing it, that the one is as modern as the other, and that both are products of the same world: from the moment when all value lies in individual independence, and all social influence is felt as a degradation, it is no longer possible for any life in society, that is to say any life at all, to be lived naturally. If there were spontaneous and immediate agreement between the individual and his environment, no one would talk about acting, or copying, or conventions; in short, if naturalism existed, there would be no further discussion about it. This is what the very form of the novel was to express; the biography of an individual who tries to be natural will show him wavering between the rejection of social ties, that is to say, madness and ineffectiveness, and the acceptance of spurious social ties, of the mask and of acting, dreaming simultaneously of absolute liberty and of transparent relationships with others.

This question of naturalism throws light upon another, that of romanticism, which in the case of Stendhal was posed in two forms: first, the co-existence before 1826 of two very different romanticisms, that of the poets and that which Stendhal upholds in *Racine et Shakespeare*, the focal point of which is the *milieu* described above (Delécluze's garret and *The Globe*); secondly, the existence of a set of problems common to the novel and to the romantic vision of the world (a gulf between values and realities, and between the individual and society) to which contrary replies are given. Romanticism chooses values and the individual as opposed to social reality, while the novel demands the impossible fusion of two requirements. What were the sociological bases of the relationship between the opposing groups under the same name which presents simultaneously a community and a divergence of thought? Without exhausting the very complex subject of the evolution of romanticism in France after 1826, that is to say, at the very time when Stendhal's novels were being written, a few remarks on the period with which we are dealing may provide the outline of a reply.

The first romantic poetry, that of Lamartine, de Vigny, the young Hugo, and the dramatic romanticism of Stendhal had neither ideas nor literary *genre* in common, and at first sight they seem to meet only in joint opposition to the classical tradition. On looking more closely, we find in both the same claim to originality in the name of which precisely they attack classicism, and the same individual dissatisfaction concerning social relationships. This common factor, however, enters into the content of two very different views of the world, the sociological bases of which are also different. The romantic poets are linked with aristocratic circles; it could be said that with the Faubourg Saint-Germain, they have the same type of marginal connexion that Stendhal and his *milieu* have with the liberal party. They are neither its ideologists nor its official poets

but they share its political and religious opinions on the problematical planes. Nostalgia for the past and for the 'beyond' forms a coherent whole with individual unease; unsatisfied with the world as it is, the poet can at least give a form to his dream of escape. It might be thought that rejection of the former conventions involved a contradiction, but the poet was unwilling above all things to be a modernist: he sought his points of reference beyond classicism, either in a feudal past or in the pre-revolutionary literature of countries like Germany. This coherence made romantic works possible beginning with this period; the lack of contact with reality and the present condemned them to vagueness and a certain poverty of subject-matter, but these are not insuperable obstacles to lyric poetry.

Liberal romanticism, on the other hand, remained theoretical and gave birth to only a few experimental plays (the most important was Mérimée's *Théâtre de Clara Gazul*). It contained insurmountable internal contradictions, several of which were indeed consciously felt by its supporters and formed the essence of discussions held at Delécluze's around 1925. It wanted to be up to date and liberal: Jacquemont compares the literary quarrel with the scientific and political quarrels, progress versus reaction. Thus he described one old professor as 'classical even in geology: respect for once-held opinions, scorn of the modern. That is a form of love for the *legitimacy*'.¹ Being romantic is primarily to write for Frenchmen of 1824 and not for those of the century of Louis XIV. But it is also to write, without conventions, original and natural works; classicism is condemned, not only in its nineteenth-century imitators, but again in the great authors of the seventeenth century, as the product of a society in which the good form of the Court and the imitation of the royal pattern were paramount. This necessitated opposing the 'former-conventional' combination to a combination of 'modern-original'. But it was just this originality which was felt to be problematic in the modern world: *Racine et Shakespeare* is full of satirical observations about upstarts with a respect for acquired reputations, about young liberals who draw their opinions from their newspapers, etc. Whether it was in the actual plot of the plays, in the *genre* adopted, tragic or comic, or in the public for whom they were intended, the same contradiction was always present. The conclusions implicit in *Racine et Shakespeare*—those which the author may have wished to avoid but which crop up everywhere in his book² and turn the pamphlet into an essay, into a work of interrogation instead of affirmation—are that originality has no established abode, that the public is reduced to one potential solitary reader, that modern work cannot be anything but a criticism of modern life, and that the need is for novel-writing. This was contradictory thinking but was closer to reality than the thinking of the romanticists; it became clear that, once its contradictions were accepted, it would be enabled to give birth to the problematic and realistic *genre*

1. *Lettres à Jean de Charpentier*, p. 65. The italic is Jacquemont's.

2. Mainly in the second part. See pp. 333-6 of the Divan edition, Paris, 1928.

of the novel. It was also clear that criticism of modern life had developed at two levels marginal to the major divisions of class and party, but had changed its meaning according to their fundamental loyalties: the 'yes and no' of the novel developed in an environment where there was no sociological basis for regret for the past or for an appeal to the life beyond, where dissatisfaction was destined to remain without ideological support and to coexist with acquiescence.

Concerning the problem of the economy and of the part played by money, the preliminary results of my research raised an objection which I made at the beginning with regard to L. Goldmann's hypotheses. The economic and social relationships in which he saw the basis of the romantic *genre* would, it seemed to me, by their nature remain hidden from the individuals who experienced them and be expressible only in a very indirect and very remote fashion. Now I have found, among Stendhal and his friends, the existence of a very lively, conscious and avowed interest in political economy. There were economists among his associates: Destutt de Tracy, Dunoyer, Cercllet, Alexis de Jussieu. He was not the only one to have read Adam Smith, Malthus, J. B. Say and Ricardo. These were discussed at Delécluze's, Fauriel speaks of them with his friend Mary Clarke, and Jacquemont ends one of his letters with the words: 'My dear friend, political economy is the devil!'¹

What in fact was hidden from them were the fundamental mechanisms which could only be analysed from the standpoint of another class. But the problems were consciously expressed in concrete and non-theoretical terms at the point where economic realities and daily life converge. The problems, for instance, of the antagonism between value in exchange and value in use, was raised from the consumer's standpoint by Jacquemont. He criticizes the Americans for knowing no other pleasure than 'the consumption of the product of earlier work; the consumption of a value'.² Contrary to the theory that time is money, he demands an opportunity to use time freely, for pleasure or for thought: buying a book, he says, costs an American manufacturer little, but he cannot afford the time to read it. Lastly, he contrasts the relationship of money to things with a use relationship, friendly and direct: 'Here (in India) it is of no concern to me that I use a different glass or knife every time; but at home there is a knife which has been mine for ten years, there is also a glass that is mine, and a Sèvres china cup . . . which is also mine by custom. I like this knife, this glass and this cup Setting aside all philosophical cant, I say that I prefer not to be rich. I believe I have more liking for people and things. . . . A man who possesses a hundred women loves none of them: for him, they are just things, and, as for us, we can almost turn things into people.'³

1. *Letters to A. Chaper*, p. 183.

2. *Correspondance Inédite*, op. cit., p. 173.

3. *ibid.*, p. 235.

It is as 'producers', however, that artists and writers resent the role of money most keenly, and that of advertisement (it is called 'puffing' and is mainly contained in newspapers) which is inseparable from it. A painter returning from Italy deplores the situation of painting in France, where 'a man must decide to turn his art into a trade . . .'.¹ J. J. Ampère writes: 'writing poetry for money is like making love'.² But, as Stendhal says, a writer is a 'manufacturer', who adds a value to his sheet of paper and must, once his work is finished, willy-nilly 'get himself sold'. 'I am only an author', writes Delécluze, 'I only feel the dignity of my profession when I am at work in my study. As soon as my work has taken the form of a book, is bound, and I know that it is on sale, I feel I have become a book-seller. After all, one must have some occupation or other in this world.'³

These circumstances attending literary production are felt to be linked directly with modern society. The objective truth of this impression remains to be proved, but it accords with what is generally recognized by historians and economists. On the other hand, there is a will towards individual independence, which is the product of the very same sociological conditions, and which renders writers and artists more susceptible to the constraints of the market than to other constraints in other times, those of patronage, for instance.

The role of money figures also in human relations, in marriage ('a market for money and vanity') and in love and friendship. It reduces acknowledged opinions to pretexts: 'We are royalists, knights, divines, etc. . . . exclusively to the extent that money allows,' writes Delécluze;⁴ moreover, he mentions 'this tacit confession which everybody makes, this secret pact to live only for money or power', which destroys 'all those attachments and props which force self-respect upon men'.⁵

Lastly, among those travellers in search of a better social order, who constantly compare one country with another, among those liberals who are fond of 'journeying into the possible', the relationships between political freedom and money, between the wealth of nations and human happiness, dominate all discussion. Sarah de Tracy is shocked by the role of money in the American Republic, and Jacquemont answers her: 'Your error is in immediately associating a republic with Sparta, and you don't believe that love of wealth and respect for it go hand in hand with republican opinions; in this you see an inconsistency, an abandonment of principles, mistakenly in my opinion; for there is a republic, I think, in the United States, and wealth there is almost the only mark of social superiority.' There are differences of opinion concerning the form of government and daily life: France and Italy, France and America are endlessly compared and contrasted; on the whole, which is the one to choose? which is happier,

1. Mlle Duvidal, quoted by Delécluze.

2. *Correspondance* II, p. 8.

3. *Journal*, p. 194.

4. *ibid.*, p. 70.

5. *Correspondance Inédite*, op. cit., p. 203.

the poor peasant in Greece or the English artisan, etc? These are unanswerable questions, which recur in Stendhal's *Voyages* and which always lead to the conclusion that the modern world, the world of freedom, is ruled by money.

And this is the question that forms the gist of Stendhal's last work before he became a novelist: the twenty-page pamphlet entitled *D'un Nouveau Complot contre les Industriels*.¹ It openly attacks a Saint-Simonist newspaper, *Le Producteur*, and the last published work of the master, *Le Catéchisme des Industriels*. Stendhal, however, gives a significant twist to Saint-Simon's ideas, diverting them towards the problem that interests him. Saint-Simon paid practically no attention to the question of money, and in particular to the differences between rich and poor, which were overshadowed by the major contrasts between the producers (or manufacturers) and the idle. This class as a whole, described as 'the industrial talent' was cast by him for the role of 'judging the value of all other kinds of ability'.² Stendhal, however, faithful to the logic not of Saint-Simon but of *bourgeois* society, immediately interprets this as follows: 'Since the front rank of society as disposed by Saint-Simon is rather numerous, including as it does all the shoe-makers, all the bricklayers, all the labourers, etc., and many others, it is apparently necessary to arrange the members of this class, which is at the head of all the others, according to their success, in other words according to their *wealth*. But who is the head of this class in Paris? Who is the man to be the *judge of every ability*? Obviously, it is the richest among the industrialists, Monsieur de Rothschild. . . .'³ And it is this idea that the pamphlet attacks, the acknowledged recognition of wealth as a value and a measure of values.

But why, it may be asked, look for this idea in Saint-Simon where it does not exist, when it is to be found much more clearly, for instance, in the writings of an apologist of industry such as Dunoyer, whom Stendhal knew well? In Dunoyer's work, entitled *L'Industrie et la Morale considérées dans leur Rapport avec la Liberté*, a constant association is found between virtue, riches, and ability, together with such formulas as 'In the social state I am describing (the real industrial society) wealth entitles people to respect. Should I not therefore support the charge made against the Americans that they speak of unsuccessful men with a sort of disdain?'⁴ Dunoyer is a brave and persecuted liberal, however, and Stendhal is bound to him by a fundamental solidarity⁵ whereas Saint-Simon had

1. Published by H. Martineau, *Mélanges de Littérature*, Divan edition, Vol. II, p. 217 et seq. The unreferenced quotations are all taken from these few pages.

2. Beginning of the *Catéchisme des Industriels*. Saint-Simon sometimes talks of the major manufacturers, as representative of the whole, but vaguely, the point is not made clear.

3. The italics are Stendhal's, as in all the subsequent quotations.

4. Dunoyer, *L'Industrie et la Morale considérées dans leur Rapport avec la Liberté*, Paris, Sautelet, 1825, p. 380.

5. It is not a case of worldly wisdom. Stendhal knew Dunoyer well, a friend of the de Tracy's and of Jacquemont; but the editor of the *Producteur*, Cercllet, used to come to Delécluze's garret and Stendhal knew him also personally. Concerning Dunoyer, Stendhal wrote after 1830 that he was 'the best intentioned, perhaps the most heroic and the most stupid of

criticized the liberal party and appealed to Louis XVIII. Stendhal sees an opportunity of reconciling his positions, of being able both to speak as a liberal and to attack the power of money: for that reason he undertakes to write a pamphlet because, in order to attack, it is necessary to have a non-problematical position to uphold. But Stendhal's distortion of Saint-Simon does not resolve the internal contradictions of his own thinking, and the pamphlet is split down the middle by a cleavage between two heterogeneous systems of thought.

On the one hand, he speaks in praise of industry as inseparable from technical (defence of the canals and railways) but especially from political progress, and himself claims to be a 'manufacturer' because, he says, 'the blank sheet of paper which cost me a penny is sold for a hundred times more after it has been blackened'. This is to recognize a factual solidarity. In his view, industry 'which proposes that we go into trade and wishes to have dealings with us' is worth more than 'privilege which claims to take away all our rights from us by main force'. It produces the liberal virtues of reason and a critical mind, and Stendhal hopes to see up to one hundred of the 'best-known industrialists' in the elected chamber. Finally, 'the money market has need of a certain degree of freedom, because without it there would be no public credit', and as the nobility, attracted by the profit to be gained, will invest their money in industry, 'privilege itself will become the friend of this sector of indispensable freedom . . . so that all manufacturing may prosper'. As a matter of history, therefore, the link between industry and political freedom is clear to Stendhal just as, by way of consequence, is the usefulness of manufacturers to the general interest. From the viewpoint of the utilitarianism of Helvetius and Bentham, which was always his position in theory, the industrialists are entirely estimable, and this word is constantly repeated.

This category of 'estimable' is contrasted with another, however, and this at first sight appears to be only a higher degree of it (in one place the expression 'the highest esteem' is found), but actually it is qualitatively different; it is 'admirable' (or 'sublime' or 'heroic', deserving of 'gratitude', 'fame', 'immortality'; all these terms are of the same order). It includes the values of art (represented by Béranger and Lamartine), of science (Cuvier and Laplace), of military courage and civic courage in all its forms, whether that of a parliamentary deputy or of liberators of their countries (Bolivar, Washington, or those who have fought for a noble cause (La Fayette in America) or those who died in such a struggle (Santa Rosa and Byron in Greece). Like the manufacturers—more than they, says Stendhal, but that is not quite the question—these men have been useful to the largest number. But in another way, whereas the industrialists have done good for the public '*in pursuit of their private good*' or more

liberal writers. Take it from me, who am a member of their party, that is saying a lot'. *Souvenirs d'Égotisme*, Paris, Pléiade, p. 1453. If the whole sentence is read carefully, and it is remembered that liberal solidarity was naturally more alive before 1830, Stendhal's political position will be found in it, expressed very lucidly.

exactly their financial interests, men who deserve admiration have in common a disinterestedness ('not looking for payment', despising its millions', a 'dupe' who 'will die in poverty' . . . a list of the expressions of this kind would be tedious). Whether they have been directly useful through their sacrifice or devotion, or through work done for its own sake and valuable in itself, the relationship between the individual and the community is transparent: the individual gives his work or his life; he receives recognition and fame. In the other type of relationship, the individual supplies something useful in order to receive money in exchange. The 'integrity', upon which contracts rest, is the subject of general esteem, but no other sentiment should or can intervene. The whole irony of the pamphlet is directed at the claim by industrialists to receive 'a big reward from public opinion' for having enriched themselves.

But even though the definition of the two types of utility is clear, the foundations of the moral judgement which Stendhal passes upon them are shaky. He accepts no other ground than that of utility; from this standpoint, however, the industrialists are beyond reproach. In Adam Smith's phrase, 'an invisible hand, turns the individual egoist into an involuntary benefactor of mankind; this is the basic assumption of political economy and Stendhal never thought of questioning it. It is very close to the thinking of Helvetius for whom every act, even that which seems to be the most disinterested, like Regulus going to his death in Carthage, is motivated by personal interest and can only be judged by whether this interest coincides or conflicts with the public good. There is only one little difference between them: the intermediary of money, the quest of profit instead of the quest of happiness. But Adam Smith's system is the tangible expression of Helvetius': an individualism which excludes money and is directly bestowed upon a human community is Utopian and, in the novels, it will survive only in the form of nostalgia. Stendhal fails to perceive this in the *Nouveau Complot*. He believes that he can 'carefully measure his esteem for usefulness', but logic deserts him when he goes on to say: 'to arrive at high esteem, it is generally necessary that advantage be *sacrificed* to some noble cause'. This was evident to his friend Duvergier de Hauranne: 'Duty, sacrifice, merit, what do these words mean and what would Helvetius have said of them?'¹ Stendhal always refused to acknowledge it: that would have meant, according to the thinking of his age, that he accepted a transcendental basis of values, some form or other of religion. His whole originality consisted in the earthly and realistic search for a remote system of values.

In point of fact, liberalism made good use of the notions of sacrifice and disinterestedness. Stendhal thought he could speak on behalf of liberal morality when he accused the industrialists of having more concern for money than for freedom, where the two conflicted, and of having lent money to the Turks in their fight against the Greeks and to the Holy Alliance

1. *The Globe*, 4 October 1829. Quoted by F. Rude in *Stendhal et la Pensée Sociale de son Temps*, Paris, Plon, 1967, p. 177.

when opposing freedom in Spain. He reproaches them especially for their inconsistency, for forgetting that disinterested sacrifice was called for in order to establish their own power: 'If Greece succeeds in becoming free, thousands of traders will settle there. . . . But will theirs be the wisdom to make the good laws which enable trade to flourish? Will theirs have been the courage needed to exterminate the Turks and to put these good laws into force?'

This might prompt other questions: did the fault lie with inconsistency among the industrialists, or with an internal contradiction in liberalism? If heroic sacrifice were to result in the opening of a new market for dealers in mahogany, did not the sacrifice itself become a fraud? Stendhal does not put these questions in the *Nouveau Complot*, where the liberal ideal remains altogether positive. In the novels, the very fact that this ideal is marginal and is not shown as a solution for the hero, that Octave commits suicide at the sight of Greece and does not die for its liberties, shows that it has become problematic.

The transitional character of the *Nouveau Complot*, however, the effort to give a positive context to an idea which is already problematical, is seen mainly in connexion with the 'thinking class'. Stendhal appears here, for the first and only time in his life, as the spokesman of a class. It is that class which should be the real judge of merit, which should 'shape' public opinion, which grants recognition and fame to great men, and which reacts as a body against the contempt of the nobility and the rich. This class is defined as that 'of people with a private income of six thousand francs. Such people alone have the *leisure* to form an opinion of their own and not that of their newspaper. Thinking is the least expensive of pleasures. The wealthy find thinking insipid and get into their carriages to go to the opera; they do not allow themselves time to think. The poor man has not got that time; he has to work eight hours a day and his mind is at full stretch to do his job well'. Half way between indigence and riches, the type of *milieu* which Stendhal frequented is familiar; but it is idealized, for the needs of his case, that is, to provide a social basis for a liberal ideology.¹ We have seen that in reality, as soon as the 'thinking gives birth to a book, it again encounters the universal question of money, of which it is acutely conscious.' Scarcely a trace of this thinking class is to be found in the novels. What they convey, on the other hand, is that there is no *milieu* that affords sanctuary and that each individual encounters the problem in its entirety, wherever he sees and wherever he comes from.

Stendhal's romantic thought is not found anywhere ready-made in his pre-novel works, neither surrounding him in a *milieu* of which he is simply the reflection nor in his essays. Sociological study, however, has already made it possible to circumscribe the problem of creation more accurately. In the first place it has eliminated the preliminary questions which a

1. Paul-Louis Courier, also, felt the need to write liberal pamphlets and to speak on behalf of a class: the class of the small independent peasant, represented by Paul-Louis, a wine grower of Véréts.

certain tradition of criticism asked of literary sociology. Stendhal's place in society is not incidental nor unimportant in his work; he owes much more to it than the subject-matter of the romantic tale: the very structure of his thought. Around him and in his work we find the elaboration of categories which are to be the fundamental categories of the novels. But they are not all there: there is still lacking, for instance, the link between the impossibility of naturalism and the power of money; this in the novels will find a form which is not theoretical but perfectly specific: the structure of the intermediate. Most of all, there is lacking the will to renounce constructing a conceptual and non-contradictory system, it is this effort that makes the pre-romantic works incoherent, while the concrete and paradoxical form of the novel finds another kind of coherence. The how and the why of this change remains to be sought; but the questions have already become more precise. Lastly our hypotheses concerning the sociology of the novel are confirmed on one important point. The first great romantic work of the French nineteenth century sprang from a *milieu* and an author who was perfectly aware of the new economic and social relationships, of the status of the individual in a society dominated by exchange value and of the problematic character which, in this society, any other value tends to acquire. Here we have an intermediate between a decisive moment in the evolution of sociology—the beginning of the industrial era—and a decisive moment in the history of the novel.

[*Translated from the French*]

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Methodological reflections suggested by the study of groups of limited complexity: outline of a sociology of mediaeval love poetry

Matthias Waltz

A work of literature is a social fact: a symbolic world, created by an author to be shared by a number of people,¹ thus necessarily creating a bond between them. All those encompassed within the structure—and amongst these are also numbered, with certain reservations, critics, philologists, literary historians—are attuned to this symbolic world and can therefore only experience, but not perceive its total structure. It follows that the primary function of literary sociology consists in stepping outside this structure so as to view it as a whole.

This method of observation is valid only on condition that the structure considered is relatively delimited, that is to say, it must be possible to describe it as a meaningful whole with the aid of its internally active relationships. That being given, the only significant factor concerning this structure, and therefore the work itself, is the relationships created in the audience by the common orientation towards the symbolic world; all other possible attributes that audience may possess can merely be of secondary significance.

The foregoing definition can therefore also be formulated in the following terms: a literary work is a symbolic world created by the author on the implicit assumption that it will constitute the centre of a group defined by its common attitude towards that world. How such a group is imagined, whether ephemeral or durable, whether pre-existing and only to be made conscious of itself or whether as yet to be created, may here remain an open question.

The problem to be dealt [with] arises from this definition: works must first be analysed with regard to the group concept which they imply. Literary history thus becomes a history of such concepts. Starting from this point, there are two possibilities. One can work back from the group to the literary work and inquire why especially this group needs literature (instead

1. As can be seen, we are not dealing here with real people—for the intention is not to conduct an audience sociology—but with imaginary ones. Yet these people are not altogether arbitrarily invented by the author: they are people he believes or perhaps hopes exist.

of ritual, military parades or similar manifestations) as a symbolic object in order to create the required relationship between its members. This enables us to describe the social function of the writer in individual cases, and perhaps one day also to formulate generalizations.¹ On the other hand, one may investigate the position of these group concepts—or perhaps also of actual groups—within the real social organization, and go on to analyse the social and economic causes of changes to be observed in these concepts.

In what follows, the evolution of the group concept which underlies love poetry until the Renaissance is to be sketched: wider problems will be touched upon only marginally. This includes a naturally summary interpretation of the meaning of this body of literature. For if it is true that the horizon of a group is in fact significant for literary creativity, it follows that literary sociology, going beyond intuitive understanding, provides the only firm methodological basis for the interpretation of such works, the horizon not being necessarily common for author and critic. The subject and the results do not matter. While certain new questions may arise, the chief purpose of this outline is to present the methodology.²

For even if a method is applied only playfully, its scope and fruitfulness, as well as its weaknesses and difficulties, are better illustrated than in an abstract presentation. It is appropriate to develop the method by the use of a mediaeval example where relationships are still much easier to survey than later. The temporal extension of the subject is provided by the approach, which is most applicable to major upheavals.

Some principles also fundamental to early French poetry can be completely and strikingly illustrated by reference to *The Iliad*. We therefore begin with a short examination of this epic. *The Iliad* shows two competing group structures: one may be represented by Achilles, the greatest hero, and the other by Agamemnon, the most powerful prince. One group is based on a kind of relationship characterized by otherness: uncle and nephew,

1. Literary sociology of Marxist origin seeks a *priori* and non-historic definitions for the function of great literature, derived from the vital aspirations of individuals. Empirical sociology, which takes the real audience as its point of origin, cannot evolve definitions which open up approaches to the work itself: at best, it can explain certain reasons for success or failure.
2. Studies in the same spirit as this outline which can be cited in its support are the works of my teacher, Erich Köhler, on troubadour poetry and the courtly epic: Erich Köhler *Ideal und Wirklichkeit in der höfischen Epik. Studien zur Form der frühen Arturs- und Graldichtung*, supplement to *Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie*, No. 97, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1956, p. 262. A summary in French appeared in *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*; Brussels, No. 2, 1963, pp. 271-84. By the same author: *Troubadour-lyrik und höfischer Roman. Aufsätze zur französischen und provenzalischen Literatur des Mittelalters, Neue Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft*, Vol. 15, Berlin, Rütten & Loening, 1962, p. 304; and my own examination of early French epics, *Rolandslied, Wilhelmlied, Alexiuslied. Zur Struktur und geschichtlichen Bedeutung*. Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1965, p. 207 (*Studia Romanica*, No. 9). Much of interest to the sociology of literature is also contained in the great work by Poirion on the courtly poetry of the late Middle Ages: Daniel Poirion, *Le Poète et le Prince. L'Évolution du Lyrisme Courtois de Guillaume de Machaut à Charles d'Orléans*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1965 (Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Grenoble 35).

younger brother and older brother, ruler and ruled, husband and wife, priest and layman, each represents something else for everyone, and each is whatever he happens to be for the other at the time. For the other group structure, the relationships between those who are alike, the relationships of rivalry, are characteristic. Consequently, a different type of action appears here. In the first group, action always serves concrete aims arising from the real desires and needs of the group and the individual. In the second case, on the other hand, only such actions are meaningful as are common to members of the group of rivals: out of the possible gamut a few are selected which, measurable by a common standard, become comparable.

Let us weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the two group structures. It is of course not coincidental that Achilles dies young: after all, he has subordinated the whole existing variety of human relationships to those of the most intensive nature: fighting, winning, killing. What he loses is life: to 'enjoy the fortune that my old father Peleus had made'.¹

In this way, he also gains a new dimension of consciousness and a new freedom. Agamemnon's every action has a concrete, externally determined motivation. Achilles chooses his life because it is beautiful, great, intensive. This is a fresh dimension where he is independent of the constricting relationships of otherness and where the criteria of choice lie within himself. He gains most in the public character of his life. For action in the world of otherness is only significant in the concrete situation of the group; the 'specialized' action which Achilles has chosen is significant in itself, quite independently of any concrete situation: its fame goes beyond reality.

In the *Chanson de Roland*, the distinction between the two group structures is more clearly developed, and the poet has sharply taken sides. Roland is not confronted by any alternative, like Achilles, since nothing exists for him any longer which does not arise out of the group of rivals. His indifference to the concrete situation is carried to the point of foolishness and he finds his only joys in combat and fame. The realm of vertical relationships² is represented on the one hand by the Emperor (who is exalted into the sphere of religious responsibility) and, on the other, by Ganelon, the all-too-gentle paterfamilias, worried about this fortune and also able to appreciate the blessings of peace. To the extent to which the principle of public life based on the relationships of rivalry becomes more widely accepted all vertical relationships with the exception of combat are relegated to the private sphere;³ as soon as they try to displace the others, they are qualified as evil.

1. Homer, *The Iliad*, IX, p. 171. Translation by E. V. Rieu. Harmondsworth, Middx., Penguin Books Ltd., 1950 (World Classics, L 14).

2. We also refer to the relationships of otherness as 'vertical' to distinguish them from the 'horizontal' relationships of rivalry.

3. Alternatively they enter into the realm of dutiful action, which is not free and does not concern us here.

The triumph of Roland over Ganelon could not last. All the immediate and vital relationships—to need or to use somebody, to dominate or to be dominated, to love or to be loved—necessarily call for a distinction between oneself and the others. Achilles had already largely concentrated these relationships into a single one—combat—but he fought for aims important to him and against enemies whom he respected and hated. In the *Chanson de Roland*, where the hero is fundamentally disinterested in aims and does not know his enemies, combat itself ceases to be a part of reality and becomes something akin to sport: in such a life, there is only one event and that is death. Death is consequently the great theme of the poem. The group portrayed in the *Chanson de Roland* must therefore choose between renouncing all vertical relationships or abandoning that vital element of noble persons, the public character of life. For those who seek to uphold both claims—to act publicly and yet find a reality in action—this world will prove to be empty. Such is the situation and such the aspirations from which courtly love springs, they allow its essential features to be understood.

First of all, a general problem: how is it that love, which in the *Chanson de geste* is still something private, suddenly becomes a universal value? It is in love that the aspiration towards the total and free relationship of otherness (involving the whole person) can again be fulfilled, an aspiration which always remained alive and realizable for the noble members within the group but for which the old politico-militaristic reality now no longer provided any outlet. It therefore follows that the troubadours could assert quite naturally that their conception of love was as much a public matter, of general interest, as the heroic deeds of Roland.

Only a force which engages man as a whole, and can also destroy him, can be set against the by now empty but none the less effective power of the old politico-militaristic sphere. This is why so much emphasis must be laid on the absolute power of love, and why ecstatic states of feeling, lifting one out of reality, must be so highly praised.

Similarly, the masochistic element inherent in this conception of love—the pleasure of submission—can also be explained by reference to the history of the aspiration of which love has here become the carrier. In the epic, all the relationships of otherness became concentrated in the single ‘sadistic’ relationship of combat, which thus acquired the character of generality and comparability needed by the group of rivals. If love is set up as the universal relationship in opposition to combat, which has become hollowly ‘sadistic’, its masochistic aspect is necessarily underlined: he who flees emptiness does not seek the power of the self but that of discovered reality.

Yet this does not explain the most striking characteristic of the courtly concept of love: the emphasis on the lady’s inaccessibility, the predilection for separation and absence, the reluctance to describe the happy moments of love. In the structural context this can be explained as follows. No troubadour would say, like Sappho:

'Some there are who say that the fairest thing seen
on the black earth is an array of horsemen,
some, men marching, some would say ships, but I say
she whom one loves best.'¹

For Sappho, the group which elevates love to its central value is evidently only one amongst many. Courtly love presents a more far-reaching, universal aspiration: it seeks to describe the true form of the noble life. For this purpose, courtly love must integrate the concrete social tasks corresponding to such a life in a new manner. This is only possible if love is understood in terms of absence: politico-militaristic action has no longer any meaning (to this extent the courtly system radicalizes real historical developments) but is given a new meaning in the context of a knight's individual life: it betokens the knight's worthiness of his lady's love. This typical relationship in the courtly world, where what is currently meaningless is referred to an absent meaning, naturally assumed the unfulfillable nature of love. The danger of fulfilled love for the courtly knight therefore belongs to the original themes of the courtly epic. The situation—the loss of possible vertical relationships within the old public sphere—offered two extreme escapes: to found a group either on the basis of a privileged relationship, or on absence, on the aspiration itself. Greek love poetry stands nearer to the first extreme, courtly poetry to the second.

The emergence and structure of the group supporting courtly poetry seems to be the result of an attempt to preserve in a new form certain essential aspirations which, in the former condition of the group, presented no problems but became difficult to realize in the transformed situation. In order to describe the thematic content of courtly poetry as an understandable whole, it was sufficient to be acquainted with the group structure; social conditions were of interest only in so far as they represented the situation in which group aspirations were realized and therefore conditioned the form of this realization. Beyond that, however, one must inquire after the causes of the transformation of the situation. For the greater part of our description, it sufficed to assume one transformation: that the old politico-militaristic sphere of public life had been emptied of meaning. This transformation can be explained by very generalized historical developments, for example, the increasing scale of groups, their rational organization and the consequently emerging division of labour. Such a general explanation fits the fact that we can observe the rise of love poetry in connexion with related features in various cultures at comparable moments of their historical development. To understand the particular characteristics of courtly poetry, one must be more precise. One must determine which economic, social or politically defined classes were particularly affected by a certain turn of events, or were in a specially favourable position to react to it. Thus Erich Köhler has shown that, for courtly love, the lower nobility, the knights, played such a special role. The special situation of

1. Sappho, *Twelve Greek Lyrics*, 13. Translated by Richard Lattimore, Bryn Mawr, 1949.

the carrier class will influence the concrete formation of group structure. The characteristic tendency of courtly love to regard itself as a universally valid form and to integrate all the social activities of the nobility is certainly a result of the socio-political aspirations of the lower nobility. But such aspirations can never find immediate expression in literature; it is only through the influence they exercise on particular forms of realization of group aspirations that they become indirectly significant for literature. The group structure is a mediating level which must not be passed over. This also solves the problem of why a form of life created by the lower nobility was accepted with such alacrity by the higher ranks of the aristocracy: it is a universal group aspiration for which the knights, due to their special position, could find a means of realization.

The system of courtly poetry whose thematic structure we have described remained stable for some time; a major change of theme and form only occurs around the turn of the fourteenth century. As for the themes, it is noticeable that love as a concrete feeling towards a realistically presented lady, who is not a collection of abstract qualities, loses its meaning. It begins to border on the frivolous: whereas previously love represented the loftiest possible life for the knight, it now becomes almost an occupation for the young who must sow their wild oats. The kind of life actually portrayed in the love lyrics obviously becomes a specific matter which no longer lays any claims to universality. If our interpretation of classic court poetry was correct, the group attitude which it transformed into reality—the aspiration of the nobility towards a total and free relationship of otherness and towards the public character and the universality of this relationship—will have to create a new means of expression, and the continuity between the two forms should be recognizable. In fact, love poetry develops in yet another direction, which Poirion very aptly calls *une poésie de l'existence*. The lady becomes ever more remote, and sometimes disappears altogether: the poet is now *l'homme esgaré qui ne scet ou il va*, who wanders about in *la forest d'Ennuyouse Tristesse*.¹ This is the same state of affairs which also resulted from the increasingly frivolous character of love: love is no longer a sphere of universality. But this only leads to different conclusions in each case. In one case, there is adherence to the actual contact² and renunciation of universality, that is to say of the belief that love has total power over man. In the other case, there is adherence to universality, but it is found that the contact which corresponds to this aspiration becomes increasingly difficult to make and threatens to disappear altogether. The unfulfilled yearning about which the poets of the classical period lamented now appears as unattainable happiness. The classical poets still experienced the complete contact, albeit as pain: now the poet no longer even thinks of winning the lady's love and considers himself

1. Charles d'Orléans, *Poésies*, ballad 63. Edited by P. Champion. Paris, CFMA, 1956.

2. 'Contact' here and below is an abbreviation which stands for relationships of otherness

fortunate to experience the pain of separation which sweeps through his whole being. Such poetry is nevertheless universal because it continues to express the by now unrealizable aspiration of the knight to pursue the knightly existence (actually realized in the older poetry), that is to say, the ability to commit oneself completely to a freely chosen and universally valid aim.¹

A member of the high nobility such as Charles d'Orléans can still maintain the traditional aspiration of the knightly person but the major portion of serious love poetry now abandons its original function and serves other group aspirations.

In this third form of courtly love poetry we are first of all interested in the form assumed by the I of the poet. The *Roman de la Rose* here serves as a model for a process which develops in substantially the same way in poetry but is less easy to describe there. The wishes and attributes of the I are externalized and become personifications; it thus loses all its individuality and stands for the man (or for the knight) in general; the I is ultimately identical with that of every member of the group. Consequently, the situation allegorically constructed around this I is a general one in the sense that everyone in reality forms part of it. In classical court poetry the universality of the narrating I was based on a different principle. It is identical with its own particular wishes and feelings, which are not normal but extraordinary, extreme. In the same way the situation is particular and extreme. The I and the situation do, of course, possess a universal meaning; however, this does not lie in being materially identical with all other members of the group but in the fact that the I realizes the common aspiration to a relationship of otherness in a particularly intensive manner. This represents a challenge to other members of the group, who are free to seek an equally complete contact. The type of group created by such relationships is, as we have seen, that of the group of rivals. The function of literature therein is plain: it invests (along with many other institutions) a life, the content of which is no longer immediately discernible, with a public character, without which the group of rivals cannot exist. Literature in which the model I is replaced by an abstract and general one is clearly based on a different type of group in which the function of literature must also change. Earlier literature created an area for a form of public action impossible outside of it. The new poetry arises out of life as it exists without its help; it does not create any sphere of freedom leading beyond reality, reduces life to general psychological concepts and then transforms these again into personifications which now have their being in the public sphere of literature and are elaborately celebrated.² Such literature does no more than repeat those aspects of real life which it finds interesting in its own public

1. This new distance from the content of meaningful action in the group allows us to discover a new concept of space and time characterized by lack of meaning and passivity.
2. It will be remembered that the great impetus in music during this period is connected with the poetry in question.

sphere.¹ It does not create an area in which group aspirations can effectively be realized but interprets the particular ways of life which it encounters as examples of existence within the group and thus allows the individual to understand and feel the universal significance of his actions.

By regarding courtly love as the expression of a certain mode of life within the group, conditioned by the historical situation, it seems possible to understand the various developments of love poetry as the reactions to changes in the situation within a comprehensive system. In the above interpretation, this succeeded only in the case of the first two lines of development: the 'frivolous' one and that represented by Charles d'Orléans. The break in the third line of development between the concrete model I and the abstract, generalized I cannot be deduced from within the system; here the group attitude essential for courtly poetry is suddenly abandoned. This shows that the chosen field of observation is too narrow: at this point other, no doubt non-aristocratic, group attitudes penetrate courtly love.²

But even if the system described completely, the problem of the cause of transformations would remain, in our case the question: why can love no longer be universal? In other words, why does it become increasingly difficult to found a group convinced of its universality based on the aspiration towards public, free and total contact? This is a question for historical research; we can merely advance certain conjectures.

We will here sketch the development of groups on the religious level, since conditions here are similar but simpler. Originally, for example, in the Peace Movement in the Crusades, these groups were based on ethico-religious foundations: each member acted voluntarily in the service of God, and thereby also in that of the group. To the extent to which the entire communal life was put on this basis, the voluntary bonds were no longer adequate; they were paralleled by an organization which, under threat of force or the promise of concrete advantage, secured the necessary services. Similar consequences flowed from this development so far as the originally effective group attitudes are concerned, as can be observed in the development of courtly love. Since the conscious relationship to transcendence plays a diminishing role in reality, the conscious effort required for maintaining this relationship becomes progressively greater. Originally always visible as a polarity of action, transcendence recedes into the distance. At the same time, the real effort needed to live within the spirit of the group becomes ever smaller. In the (imaginary) ideal case where private interest appropriately constructed by the organization coincides entirely with group interest, the correct and conscious attitude of the

1. This duplication of real life by another, in which the meaning of the first is played out, is a frequent manifestation in the late Middle Ages. The literature described stands to its classical equivalent in exactly the same relationship as the purely ceremonial tournaments stand to those fought in earnest in earlier times.

2. Bourgeois religious literature can be imagined as an intermediate link which also copies courtly poetry and gives it a new meaning consistent with a different group outlook.

individual to the group demands neither the jealously admiring emulation of a model, as in courtly love, nor obedience to duty, but merely the recognition of the universal significance of what one is in any case doing for particular reasons. The third type of late mediaeval poetry emerging from the tradition of courtly love falls within the context of this group attitude.

Where there exists an aspiration to maintain a relationship to transcendence encompassing the whole of life, transcendence becomes ever more remote. But where the evocation of transcendence only serves to maintain the consciousness of what everyday life means to the group, transcendence penetrates further and further into everyday life. It no longer makes any demands, and the need to keep the general significance of individual acts explicitly in view becomes greater the more the real relationship with generality tends to get lost. In my opinion, the history of the late mediaeval theatre can be understood sociologically in this context.

The history of mediaeval love poetry seems to us to have been part of a more comprehensive development. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries social relations were conceived and ordered in a certain way as group life. The necessity to adapt group life to changing conditions led certain aspirations, amongst them that which finds expression in courtly love, to the state of paralysis and emptiness characteristic of several spheres during the late Middle Ages. The relationship between social reality and group life which evolved during the Renaissance is a reaction to this situation and therefore implies an interpretation of preceding developments.

When Villon asks the Duke of Bourbon for money he slips into the role of the jester and turns to the prince. The lucidity and wit with which he plays his part are typical of Villon; it is typical of this time that the relationship is necessarily conceived as one between two social roles. Marot, who is lying in jail and must ask for the King's help, uses his wits in an opposite manner. He laughs at the situation, at the figure he himself cuts, at the pompousness of the authorities: by standing above the situation in this jocular manner, he finds a relationship to the King which is not based on their respective social roles but precisely on the ability to rise above these and to make them the subject of a gay epistle. In the late Middle Ages, all relationships which arose out of the respective social roles were looked upon as having moral value and emotionally binding force. Villon's work shows both the notion and the reality of such relationships. To put it another way, group relationships were forced to copy actual social relationships: we have seen what a paralysing effect this had. The example of Marot's epistle shows up the, as far as we are concerned, central aspect of the innovations now coming about: one refuses to invest real social relationships with a 'human' content. This means that they no longer form an immediate part of group life but count as 'official' relationships: what meaning remains to them is derived from the 'human' relationships in the service of which they stand, according to the new

conception.¹ Under these circumstances, even the inclusion of transcendence into daily life, so characteristic of the late Middle Ages, becomes impossible. What is significant from the point of view of literary history is the consequent doom of the sacred drama.

This whole process is unthinkable in the absence of a new confidence. Whereas previously the play of interests was feared because it was felt that it drained social relations of their human content and would eventually undermine order completely, this same play of interests is now widely trusted to preserve by itself the coherence of society, to keep the world in joint without particularly forceful direction on the part of the higher interests of group life. A whole large sector of life is therefore sacrificed; formerly intrinsically meaningful, it can now be lived only by reference to something else. However, since this sector could be maintained only by almost total renunciation of freedom, such renunciation simultaneously means reconquering freedom and was understood in this manner by the contemporaries.

A short examination of love poetry allows us to discern more clearly what sort of area beyond the reality of social organization is here being discovered. The essential features of late mediaeval love poetry—the absence of the loved one, the passivity of the lover, the abstract generality of the narrating I—have disappeared. As in the classical period of courtly poetry, a group of rivals can again be founded on the aspiration towards a public and free relationship of otherness embracing the whole person. Certainly, this results in a series of significant difficulties caused by the changed relationship between the group and social reality, which find their counterpart in important innovations in the poetic system.

Love in mediaeval poetry is a complex dialectic of power, of rights and duties, which is discussed between the lady and her lover. The terminology of feudal law suits a love in which sensuous aspects are of course present but remain essentially implicit. What the troubadours are concerned about remains very similar to that with which one deals in the great affairs of real life. This explains why language allows them simply to describe more or less what they are doing. The poets of the Renaissance have abandoned the attempt to engage the whole personality in love as it appears under real social relations. Love now exists on the level of self-consciousness, of what might be called the self-consciousness of the physical person, giving the word its widest connotation. One need only recall the extreme but not untypical example of Louise Labé to understand what is meant. Thus, poetic language faces a new task. The area which is here being raised into the realm of the conscious and on which the honour of entering the public sphere is to be bestowed is so far removed from that which, in 'real life', is considered to be an important public act that poetic language can no longer follow the lines of real actions but must transform the reality of love

1. This revaluation reproduces, on another level, the development from the epic to the courtly world. Here, too, things which formerly had value in themselves, for instance property now remain universally meaningful only in their relationship with higher values.

in a quite novel manner. To explain this would mean reviewing the whole of Renaissance poetics. One striking feature by way of example: Provençal poetry always describes situations which, by their content, are meaningful for love. This is one reason for its much-lamented monotony. Renaissance poetry invents situations—for example, the poetess in conversation with her lute—which are unimportant so far as content is concerned but are particularly expressive at the desired elevated stylistic level.

The I of the courtly canzone is concrete and general, the carrier of the entire aspirations of the group. Similarly, the situation is general: every single canzone contains the complete relationship between the lover and his lady. The couple is therefore quite naturally the centre of the world. Only as much of nature is described as relates immediately to the I: the metaphorical language of this poetry makes use of the whole world for one single purpose—to celebrate the lady's beauty. In the Renaissance, the I and the situation no longer attain this degree of generality: every sonnet describes a special situation and even the cycle is not complete in the sense in which the canzone used to be. In the era of classical courtly poetry, love could create a separate group defined by its own way of life, which at least for some time enabled its members actually to free themselves of other bonds and thus became the only basis of their personality. Here lay the real meaning of being conquered by love: the individual could be universal. In later times the group founded on love remained entangled in real social relationships: instead of existing by their side, as an autonomous world, it exists within them as something super-real. He who lives only partially within the real group can never fully realize the universal life. The disappearance of the possibility of total contact led to the discovery of a new area in the late Middle Ages, an area of emptiness. The fact that this relationship cannot be fully realized now allows a happier and richer area to be created. Incomplete contact, which alone is still possible, demands a further complementary contact, and so on. Only the infinity of possibilities can compensate for the incomplete nature of each single possibility. Universality is no longer to be found in individual contact but in the area which encompasses the infinity of possible contacts. This is the area of Renaissance literature, the area which it occupies and which it creates. The poetic I can now no longer be a general one, in the old sense; it is particular and partakes of generality. Nor is it any longer the master of nature which only derives meaning from its relationship with the I. In nature the I seeks again, but at a lower level, the life which it sees only partially realized in itself and which it experiences as something higher than its own person. This form of relationship, which allows nature some autonomy, now becomes the basic principle of the metaphor. Thus nature becomes a hierarchically sub-divided area according to the extent of participation in real life, in which creatures are mutually bound by the fact that they need each other in order to compensate for their individual incompleteness.

At the outset we tried to show that literature can only be a (relatively)

defined subject, accessible to reason for the external observer if account is taken of that group which was the author's natural horizon when the work was written. In asserting this, we have done no more than adopt an attitude towards European history similar to that adopted by modern ethnology towards its subject-matter. It is immaterial whether we follow the line of Durkheim and Mauss and consider symbolic forms as a product of social thinking or, with Lévi-Strauss, reverse this relationship: in any case it has long been accepted in anthropology that groups and symbolic forms can only be understood in their relationship to each other.

Now it is difficult actually to locate the groups in the complicated societies of the *histoires chaudes* (to adopt a formulation by Lévi-Strauss). The most complete answer to this question is supplied by Marxism. Marxists hold, probably correctly (even if they do not formulate it thus) that a genuine group can only be founded on material realities. But since the horizon of its experience is that of the destroyed groups of the nineteenth century, and since an essential Marxist effort lies in showing contemporary group forms and their assigned symbolic forms as spurious and unmasking them as standing exclusively in the service of the concrete interests of the ruling classes, it has generalized the degraded relationship which, in their time, actually existed between group form and ruling-class interests and has failed to recognize the (relative) autonomy which exists at the level of the group. In the course of further developments, Marxist historians have extended and refined their views concerning the relationship between substructure and superstructure but the two mediating strata with which they have principally worked—class consciousness and vital individual aspirations—do not give a satisfactory answer to our question: a class is not a group and the individual cannot found symbolic forms.

Let us first try to define the concept of the group with greater precision. Our example of the noble form of life is again useful here: if Roland, dying alone, evidently feels that he is dying before the eyes of the group and therefore actually stages his death, the group under whose scrutiny he feels himself to be is, of course, not the concrete sum of the soldiers of the Franconian army. Not only is their number irrelevant but it would not even make any essential difference if some other Christian prince turned up with a different army. The people are interchangeable: what is characteristic is obviously the existing relationship between Roland and the representatives of the group. What we call a group is therefore not a number of somehow mutually connected people, but a system of meaningful relationships which serves its members as the basis for the interpretation of their relationship with others. Such a system can, of course, be called a group only if it exists, that is to say, if it is made up of real persons. Consequently a slight shift in verbal usage allows us to call the people who entertain these relationships, a group.

A certain concept of the person corresponds to this concept of the group: a group member is a person to the extent to which he realizes such a group relationship. The relationship can be of various forms. For the members

of the nobility it consists in the principle of public life, that is to say of representation, which can be found in Racine, as much as in the *Chanson de Roland*, and is still emphasized as characteristic in *Wilhelm Meister*. At every moment the aristocrat feels himself to represent the group: the aristocrat is always required to be a person, never a private individual.

This concept of the group as a system of meaningful relationships implicitly present in the consciousness of its members allows us to summarize in abstract form the thesis which the sketch of love poetry was intended to clarify. Groups, in the sense submitted, are the area in which symbolic forms are born and which, together with them, constitute a relatively delineated and intelligible unity. The system of relationships constituting the group possesses great stability: we can interpret the history or real group structures as the repeated attempt to integrate changing social conditions with the system, in other words to preserve the life of the group under changing conditions.

We can sketch out this history in the roughest schematic outlines. At the beginning, presumably there existed a state of affairs when all relationships important to the real group were also genuine group relationships. When developments can be discerned with greater clarity, two phases can be identified: periods in which an effort is made, through the limitation of aspirations and the training of consciousness, to adapt group life to progressively less favourable conditions (growing scale, more differentiated organization, etc.) alternate with (considerably more interesting) revolutionary periods. A whole area in which the aspirations of group life could formerly find expression is here abandoned, and now counts merely as an inevitable pre-requisite. A new, more intimate and formerly private area of life is discovered, becomes universal, becomes the area in which genuine group relationships—genuine ‘humanity’, as it was called at the time—are possible. In this manner there arises the paradox that ever larger groups have fallen back on progressively more intimate human relationships in order to preserve their consciousness as a group. This goes so far that one can ultimately assert—with increasing justification—that the only really vital relationship is that of the small child with its immediate environment and that all other relationships are mere reproductions thereof. To the extent to which the universal person—that is to say, the person living consciously in relation to group content—loses some of his freedom, since he is also entangled in those areas which are no longer integrated, a wider surrounding area in which the new universality is alive must become tangible. Each of these revolutions is a renaissance, discovers a new history, builds a wider world about itself. Development leads to the point where society can no longer honestly regard itself as a group¹ but where the aspiration towards group life, towards being a person, still exists and is expressed in a literature of total absence.

1. This is, of course, most clearly shown in the religious field but also, for example, in the fact that no relationship of dominance can any longer be regarded in good conscience as a human one.

In these summarizing remarks we have always referred to groups; in the foregoing outline only to certain group aspirations. This is the symptom of a dilemma: the group aspirations which interested us as literary historians can be isolated from the total group system only with difficulty, as the outline has shown. In order to understand their development, that of the whole group must be known. The sociology of literature needs a sociology of religion to examine the vital religious forms in their respective relationship with group structure.¹

Ideally, the literary sociologist would be acquainted with the development of the total group. He could then place works before the correct group horizon without too much trouble and devote himself to the problem of special interest to him (and about which we can say practically nothing here): the relationship between group structure and literature.

Can poetry, in contrast to other symbolic forms, be associated with certain aspects of the group? We have tried to show plausibly that, at the point when a certain group aspiration can no longer be immediately lived in reality a subgroup is founded which takes this aspiration for its very content. This subgroup must create its own symbolic forms. Poetry thus becomes associated with a particular type of subgroup, in contrast to religious forms which always stand in relationship to the whole group. This example must certainly not be generalized but it shows the association of poetic tradition with elements of group structure to be in principle possible, though surely not in all cases. While every literary work creates a group—even a generic category like the fairy-tale does so²—this group need not stand in immediate and implicitly conscious relationship with the total group, as in our example.

We also lack the help of the sociology of religion in determining what role symbolic forms play in real group life. The progression from the constantly intervening God of the Romance period to the merely symbolic interpretation of the Resurrection in modern Protestant theology obviously runs parallel with the progression from a narrative, the content of which is at once poetically significant and factually true, to the modern inability of relating anything meaningful at all. But an analysis of religious development would certainly be the better way to understand its background—transformations in group structure—together with which it alone forms an intelligible whole.

The relationship between literary form and group structure is a fascinating

1. The close connexion with the sociology of religion is equally made clear in the available studies on the sociology of literature. One could well imagine that the sociology of small groups, of the American variety, which I do not know, could yield interesting information about the relationship between group structure and the meaning and structure of symbolic forms. The most likely material of interest may derive from observations of such groups as engage, at least subjectively, the entire personality of their members, e.g., gangs of youths.
2. Recent research has shown that the fairy-tale contains a very characteristic 'world-image' which must be accepted at least temporarily by the listeners and which provides a link between them.

problem about which we can unfortunately say nothing. Our sketch has shown that it is possible to establish a more than analogous link between group structure and the principles of metaphor. If our assumption, to the effect that love poetry is a means of solving problems of group life, is really justified, then the poetics of a literary form and its corresponding group structure should be mutually illuminating. Thus the still rather inaccessible aesthetics of classical courtly poetry, the emergence of *formes fixes* and the new meaning of tone values during the Renaissance should be more easily understandable.

[*Translated from the German.*]

Dr. Matthias Waltz teaches Romance languages at the University of Heidelberg. His most important publication is Rolandslied, Wilhelmlied, Alexiuslied. Zur Struktur und geschichtlichen Bedeutung (1965).

*The world
of the social sciences*

Research and training centres and professional bodies

Contributions to this section are invited. Statements not exceeding 1,500 words should be submitted in two double-spaced typewritten copies, in English, French, Spanish, Russian, German or Italian. Particular emphasis on current or planned research activities is desirable.

New institutions and changes of name and address

New institutions

International

International Industrial Relations Association
(Association internationale de relations professionnelles), 154, rue de Lausanne,
1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland.

Colombia

Centro de Estudios Demográficos (Center of Demographical Studies), Univer-
sidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Medicina, Apartado Nacional 2509,
Bogotá.

Hungary

Magyar Gerontologiai Társaság (Society of Hungarian Gerontologists), Üllőiút 93,
Budapest, IX.

Sweden

Peace Research Working Group, Department of Sociology, University of Lund,
Getingevägen 8, Lund.

Section for Peace Research, Institute of Education, University of Stockholm,
P.O. Box 23052, Stockholm 23.

Trinidad

Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, St. Augus-
tine.

United Kingdom

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, Sussex.

1. For cumulative index to this section, see vol. XVI (1964), No. 1, p. 117.

United States of America

Educational Resources Center of the University of the State of New York, The State Education Department, D-52 Defence Colony, New Delhi-3, India.

Changes of name and address

International

International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI), Sveavägen 166 Fack, Stockholm 23, Sweden.

[Formerly: Sveavägen 13 15, P.O. Box 40279, Stockholm 40, Sweden.]

International Sociological Association, Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale, Palazzo di Giustizia, Via Freguglia, Milan, Italy.

[Formerly: Case postale 141, 1211 Geneva 24, Switzerland.]

Argentina

Departamento de Sociología 'Raúl A. Orgaz', Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Trejo 241, Córdoba.

[Formerly: Instituto de Sociología y Ciencias Sociales 'Raúl A. Orgaz'.]

Belgium

Centre d'étude de la délinquance juvénile, avenue Jeanne 44, Brussels 5.

[Formerly: 49, rue du Châtelain, Brussels 5.]

Chile

Instituto de Economía y Planificación, Universidad de Chile, Casilla 3861, avenida Condell 343, Santiago.

[Formerly: Instituto de Economía, Universidad de Chile; Instituto de Planificación, Universidad de Chile.]

Denmark

Sociologisk Institut, Københavns Universitet, Rosenborggade 15, Copenhagen K.

[Formerly: Fiolstraede 4, Copenhagen.]

France

Centre d'ethnologie sociale et de psychosociologie, 1, rue du 11-Novembre, 92 Montrouge.

[Formerly: Groupe d'ethnologie sociale.]

Sweden

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies), Box 345, Svartbäcksgatan 10, Uppsala 1.

[Formerly: Drottninggatan 2, Uppsala.]

United States of America

Institute for Community Studies, 2300 Holmes, Kansas City, Missouri 64108.

[Formerly: Community Studies, Inc.]

The Population Council, 245 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

[Formerly: 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.]

Meetings

Approaching international conferences in the social sciences¹

1968

Poland(?)	European Society of Linguists: Meeting (2nd)	Professor Werner Winter, Secretary, Gutenbergstrasse 82, 2300 Kiel (Fed. Rep. of Germany)
Netherlands or Yugoslavia	European Society for Opinion Sur- veys and Market Research: Congress (21st)	17, rue Berckmans, Brussels 6 (Belgium)
Mexico	Inter-American Indian Congress (6th)	Inter-American Indian Institute, Niños Héroes 139, Mexico, D.F. (Mexico)
1968 or 1969 Latin America	International Catholic Migration Commission: International Migra- tion Congress	65, rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva (Switzerland)
Finland	International Economic Course (40th)	Professor Felix Schmid, International Society for Business Education, En Corjon, 1052 Le Mont-sur- Lausanne (Switzerland)
Helsinki(?)	International Political Science Asso- ciation: Round Table.	27, rue St-Guillaume, 75 Paris-7 ^e (France)
Buenos Aires	Extraordinary Conference of the Latin American Law Faculties (4th)	Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Buenos Aires, calle Viamonte 444, Buenos Aires (Argentina)
United Kingdom	Unesco: European Seminar on Data Sampling Techniques and Data Analysis (3rd)	SHC, Unesco, 75 Paris-7 ^e (France)
Germany (Fed. Rep.)	European Seminar on use of Mathe- matics in the Social Sciences (5th)	SHC, Unesco, Place de Fontenoy, 75 Paris-7 ^e (France)

1. No further details concerning these meetings can be obtained through this *Journal*.

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|----------------------------------|---|---|
| Rio de Janeiro | Unesco: Seminar on Sociology for University Teachers, Specialists and Advanced Students | SHC, Unesco
Place de Fontenoy,
75 Paris-7 ^e
(France) |
| Rome | World Congress on Human Rights | Miss Enrichetta Bevilacqua
Somalvico,
Via G. Rossini 49,
Pesaro (Italy) |
| 15 Jan.-28 Feb.
Quito | Inter-American Children's Institute: Pan-American Congress (13th). Theme: The growing population and its influence on children, adolescents, youth and the American family | Rafael Sajon,
avenida 8 de Octubre 2882
Montevideo (Uruguay) |
| Feb. 1968 | Unesco: Symposium on Human Rights and the Identification of Universal Human Values | SHC, Unesco,
Place de Fontenoy,
75 Paris-7 ^e (France) |
| 7-9 March
Washington,
D.C. | Society for International Development: World Conference (10th) | Pastor B. Sison,
1346 Connecticut Avenue,
N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036 (U.S.A.) |
| March
Teheran | International Sociological Association: International Seminar on Family Research (10th). Theme: Family and social change | Professor John M. Mogey,
Secretary, Committee on
Family Research,
International Sociological
Association,
232 Bay State Road,
Boston, Mass. 02215
(U.S.A.) |
| March | Unesco: Round Table on The Diversity of Cultures as against the Universality of Sciences and Technology | SHC, Unesco,
Place de Fontenoy,
75 Paris-7 ^e
(France) |
| 22 April-
11 May
Geneva | United Nations, Commission on Human Rights: International Conference | United Nations, New York,
N.Y. (U.S.A.) |
| 12 May-
4 June
Melbourne | Study Conference on Human Problems in Industry (3rd). Theme: The human problems of industrial development and redevelopment in Commonwealth countries | C. T. Looker,
Chairman of the Executive
Committee organizing
Ian Potter and Company,
Melbourne
(Australia) |
| May
Athens | International Centre of Research and Information on Public and Co-operative Economy: International Congress (8th). Theme: Organization and financing of public and co-operative enterprises | M. Stratis, D. Someritis,
62 A, rue Sina,
Athens (Greece) |
| 5-27 June
Geneva | International Labour Organisation: International Labour Conference, 52nd Session | 154, rue de Lausanne,
1211 Geneva 22
(Switzerland) |
| June
Ann Arbor,
Mich. | Unesco: Seminar on Data Comparison | SHC, Unesco,
Place de Fontenoy,
75 Paris-7 ^e (France) |
| June or July
Philadelphia | International Federation for Housing and Planning: World Congress (29th) | Wassenaarseweg 43,
The Hague (Netherlands) |

- 7-15 July
Dublin International Bar Association:
Congress (12th) Eric A. Plunkett,
Incorporated Law Society
of Ireland, Solicitors'
Buildings, Four Courts,
Dublin 7 (Ireland)
- 5-10 August International Committee for Co-
Drienerlo- operation in Rural Sociology/Euro-
Enschede, pean Society for Rural Sociology:
Netherlands World Congress (2nd). Theme: De-
velopment and rural social structure
- 6-14 August Unesco: International Conference on
Paris Educational Planning Place de Fontenoy
75 Paris-7^e (France)
- 14-17 August International Association of Schools
Helsinki of Social Work: International
Congress of Schools of Social Work
- 18-24 August International Association of Applied
Amsterdam Psychology: International Congress
of Applied Psychology (16th)
- 18-24 August International Council on Social Wel-
Otaniemi, fare: International Conference of
Finland Social Work (14th)
- August International Economic History As-
Bloomington, sociation: International Congress of
Ind. Economic History (4th)
- 2-7 September International Economic Association:
Montreal International Congress
- 3-10 September International Union of Anthropolo-
Tokyo and gical and Ethnological Sciences:
Kyoto International Congress of Anthropo-
logical and Ethnological Sciences
(8th)
- Sept. (early) International Association of Adminis-
The Hague trative Sciences: Congress (14th).
Theme: Adaptation of administra-
tion in a changing society
- September Unesco: Seminar on Investment in
Beirut Education in the Arab States
- 1969
- Spain European Society for Opinion Sur-
veys and Market Research: Congress
(22nd) 17, rue Berckmans,
Brussels 6 (Belgium)
- Europe International Association of Penal
Law: International Congress of Cri-
minal Law (10th) Pierre Bouzat,
Secretary General,
43, avenue Aristide-Briand,
35 Rennes (France)
- (envisaged) International Social Science Council:
Conference on Models of Nation-
Building. 6, rue Franklin,
75 Paris-16^e (France)

London	International Union of Psychological Science: International Congress on Scientific Psychology (7th)	British Psychological Society, Tavistock House South, Tavistock Square, London W.C.1 (U.K.)
London	International Union for the Scientific Study of Population: Congress (16th)	E. Grebenik, Dept. of Social Studies, The University, Leeds 2 (U.K.)
New Delhi	World Peace Conference	Mr. R. R. Diwakar, Gandhi Peace Foundation, 2 Residency Road, Bangalore 25 (India)
(Beginning) Athens Oct. (probably) Washington, D.C. or Baltimore	International Union of Local Authorities: Congress (19th) International Association of Gerontology: International Congress (8th)	The Hague (Netherlands) Professor N. W. Shock, Gerontology Branch, Baltimore City Hospitals, Baltimore, Md. 21224
<i>1970</i>		
Moscow	International Committee of Historical Sciences: International Congress of Historical Sciences (13th)	270, boulevard Raspail, 75 Paris-14 ^e (France)
Leningrad	International Economic History Association: Congress (5th)	Professor Frederic C. Lane, Dept. of History, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 21218
Madrid	International Society of Criminology: International Criminological Congress (6th)	Dr. Georges Fully, Secretary-General, 2, place Mazas, 75 Paris-12 ^e (France)
Varna, Bulgaria	International Sociological Association: World Congress (7th)	Professor Angelo Pagani, Secretary-General, Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale, Palazzo di Giustizia, Via Freguglia, Milan (Italy)
July (probably) Tokyo	International Bar Association: Congress (13th)	Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Hoso Kaidan Bldg. 1-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo (Japan)
Autumn Tokyo	United Nations: Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of offenders (4th)	New Ohtemachi Building, Room 411/412, 4 2-chome, Ohtemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo (Japan)

1972

Tokyo

International Union of Psychological
Science: International Congress on
Scientific Psychology (8th)

British Psychological
Society,
Tavistock House South,
Tavistock Square,
London, W.C.1 (U.K.)

The role of science and technology in economic development

Second meeting¹ of the Unesco panel of consultants
Paris, 12-15 December 1966

The second meeting of the panel arranged by Unesco's Office of Economic Analysis discussed some key problems of the economics of science and technology. The participants considered the following items: the problem of integration: cost-benefit analysis: the effects of the concentration of research.

PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION OF SCIENCE PLANS INTO PLANS FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

This question was thoroughly discussed at the previous meeting, which concentrated on the following points:

The concept of integration

The relations involved. The integration of an economic plan with a science plan involves determining the relations between the two. Neither should dominate the other. If the economic plan is imposed on the science plan, or vice versa, both will suffer. Professor Perroux considers integration to mean the combination of two plans whose aims are not, at the start, convergent but pull against each other. On the other hand, it would be a serious mistake to draw up the economic plan independently of the science plan; there are many examples to show the absolute necessity for liaison between the persons responsible for each, and contact must be established from the outset.

Content of plans. The integration (combination) of economic and science plans obviously presupposes that both exist, but links can exist even before the plans are established. There are different types of science and economic plans, and different methods of planning. But much has still to be done before we can define the 'content' of a science or an economic plan. We must concentrate on calculating the indices; the present aim is to obtain more accurate calculations of the objective and the mean variables—the objective variables now including variables formerly regarded as non-economic, e.g., education, health, and scientific research itself.

The receiving structure. Science engenders new ideas, and then needs a new structure of scientific institutions capable of receiving them, regardless of whether the ideas derive from outside or from economic development needs, both industrialized and developing countries equally need a minimum receiving structure. Advanced countries which already have a receiving structure need to study its functioning and see how far it meets their needs. In developing countries the problem is entirely different since hardly any possess a receiving structure. When they do, the machinery for duly processing the information must be overhauled or established—scientific data from abroad or imported processes need adaptation before they can be assimilated and this usually involves further research.

Essential factors

Science and economy use human and financial resources, two factors which accordingly are inherent in the integration of scientific and economic planning.

The manpower factor. For their scientific needs, developing countries suffer from

1. A report on the first meeting appeared in this *Journal*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (1966), pp. 444-7.

a shortage—often a complete lack—of manpower. This is a factor that requires careful consideration. Inadequate numbers of specialists or experts are being trained. A more radical approach is needed, a new type of person, an educated elite, versatile, capable of assimilating new ideas, innovation and technology and adapting them to the country's needs.

The financial factor. The financial and manpower factors are closely interrelated and cannot be divorced. The financial factor, it is agreed, needs more detailed study covering standards and methods applied in allocating resources for scientific and technological development and the financial criteria that govern science policy.

Co-operation

Inequality between nations. The inequality is flagrant in the resources for financing, investment and the promotion of science and technology respectively available to the advanced nations and the developing areas. Some kinds of research are far beyond the capacity of certain developing countries, which must accordingly depend on research in more favoured countries.

Scientific autonomy. How can the inequality between the different groups of peoples be attenuated? It is sometimes said that because of the international nature of science certain countries can do no more than apply the results of others. Others believe that developing countries need transitional structures which would allow them time to assimilate technological data before passing on to achieve a scientific culture and to be capable of making their own active contribution to knowledge. Two important points were made in this connexion:

1. External aid and less advanced technologies can serve to raise living standards and pave the way for something better; but this intermediate technology can never be more than a palliative.
2. Science and economic policy relations between advanced and developing countries may, on the other hand, be based on the idea of having the developing countries aim at the highest levels in science and technology.

The idea of specialization—some countries have scientists, others can make do with adapted techniques—is difficult to accept: intermediate technologies for the smaller and weaker countries, advanced technologies for the rich and powerful. It degrades science and, anyhow, people will have no truck with it—they all demand scientific autonomy.

The simple transferring of scientific ideas and technicians has little to do with a real policy of science for development—much preferred by any nation intent on scientific autonomy.

The need for co-operation. It is needed because developing countries have much to do in science and little to do it with. International co-operation could be encouraged in various ways, e.g. by co-operation between centres with a view to speeding up the training of research scientists, technicians and monitors, or by co-operation in training key people in developing countries to spearhead scientific progress at the highest level.

Science humanism. Apart from transferring practical information, research should help to advance the developing nations, widen their outlook and encourage a new humanism of science—a concept accepted by peoples with different social backgrounds and policies that could therefore provide a basis on which to build up international co-operation, a lasting peace, collaboration instead of strife (though without sacrificing debate and discussion), and attain certain simple aims that are common to everyone.

Propagation of innovation

Two important points resulted from the discussions.

1. The large production units necessitated by the demands of technology and economics facilitate innovation and the circulation of scientific and technical information. The science plan and the economic plan should therefore tend to



- associate research with the major production units (but not overlook the others) and link the science policy and concentration policy. Smaller production units could (as in many countries) be served by co-operative research associations.
2. Innovations may be regarded as the production coefficients of a matrix. In industrialized countries with the same material inputs, coefficients tend to fall, which means that, in real terms, productivity tends to rise in many industries—a trend that should be promoted by circulating information, with help from the authorities.

Favourable conditions. The propagation of innovation depends on certain factors.

1. Irrespective of the social system, the size of the economic unit is important, e.g., can a country with a population of three million constitute a modern economy?—a question that faces many small African countries.

Multi-national co-operation agencies would facilitate the propagation of innovation. The large economic unit also favours propagation, in rapidly changing and developing forms, through its relations with other countries.

2. The effectiveness of propagation largely depends on the receptivity, customs and needs of people at the receiving end which in turn depend on primary and technical education and the training of research scientists and technicians at the highest levels. Changes among the public presuppose a change in the government's approach both to the élite and to the general public. Innovation passes not only via industries but via social groups.
3. As effectiveness will also depend on the action of the public authorities, their decisions regarding innovations and their propagation should be discussed with the people concerned.

Morphological study of countries. To determine the best models for propagating innovation, morphological studies must be made of the economic structures of developing countries. These fall into three main groups: industry sporadic; semi-industrialized—light industry but no heavy; industrialized by nineteenth-century but not by twentieth-century standards. Innovation must, therefore, be related to both the industrial and the agricultural context. Paradoxically enough, modern techniques (including nuclear techniques) are propagated in developing countries much more readily than less advanced techniques; however, technology advances more quickly and easily in industry than in agriculture.

Propagation models. Two sets of models were considered. The first concerns propagation of innovation after a conflict between developed and developing countries. The second concerns developing countries which have not undergone a period of conflict.

Final remarks

It appears essential that scientists should participate in helping to combine a country's science and economic plans, and in the choice of propagation paths.

Economists should in turn acquire the basic science and technology data underlying the economic choices and the alternatives submitted to governments. The influence of scientists on planners is to be regarded as desirable.

This is the only way to produce scientific humanism and replace the superficial transfer of techniques by developing the ability of peoples (a) to produce their own scientific élites and (b) to provide at least the elementary prerequisites of scientific rationalization.

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Critique of the method

The cost-benefit analysis method has long been known and has many applications. How can it be used in the selection of research projects, especially projects for the application of existing knowledge!

The sceptical view is that, in the present state of knowledge, it is almost impos-

sible to assess project costs and returns, or choose finally between several projects. Taking a less pessimistic view of the possibilities of applying cost-benefit analysis, a more thorough and less cut and dried examination could be made; and criticism applies rather to the use made of results—which are sometimes not as accurate or as reliable as they might be—rather than to the method itself.

Difficulties to be overcome

A basic contradiction. Firstly, there is a methodological difficulty. Cost-benefit analysis is purely economic but projects have socio-cultural and political implications which are difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate.

Time factor. Secondly, some research projects have long-term implications for development, whereas cost-benefit analysis is limited to short-term factors and this greatly complicates the evaluation of a project in which the items to be measured are constantly increasing in number. Calculation must take account of present conditions.

Optimization. How should the projects for cost-benefit analysis be selected from among the many projects involving application of the knowledge available to a country? What criteria should we use? What should in fact be optimized—the use of manpower, opportunities for sales abroad, domestic economic needs?

Applications

Qualitative aspect. The unpredictability of research need not hinder cost-benefit analysis, since the assessment of the chances of success may, in certain cases, be highly accurate. But the limitations must also be stressed. Cost-benefit analysis may fail completely as soon as a qualitative element enters into the picture.

Choice of projects. Cost-benefit analysis does not enable us to determine the total amounts to be allocated to research and development, but it is much more likely to succeed when a choice has to be made between a number of application projects.

An important point made in relation to the application of cost-benefit analysis to areas of existing knowledge was that there may be a complete change if fresh discoveries are made during the amortization period. Hence, allowance must be made for new discoveries that may soon be made during the period of amortization. This is the only way in which research should enter into cost-benefit calculations, and vice versa.

Cost-benefit analysis under different socio-economic systems

The analysis can perfectly well be applied under different socio-economic systems, but since the concept of costs, profits and other factors may vary with the system, it would be most useful to compare two modes of application. Various aspects of this question were raised during the discussions.

1. Since socialist and western markets are not comparable, how should their respective costs be determined?
2. How are 'indirect benefit' and 'external economies' understood in a socialist system?
3. How is cost-benefit analysis applied to research and development in a planned system? Two interesting cases call for consideration: (a) the application of the method on a national scale; and (b) the application of the method on a sub-national scale, within a particular nation.
4. The real values underlying prices in the two systems should be studied and a comparative table made.
5. As a cost-benefit analysis cannot be made without taking account of the capital factor, what interest rate is used in socialist countries?

Functions of production

The best results are probably produced by the most up-to-date functions of production, for they admit technological progress as a function of time, in an

appropriate form. It is difficult to calculate them, but improvements have been made.

In view of these improvements, it appears that the following might be advisable: (a) the systematic study of learning functions or learning curves, in the broad meaning of the terms; and (b) the correction of a Cobb-Douglas function by appropriate mathematical processes, taking the environment into account.

EFFECTS OF THE CONCENTRATION OF RESEARCH

The vast majority of research projects are concentrated in a very small number of advanced countries. What effects does such concentration have on the developing countries? Despite the very lively discussion, this question has not been thoroughly studied and needs further investigation.

Certain major points were discussed, however: (a) the reasons for the rapid increase in scientific research; (b) the relation between major research programmes and targets for economic growth; (c) co-operation and the international division of labour in science and technology; and (d) development problems of large-scale and intermediate technology; the part that each plays in the general and scientific development of developing countries.

The major problems resulting from the concentration should be studied in relation to inequality phenomena, by reference to three criteria: (a) dimensions; (b) nature of activity; and (c) bargaining power.

International Peace Research Association

Second General Conference, Tällberg, 17-19 June 1967¹
by Jaap W. Nobel

Some one hundred and fifteen scholars from countries all over the world convened in Tällberg (Sweden) from 17-19 June 1967 for the second conference of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). A wide range of disciplines was represented at the conference which was organized jointly with the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI), set up in Stockholm last year.

In three days approximately forty-five papers were read and discussed, covering subjects ranging from simulation to games theory, from statistics of international relations to studies of nationalism, from legal aspects of intervention to the Kashmir conflict. The central theme of the conference, however, was 'poverty and peace'.

Peace research would seem to be a field covering many different disciplines, the relevant parts of which are slowly being put together to form an integrated approach to the problem of peace and war. Although there is still a long way to go, peace research is now clearly coming into its own. Whatever differences of opinion exist as to methods and focus, some points of consensus have certainly emerged. It is now recognized that scientific research into the causes of war and the conditions of peace has a contribution to make to the furthering of peaceful relations. Even at this early stage, insights are emerging which seem to have direct implications for political action and conflict control. Such knowledge is spreading, although it may take some time before it reaches the centres where decisions are made. It is also important that the dissemination of knowledge and insights be internationalized

1. The inaugural conference of the IPRA (Groningen, July 1965) was reported in this *Journal*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (1966), pp. 107-12.

in order to give relevance to such concepts in the international arena. Much of the policy of peace depends on an international appreciation of the types of action that lead to peace and war respectively. Whether or not, for example, we will succeed in avoiding the pitfalls of intervention will depend largely on whether we can develop a frame of reference which will make what we are doing clear both to ourselves and to our opponents.

The current military conflicts cast a shadow over the conference to which the Secretary-General, Professor Bert V. A. Röling (Netherlands) referred in his opening statement. It was indicative of the atmosphere of the conference that, barring some explosions of uncontrolled feelings, such delicate matters could be treated, with respect on all sides, from the different points of view. No one had any illusions about the extent to which social scientists can influence political events once they have reached the acute crisis level. Typically it would seem, peace research operates at an earlier stage of conflict development. Though there was no unanimity on the subject there was fairly wide support for the position that peace research should not steer clear of those issues which have become too hot to handle but should endeavour to make a contribution to the solving of the problem within a strictly scientific framework.

The leitmotiv of the conference, 'poverty and peace', certainly led to wide diversions and many of the papers treated other subjects. Nor was there unanimous approval of the main theme. Professor Gunnar Myrdal (Sweden), in the first paper read to the conference, cast some doubt on the wisdom of such a point of departure. In his opinion, the connexion between poverty and peace is no more than a popular theory, a complex of stereotypes unrelated in any way to reality. The major change that has occurred in the developing countries has been the population explosion against a background of diminishing growth. According to Myrdal, there is an intuitive notion, not substantiated by any factual evidence, that the swelling majority of the poor inevitably leads to international instability. Analysis has been distorted by compassion and a connexion assumed without any empirical foundation. Reviewing some of the armed conflicts in South East Asia, Myrdal concluded that in no instance was there any indication of a relationship between war and the widespread poverty in this area. The theory relating war to poverty is, in Myrdal's words, worse than 'superficial diletantism'. Quoting the example of Bihar he concluded that starvation leads to apathy not to insurrection. If this statement was rather strongly worded it must be remembered, as pointed out by Professor S. Dasgupta (India), that Professor Myrdal, whose name is a 'household word' in India, has devoted much of his energy to the problem of development. It should be remembered that the point of contention was not whether development aid is good in itself, but whether there is any evidence of poverty leading to war.

It was on this question that Professor Amitai Etzioni (U.S.A.) offered some revealing insights. It is clearly beyond doubt that no single factor leads to war. While poverty in itself may not provoke war, there may be other indirect connexions. The view has been put forward, and there is some historic evidence for this, that the most unsettling circumstance is limited development leading to rising expectations rather than poverty as such. Whether or not war ensues will depend to a considerable extent on who mobilizes the discontent springing from poverty. The readiness to contemplate extreme solutions is more likely to be found within a radical party than in a Church. Then again, it has been maintained (Johan Galtung) that disequilibrium of status rather than general low status may produce tension. The unequal development typical of the poor countries is likely to be a factor of significance. While general low status is accepted as inevitable, once changes are introduced affecting the status of one rank, the backwardness of other ranks becomes intolerable. Moreover, apart from poverty, an unequal distribution of resources has often led to conflicts within countries and these have their effects on international relations. Thus, in the opinion of Etzioni, a reduction of sharp differences in wealth is a prerequisite to peace.

In further discussion in the working groups it was pointed out by Professor Bert V. A. Röling that economic development has immediate effects on domestic unrest and political instability. These in turn may, through the intervention of outside powers, lead to international conflict and war. According to this view, development aid will incite domestic unrest in the transition period. Given the importance of aid to developing countries it is now of major concern to find ways and means of regulating foreign intervention.

Professor Etzioni spoke on the subject of domestic politics and foreign aggression. Whether or not a society can make such changes as are necessary depends on several factors. Looking in particular at American society, Etzioni pointed to some of the defects in our knowledge and learning in matters concerning international relations. Information is collected on almost any subject, and with disconcerting thoroughness. Cloud formations are analysed and the information stored for future reference although it far exceeds our needs. On matters concerning war and peace, on the other hand, there is no such zeal. Politicians do not want scientists to meddle in their affairs and hence restrict their freedom of action. Moreover, such learning as we have acquired does not usually reach the centres where decisions are made. There is a debate going on in Washington but only within a fixed set of assumptions. More knowledge and a freer flow of ideas from those engaged in research to those responsible for decisions seem to be prerequisites for peace. Another factor inhibiting peaceful relations is the disdain in the United States for long-term planning and a dedication to what has been called incrementalism. A third factor is the power structure of society, particularly the changes that take place within it, affecting the political decisions made at the top. Mobilization of society passes through the middle classes rather than the base. Future changes will have to take place through these broad social movements. Whether a society is capable of making the necessary changes may thus depend on the presence of such social forces. It may also depend on the structure of society inasmuch as a pluralist society has less capacity for change than a monolithic society. Looking to the future, Etzioni concluded that there is no prospect for world peace without a world community. The multi-state system has shown two things: (a) occasional war is inevitable under this system; (b) the establishing forces which in the past held the system together (such as the code of ethics of an international nobility) no longer exist. Thus we are forced to contemplate the establishment of a world community as the only alternative to an increasingly warlike and destructive international system.

Another plenary session was devoted to a paper on 'Entropy and the General Theory of Peace' by Dr. Johan Galtung (Norway). Galtung's approach is a new one: he has collected every peace plan he could find and has classified them according to a 'typology of peace thinking'. It should not be surmised that in itself this is the most advanced collection of peace research plans, for the proposals are in general based on fairly simple concepts of international relations. They reflect very much the personal situation of the author or his country. What has entropy to do with all this? It is in fact an index of the distribution of elements within a system. The higher the entropy the less structured the system: knowing the position of one element will not help to locate the other elements. It is Galtung's thesis that one is better off in a poorly-ordered than in a well-ordered system because conflicts are likely to be less violent in the former. There is some theoretical foundation for this argument deriving from the beneficial effects which have been ascribed in the relevant literature to the criss-cross structure of conflicts. Thus in a tightly, ordered society with many links between 'top-dog' nations (in Galtung's terminology) and between 'top-dog' nations and 'under-dog' nations but few, if any, links between these 'under-dog' nations themselves, conflict is likely to be concentrated at the top and to be unmitigated by the soothing effect of quarrels elsewhere. *Détente* among the leaders may have to be bought at the price of increasing conflicts within the opposing camps as evidenced by the *détente* in the Cold War. But if macro-conflicts can be avoided by introducing micro-conflicts it may be worthwhile to

modify the rigid structure of the 'feudal international system'. Thus, returning to the typology, associative peace thinking, which seeks to break down divisions in the international system may be more conducive to a peaceful world than the dissociative type of thinking which seeks to control conflict by setting up boundaries and ordering the system into tightly closed compartments. In the discussion, Professor M. Haas (U.S.A.) argued that empirical data seem to suggest that low entropy may be preferable to high entropy. Professor Olumbe Bassir (Nigeria) expressed concern about jargon from physics being uncritically applied to peace research. Dr. P. Boskma (Netherlands) pointed out that, in biology, the evolution theory testifies that there is a development from high entropy towards low entropy rather than the other way round.

Jerome Laulicht's (U.S.A.) 'Public Opinion Research Plan' is a proposal for carrying out research on attitudes concerning war and peace on an international scale. Notwithstanding extensive research on public opinion, it is remarkable that so little attention has been given to tapping different attitudes and opinions in different strata of society, in the vital area of war and peace problems. Very little is known about the structure of public opinion in this respect: what sorts of people entertain what sorts of ideas about international relations. Additionally, such information should be available for different countries, allowing comparisons of the findings to gain an insight into the public opinion structure which is behind international decision making. One thing has clearly emerged from those surveys already undertaken: attitudes and opinions are determined by knowledge to a much larger extent than has been formerly assumed. A *caveat* was expressed by Alan Newcombe (Canada): running through a collection of some 500 public opinion studies he was struck by the lack of coherence. Little attention is paid to previous studies and each study has its own private indices. Newcombe's advice: 'Don't discover America for the 501st time'.

All the other papers were treated in the working groups with about half an hour allotted to each. There were a number of contributions on simulation. Professor A. N. Oppenheim (U.K.) mentioned a simulation of the Middle East conflict which was played eighteen months earlier. Interest was focused on what happens when one of the nations involved acquires nuclear weapons. It turned out that personality characteristics made very little difference to the outcome. Two sets of players cast in the same role, played the game more or less in the same way. A decisive factor was the expectation of support by the big powers. As in the real world, simulated decisions have to be made under stress and within certain time limits. Pre-emptive war was the rule as soon as Israel was thought to produce nuclear weapons. Professor K. Mushakoji (Japan) found that attitudes towards negotiation vary according to nationality. In particular his experiments indicate that the American approach was more issue oriented whereas the Japanese approach was more human relations oriented. Dr. J. R. Raser (U.S.A.) also pointed to cultural differences which may be detected with the help of cross-cultural simulation experiments.

There were also a number of case studies, all of them of some theoretical or methodological interest. Robin Jenkins and John MacRae (U.K.) presented a paper on 'Religion, Conflict and Polarization in Northern Ireland'. It is the result of a field study in Ulster, examining the conflict between the Protestant and Catholic population. Community conflict in this case leads to a remarkable degree of polarization; both groups tend to isolate themselves. There is a very strong relationship between religion and voting preference, practically all the Protestants voting for the Unionist party whereas the Catholics vote for a number of other parties. As a rule, people pick their friends among members of their own group. Only a limited number seem to cross the barriers set up by religion. Interest focuses around these 'marginal men' who have more than half of their friends in the other camp. The writers of this study are particularly interested in the role these marginal men play in a polarized situation. It is striking that notwithstanding sharp differences there is general agreement among respondents on both sides that there should be

more co-operation between Protestants and Catholics. A large majority of the Catholics support the idea of an eventual unification of the Catholic and Protestant branches of the Christian Church, while a considerable minority of the Protestants take this view. When it comes to mixed marriages, however, the polarized structure re-emerges.

P. Smoker (U.K.) analysed the India-China conflict by counting the number of messages exchanged and applying a time series analysis. Dr. M. A. Chaudhri (Pakistan) took a fresh look at the Kashmir conflict. Malvern Lumsden (U.K.) presented a strategic analysis of Cyprus. This was an attempt to put the Cyprus conflict into games theory terms on the basis of the measurement of the utilities that Cypriots perceive in a simplified matrix of outcomes. Though games theory has received much attention and empirical studies of attitudes are common, there have been very few, if any, attempts to analyse outstanding political controversies with the help of these techniques. In this study the alternatives open to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively were cast into the form of a 'Prisoner's Dilemma' game leaving both sides in a position to choose between a maximum solution, 'Enosis' for the Greeks and 'Partition' for the Turks, or some form of co-operative policy. If both sides try to enforce their maximum demand, war of course follows.

Håkon Wiberg's (Sweden) study was based on a perusal of the older and more recent literature on race conflicts in the United States. Several factors contributing to the outbreak of violence between races, as recorded in the available literature, were discussed.

Mrs. Ingrid Galtung (Norway) introduced a paper on attitudes toward development aid. Most people support aid to developing countries when asked in a general way. If the question is framed in moralistic terms there is very little disagreement. But this solid consensus breaks down when specific questions are asked. If aid means the support of the shipping industry or of the textile industry of a developing country or if it means floating coffee prices, the humanitarian support collapses. At present the discussion on development aid has become secularized, that is it has moved away from the moralistic arguments which were currently employed around 1952 to specific arguments.

From carefully worded questionnaires and strictly circumscribed methodology to the unstructured type of analysis which was presented by J. D. Newnham (U.K.), the procedure is comparatively simple though time consuming. Instead of using a formal interview, Newnham has attempted to get at attitudes in a conflict through small group discussions involving both parties plus one or two social scientists. This technique was used to analyse the conflict structure of the Arab-Israeli conflict by bringing together two students from either side for a confidential meeting with social scientists. The purpose of these meetings was to obtain, in as free and informal an atmosphere as possible, a verbal report of the attitudes of the students from the groups in conflict. The ensuing discussion was recorded, initially in shorthand, then, as confidence in the impartiality of the research grew, by tape-recorder. Naturally, this very open procedure without control of any variables rules out theory testing. On the other hand, it is within such informal surroundings that parties are likely to speak their minds. Thus Newnham can report with some confidence which are the main issues in the minds of the conflicting parties as expressed in these lengthy closed sessions. There is also a secondary effect to be considered: apart from any advantages accruing to the social scientist, the parties to the conflict are presented with a unique opportunity of discussing their problem in a strictly impartial atmosphere. Thus, this technique can be used in an 'applied' sense to enable parties to a conflict situation to re-establish communication and reach some shared frame of reference.

Inevitably, many contributions to this conference have been left unreported. Even the participants themselves were faced with a choice of different working groups. Parallel to the conference, an international workshop on mass media was held which presented its findings to the IPRA conference on the last day.

One proposal should be mentioned here which may have implications for the future of peace research. Johan Galtung (Norway) suggested that a one-year course on peace research should be set up to acquaint about twenty-five graduate students with peace research as it now stands. During the course students should be taken from one peace research centre to the next in order to ensure that all schools of thought were represented. In such a way a cadre of 'deideologized, denationalized consultants' could be formed.

In evaluating a conference of this type it should be remembered that it is primarily meant to establish contact between scholars all over the world working in the same field. There was little time for thorough discussion of all the papers presented and the points of view put forward. Certainly the sheer number of papers and topics may have been confusing to some. These general conferences, which are scheduled for every other year, do, however, serve the purpose of informing all those interested where international peace research now stands. They serve to take stock rather than to provide immediate answers to current problems. They also help to diffuse ideas on an international scale.

Peace research has its beginnings within separate political communities troubled by the prospects of ever-increasing conflicts and dangers in the international arena. If it is to be effective as a controlling force in the world, offering alternatives to politics based on military threats, it will have to be internationalized. International research projects, some of which were contemplated and discussed at the Tällberg conference, should become the rule rather than the exception.

International appointments vacant

This new section is open, free of charge, to international or national institutions or organizations seeking to recruit social scientists at the international level. The language in which notices appear indicates the chief linguistic requirement for the post in question, but other desirable languages may also be mentioned.

Summary notices for insertion, in two double-spaced typewritten copies, including field of specialization, main duties, location, duration of initial appointment, deadline for applications, level or salary offered and full contact address should reach the Editor, International Social Science Journal, Department of Social Sciences, Unesco, Place de Fontenoy, 75 Paris-7^e, no later than 10 November, 10 February, 10 May and 10 August for publication, respectively, in the March, June, September and December issues of this Journal. Where deadlines for the receipt of applications are fixed, due account should be taken of the delays in reaching an international readership.

Under no circumstances should applicants address themselves to the editor of this Journal, but always directly to the contact specified mentioning this Journal.

Unesco

Inquiries should be directed to the Recruitment Division, Bureau of Personnel, Unesco, quoting the reference code.

The levels indicated are the international civil service gradings to which the post is assimilated. Gross salaries, net of national income tax, corresponding to these grades are as follows:

P3: \$11,270

P4: \$13,900

P5: \$17,400

D1: \$20,000

Travel costs, installation and repatriation grants as well as other benefits are paid by Unesco.

Sociologist

Reference. REG/LA/BRAZOC I.

Location. Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).

Functions. The Brazilian Government has asked Unesco to make a sociologist available to the Latin American Social Research Centre (CENTRO). CENTRO is a regional institution with its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, and a sub-regional

office in Mexico City. It has been receiving aid from Unesco since 1958. Its programme is drawn up and supervised by a Management Board which also looks after the Latin American Social Science Faculty (FLACSO) at Santiago, Chile. The expert will be required to assist the director of CENTRO in drawing up the regional programme and in supervising its execution in accordance with the terms of the contract concluded with Unesco. He will also be required to:

- (a) Draw up and supervise the programme of the sub-regional office in Mexico City.
- (b) Direct the assistant experts made available to CENTRO and its sub-regional office by Unesco or by governments which have concluded special agreements to that effect or by any other institution or authority.
- (c) Ensure that any work accepted by CENTRO or the sub-regional office is of a scientific character.
- (d) Supervise the studies and research of fellowship holders working at CENTRO or at the sub-regional office.
- (e) Represent CENTRO, at the director's request, at social science meetings organized in the region.
- (f) Co-operate personally in field research, the nature and duration of which will be fixed in agreement with the director.

Qualifications. Doctorate or equivalent degree in sociology. Experience in university teaching and research, gained, partly at least, in Latin America.

Language qualifications. Spanish and English or French. Working knowledge of Portuguese desirable.

Duration of appointment. Fifteen months.

Level. P5.

Adviser in social research

Reference. P.P./ss.

Location. Bangkok (Thailand).

Functions. The Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, intends to establish an Institute for Social Research to be attached to the Faculty of Political Science and to be staffed on a part-time basis by the academic staff of the faculty. It is also proposed to recruit full-time research assistants. The main aims of the institute will be to promote and undertake research on various socio-economic problems of the country, to carry out research projects commissioned by government agencies, to improve the quality of the teaching offered by the university by providing appropriate material drawn from its research projects, to organize seminars and training courses on research methodology and to provide facilities for research workers operating in Thailand. The Government of Thailand has requested Unesco to provide the university with the services of an expert to assist the university with the creation of the institute and its development during the initial stage. In particular, the expert will be requested to carry out the following duties:

- (a) To work out proposals for the organizational structure of the institute.
- (b) To make a survey of the present situation of social research in Thailand and to prepare an outline of the research programme of the institute.
- (c) To conduct seminars on research methodology for faculty members of the university.
- (d) To assist in the establishment of appropriate scientific contacts between the institute and other academic institutions in Thailand and abroad.

Qualifications. Ph.D. or equivalent in sociology or anthropology. Extended experience of sociological research as well as of problems of organization and administration of a research institute. Experience of field research in South-East Asia would be an asset.

Duration of appointment. Six months.

Level. P5.

Specialist in educational psychology and principles of education

Reference. ZAMBED/SF/3.

Location. University of Zambia, Lusaka.

Functions. Under the authority of the vice-chancellor, and the guidance of the chief technical adviser, the specialist will be required to:

- (a) Teach courses to undergraduate students reading education for the B.A. and B.Sc. degrees.
- (b) Teach courses to graduate students reading for the post-graduate certificate in education.
- (c) Assist in the mounting, through correspondence, of the courses outlined in (a) and (b) above.
- (d) Assist in the teaching of students for the post-graduate Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) degree, and assist in the supervision of research.
- (e) Assist in the supervision of teaching practice.
- (f) Help organize and supervise in-service courses for practising teachers.
- (g) Take part, as requested, in the general work of the University of Zambia.

Qualifications. High academic qualifications, i.e., Ph.D. or the equivalent, particularly in the field of educational psychology, plus relevant teaching experience.

Duration of appointment. Two years.

Level. P4.

Specialist in educational psychology

Reference. KENYED/SF/3.

Location. Department of Education, University College, Nairobi (Kenya).

Functions. The expert, under the direction of the chief technical adviser, who is the head of the team of international experts appointed to this project, will perform the following duties:

- (a) Teaching on the human factor in development, changes in children's needs and demands as a result of changing conditions in society, and the role of the teacher under these conditions.
- (b) Assisting in finding and training a suitable Kenyan counterpart to take over the duties of the post.
- (c) Assisting the chief technical adviser in that area of his work concerned with the Kenya Institute of Education, in particular with examinations.
- (d) Participation in the research programme of the project with special responsibility for those aspects dealing with selection procedures, examinations and certification in relation to both the cultural background and development needs.
- (e) Preparation and co-ordination of syllabuses in educational psychology, which might be prepared for training colleges, for special in-service courses for teachers, and for courses organized outside the framework of the college.
- (f) Participation in the in-service teacher-training programme of the project.

Qualifications

- (a) A university degree including, or followed by, research in educational psychology and experience in the field of testing or guidance work. Relevant experience either through research or work on educational problems relating to development planning will be an advantage.
- (b) Considerable experience in teaching at the second level of education. Experience relevant to education in rural areas of developing countries will be an advantage.

Duration of appointment. Two years.

Level. P4.

Educational financing

Reference. COSTED 14.

Location. San Jose (Costa Rica).

Functions. Adviser in the field of educational financing to carry out the following duties:

(a) Assist the Ministry of Education in carrying out a systematic review of the bases for financing of education in Costa Rica and advise on the establishment of a capital investment plan for educational development.

(b) Advise on administrative liaison between the Ministry of Education and governmental planning and finance authorities to ensure equilibrium between sources of financing and educational expenditures and forecasts.

(c) Assist in the analysis of unit costs of the various types and levels of education.

(d) Advise on the costing and alternate sources of financing of educational development programmes and projects.

(e) Suggest, as required, reforms in budgeting and accounting procedures within the Ministry of Education.

(f) Train counterpart personnel in techniques of financial administration and management.

Qualifications. University degree or equivalent, with experience in public finance; practical experience in problems of educational financing at a national level; ability to cost educational plans and projects; knowledge of the modalities of financing educational development projects from internal or external sources; Spanish essential.

Duration of appointment. One year.

Level. P5.

Adult education and rural sociology expert

Reference. PHILETS/SF/11.

Location. Mindanao Institute of Technology (Philippines).

Functions. In consultation with the president of the college and the chief technical adviser, and in consultation with his local Philippine counterparts, the expert will develop the facilities and instruction, theoretical and practical, of the basic subjects of the adult education and rural sociology curriculum. His main duties will be:

(a) To draw up syllabuses and evolve methods of teaching in his speciality.

(b) To draw up lists of any additional equipment needed in his field.

(c) To advise on the layout of the laboratories and the installation of the equipment in his field.

(d) To participate in the teaching programme, theoretical and practical, and in the supervision and evaluation of the supporting staff and students.

(e) To train the Philippine counterpart who will eventually replace him.

(f) To conduct classes for out-of-school youth and adults, especially farmers and housewives, as demonstration classes for those who are being trained in the rural education programme. Ways and techniques should be perfected to effect literacy combined with vocational efficiency. Extension methods will be demonstrated and taught.

Qualifications. Advanced university degree with special emphasis in the fields of agricultural education, adult education and rural sociology.

Duration of appointment. Two years.

Level. P3.

Specialist in education (social studies)

Reference. ZANBED/SF/10.

Location. University of Zambia, Lusaka.

Functions. The School of Education, University of Zambia, admits graduates of recognized universities to a post-graduate certificate in education of one academic year; it also provides education as a course within the first degrees of B.A. and B.Sc. Higher degrees in education will begin in 1968. Under the authority of the vice-chancellor, and the guidance of the chief technical adviser, the specialist in social studies will be required to:

(a) Teach courses to undergraduate students reading education for the B.A. and B.Sc. degrees.

(b) Teach courses to graduate students reading for the post-graduate certificate in education.

(c) Assist in the mounting, through correspondence, of the courses outlined in (a) and (b) above.

(d) Assist in the teaching of students for the post-graduate Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) degree, and assist in the supervision of research.

(e) Assist in the supervision of teaching practice.

(f) Help organize and supervise in-service courses of practising teachers.

(g) Take part, as requested, in the general work of the University of Zambia.

Qualifications. Ph.D or equivalent, plus relevant teaching experience. Applicants should possess major qualifications in history and substantial minor qualifications in geography, or the reverse, and possess interests in subjects cognate to these two disciplines.

Duration of appointment. Twenty-two months.

Level. P4.

Expert en sociologie de l'éducation

Référence. URUGUASOC 1.

Lieu d'affectation. Montevideo (Uruguay).

Origine et attributions. Le gouvernement de l'Uruguay a demandé à l'Unesco de mettre à la disposition de l'Office de la planification et du budget un spécialiste de la sociologie de l'éducation qui remplira les fonctions suivantes :

a) Il collaborera à la préparation et à la mise en œuvre des programmes de recherches sociologiques du département de politique sociale et du secteur d'éducation de l'Office de la planification et du budget ;

b) Il préparera et dirigera un projet de recherches portant sur les aspects sociaux du fonctionnement du système d'éducation nationale au niveau primaire et technique ;

c) Il préparera et dirigera un projet de recherches sur la situation et les aspirations du corps enseignant national, ainsi que sur les attitudes à l'égard de son évolution ;

d) Il aidera l'Université de l'Uruguay à préparer des projets de recherches sociologiques.

L'expert pourra également être invité à donner à l'université un enseignement portant sur la sociologie de l'éducation et la sociologie du développement, et à conseiller, sur leur demande, diverses institutions publiques au sujet des problèmes relevant de sa compétence.

Titres et aptitudes requis. Doctorat ou titre équivalent en sociologie; expérience de l'enseignement et de la recherche au niveau universitaire et expérience pratique de la recherche relative aux problèmes de sociologie de l'éducation et de sociologie du développement, particulièrement en Amérique latine. La connaissance de l'espagnol est nécessaire.

Durée. 1 an.

Niveau. P5.

Expert en éducation communautaire

Référence. VIETNAMED 10.

Lieu d'affectation. Tan-An (Viet-nam).

Attributions. Le gouvernement vietnamien a l'intention de transformer les 4 500 écoles primaires rurales traditionnelles du pays en écoles communautaires, afin qu'elles contribuent davantage au développement économique et social des villages. Le rôle de ces écoles ne sera pas seulement d'enseigner à lire et à écrire à la population, mais de l'amener à participer activement à la reconstruction de la communauté. L'expert devra, par ses avis et sa participation directe, aider le Ministère de l'éducation à :

- a) Élaborer et organiser le programme d'éducation communautaire;
- b) Préparer des programmes d'alphabétisation fonctionnelle axés sur les besoins du développement général;
- c) Mettre en œuvre le programme du Centre de formation de maîtres pour les écoles communautaires, situé à Tan-An;
- d) Former des maîtres d'écoles communautaires rurales.

Le titulaire du poste devra également faire fonction de consultant technique pour les projets qui bénéficient d'une aide commune de l'Unesco et du FISE. Il travaillera en collaboration étroite avec le directeur du Centre de formation de Tan-An et avec les autres personnes qui participent à l'exécution de ces projets. Il devra à cet effet se rendre fréquemment de Saigon au centre de Tan-An.

Titres et aptitudes requis. Diplôme universitaire, de préférence en pédagogie ou en sciences sociales; expérience de l'éducation communautaire dans les pays en voie de développement ainsi que de la préparation et de l'exécution de programmes d'alphabétisation et d'éducation des adultes; bonne connaissance pratique de l'anglais.

Durée. 1 an.

Niveau. P4.

Professeur d'histoire et de géographie à l'École normale d'instituteurs

Référence. CAMEROUNED/SF/16.

Lieu d'affectation. École normale d'instituteurs (provisoirement Yaoundé [Cameroun]).

Attributions. Sous l'autorité du directeur de l'établissement assisté du conseiller technique, le professeur remplira les fonctions suivantes :

- a) Il enseignera l'histoire et la géographie conformément aux nouveaux programmes, largement africanisés (niveau : 1^e, 2^e et 3^e années d'études dans les écoles normales primaires).
- b) Dans ces cours, il fera une part importante à l'économie et à la sociologie africaines, ainsi qu'à l'étude des faits sociaux.
- c) Il accordera une place importante à l'aspect didactique de ces disciplines.
- d) Il travaillera en collaboration avec le directeur des études, chargé de la pédagogie générale, et prendra part aux travaux de recherche pédagogique menés au sein de l'établissement ou en collaboration avec l'IPN, le Bureau pédagogique ou tout autre organisme gouvernemental créé ou prévu à cette fin.

Titres et aptitudes requis. Diplôme universitaire (licence d'histoire et de géographie ou diplôme de professeur d'école normale) ; diplôme en sciences économiques et sociales ou formation correspondante ; connaissance spéciale de l'histoire et de la géographie africaines, expérience de l'enseignement dans un établissement de formation pédagogique ; faculté d'adaptation, goût de la recherche et du travail d'équipe ; la connaissance de l'anglais est souhaitable.

Durée. 2 ans (avec possibilité de renouvellement).

Niveau. P4.

United Nations

Applications and inquiries should be addressed either to:

Technical Assistance Recruitment Services

United Nations, New York 17

or to:

Bureau Européen de Recrutement pour l'Assistance Technique

Palais des Nations, Genève (Suisse)

mentioning this Journal as the source.

Since most of the job descriptions have been circulating for some months, it is possible that some posts have already been filled. Should this be the case, applications will be examined for recruitment to similar posts in the future.

Recruitment to the posts below is not undertaken at levels fixed in advance. Salaries are negotiated on a monetary basis taking into consideration the requirements of the post and the experience and stature of the candidate.

Economist (planning)

Reference. GUA-022-A.

Duration. One year, with possibility of extension.

Duty station. Guatemala City.

Duties. The expert will be attached to the General Secretariat of the National Economic Planning Council where he will advise the General Secretary and his staff. In particular he will be expected to:

(a) Make an analysis of the material on planning already available in Guatemala, including national accounts and other statistics and projections thereof, the preliminary outline of a five-year development plan prepared by the General Secretariat in collaboration with the Joint Programming Mission, and the related sectoral diagnoses and minimum plans.

(b) Elaborate programming methods and quantitative models, including those applicable to regional and sectoral programmes.

(c) Formulate short- and long-term plans and their implementation.

(d) Design ways and means of co-ordinating sectoral and regional programmes and projects with the national plan.

(e) Train counterpart staff.

(f) Perform other advisory duties as requested by the General Secretary.

Qualifications. Degree in economics, with considerable practical experience in economic planning; familiarity with economic and social problems of developing countries in Latin America desirable.

Language. Spanish.

Statistician (Sample Surveys)

Reference. INS-258-C.

Duration. Eighteen months, with possibility of extension.

Duty station. Djakarta (Indonesia) with extensive travel in the field.

Duties. The expert will be attached to the Statistical Research and Development Centre and will be expected to:

(a) Advise on the planning and execution of national surveys.

(b) Assist in developing the required field organization and in carrying out the entire work of the survey.

(c) Assist in training personnel in survey organization and techniques.

Qualifications. Extensive experience in planning, designing, execution and analysis of large-scale socio-economic sample surveys.

Background information. The National Sample Surveys constitute one of the main programmes of the Statistical Research and Development Centre. The centre is planning to conduct the third round of the National Sample Surveys in the latter part of 1967. As it will be nearly four years since the sample design was prepared, it may be necessary to revise the design taking into consideration the results of the last two rounds. Since sample surveys are the only means for collecting much-needed data in Indonesia, considerable attention has to be paid to the design and preparation of schedules for the next survey.

Statistician (Urban research and planning)

Reference. VEN-422-SK (TARS-252-SK).

Duration. Three months.

Duty station. Caracas (Venezuela).

Duties. Under the supervision of the project manager/technical director, the expert will be a member of a team appointed by the United Nations to advise and assist the Ministry of Public Works and the Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CENDES). He will be expected to:

(a) Undertake full responsibility for defining the samples related to a general survey on the demographic, sociological and economic aspects of the phenomenon of urbanization.

(b) Supervise the technical steps for the sample survey.

Qualifications. Advanced academic training in statistics; experience in research work.
Languages. Spanish; English desirable.

Demographer (Urban research and planning)

Reference. VEN-422-SC/REV. 1 (TARS-412-SC).

Duration. One year, with possibility of extension.

Duty station. Caracas (Venezuela).

Duties. Under the supervision of the project manager/technical director, the expert will be a member of a team appointed by the United Nations to advise and assist the Ministry of Public Works and the Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CENDES). He will be expected to:

(a) Analyse, in close co-operation with the national team in charge of the subproject 'Demographic Aspects', the internal migration of Venezuela.

(b) Supervise all the demographic research related to the implementation of this project.

(c) Train personnel in demography.

(d) Give technical assistance in other activities of CENDES.

Qualifications. Advanced academic training in demography; experience in research work.

Languages. Spanish; English desirable.

Urban research and planning. Regional planner (Project Manager/Technical Director)

Reference. VEN-422-SA.

Duration. One year, with possibility of extension.

Duty station. Caracas (Venezuela).

Duties. The expert, as Project Manager/Technical Director of the project, is expected to:

(a) Assume full responsibility under the general guidance of the Executing Agency, for the implementation of this project and the execution of its work programme in accordance with the plan of operation.

(b) Co-ordinate and direct, as the leader of the international team of experts to be provided by the Special Fund to this project, the activities of the team, in close co-operation with the national Director of the Urban Research and Planning Project and the counterpart personnel.

(c) As Technical Director and in co-operation with the national director of the project, supervise the formulation and execution of a practical research programme in the field of urbanization in Venezuela. Particular aspects of this programme are to: identify the most important phenomena characterizing urbanization in the country; determine the causes and consequences of such phenomena; forecast future problems of urban development in the country; make specific recommendations for the solution of present and future problems in the above-mentioned urban development field; develop national policies on urbanization in the context of a national development plan; provide basic information for market analysis and other pre-investment studies, including the location of public and private investment and the distribution of social overhead investments; advise on the selection of professional personnel required by the project and assist in the preparation of fellowship training programmes for counterpart personnel; submit periodic progress reports to the Executing Agency and a comprehensive report at the conclusion of the project.

Qualifications. Advanced academic training and/or wide experience in social sciences, with specialized knowledge and experience in regional and urban research planning. Previous experience in developing countries, preferably Latin America, desirable.

Languages. Spanish essential; working knowledge of English desirable.

Regional public administration adviser for the Caribbean

Reference. LAT-553-E.

Duration. One year, with possibility of extension.

Duty station. Port-of-Spain (Trinidad and Tobago). Travel to the countries and territories of the area will be required.

Duties. Under the supervision of the Chief of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) Unit for the Caribbean, in consultation with the Public Administration Unit of ECLA, and with the substantive guidance of the Head of the Public Administration Branch at United Nations Headquarters, the expert will be expected to:

(a) Assist the governments of the countries and territories of the Caribbean as consultant on public administration matters to find solutions to administrative problems in the various countries in co-operation with advisory groups on economic and social planning.

(b) Recommend all necessary measures to improve public administration at national, regional and local levels in the fields of organization and methods and the training of personnel.

(c) Advise the governments on and prepare new public administration projects which might be considered for implementation within technical assistance, Special Fund or any other programmes.

(d) Assist the United Nations technical assistance experts in public administration attached to the respective country programmes and comment on their progress and final reports in accordance with procedures established by United Nations Headquarters and the ECLA Secretariat.

(c) Assist ECLA, as required, in the development, organization and operation of regional and sub-regional seminars, study tours, workshops and the like in the various fields of public administration, and in research projects.

Qualifications. University training and wide practical experience at a high level in public administration, preferably with emphasis on administrative aspects of development planning and administrative aspects of development planning and administrative reform; ability to formulate and define programmes which may subsequently be put into practice; intimate knowledge of the systems of administration in the Caribbean sub-region or of systems akin to them.

Languages. English; Spanish or French desirable.

Organization and Methods adviser

Reference. INS-564-A.

Duration. Six months, with possibility of extension.

Duty station. Djakarta (Indonesia).

Duties. Under the general guidance of the Director of the Institute of Public Administration in Djakarta, the expert will be expected to:

(a) Organize and conduct in-service training courses for government officials in the field of organization analysis, work study, records management (including forms, directives, correspondence, archives, etc.), systems and procedures, office layout, purchasing and supply and mechanization.

(b) Train and develop counterpart staff in organization and methods responsibilities.

(c) Advise the government on policy and administrative matters related to improvements in government operations and organization structures.

Qualifications. University degree or the equivalent in training and experience with many years' responsible experience in organization and methods work. Dutch desirable.

Background information. The Institute of Public Administration at Djakarta is responsible for providing training in the principles and techniques of public administration to Indonesian public service officials. It is *inter alia* attempting to train officials in modern techniques of Government administration to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations.

Adviser to the National Centre for Information on Foreign Trade

Reference. MEX-202-B.

Duration. One year.

Duty station. Mexico City.

Duties. In co-operation with the Deputy Director General of the National Bank for Foreign Trade, S.A., and the Director of the National Centre for Information on Foreign Trade, the expert will advise the National Centre for Information on Foreign Trade (CENICE) of the National Bank for Foreign Trade of the Government of Mexico on:

(a) Trade relations with the European Common Market and the markets of Latin America, Central America, Africa and Asia.

(b) Commercial presentation, quality standards, monetary restrictions within buyer countries, usual procedures for international price quotations, and freight rates.

(c) Incentives established by the Government of Mexico, such as subsidies, exemptions, tax and credit facilities.

(d) The advantages obtainable by Mexico from its participation in bilateral agreements and agreements on primary commodities from multilateral nego-

tiations and membership in international and intergovernmental organs, and from participation in international trade fairs and exhibitions.

Qualifications. Economist with long experience in multilateral trade organizations and in the organization of information centres for foreign trade; ability to participate in round-table discussions with persons interested in exports, and to create, in co-operation with the National Centre for Information on Foreign Trade, a basic frame-work for the various services needed.

Language. Spanish.

Community development adviser

Reference. ECU-432-A (TARS-022-A).

Duration. One year.

Duty station. Quito (Ecuador).

Duties. Under the general direction of the Technical Director of the National Board for Planning and Economic Co-ordination, and in co-operation with the team charged with preparation of the Programme of Community Development within the General Development Plan, the expert will be expected to:

(a) Review the technical reports and investigations, and the reports of economic programmes of the national agencies related to community development;

(b) Identify specific economic problems of the rural communities, taking into account the geographic and ethnic differences within the country;

(c) Advise the experts of the community development team on the economic aspects of its programme, especially taking into account the following points: the existing relationships between the programmes of the economic sectors and the actions proposed in the Community Development Plan, particularly in regard to agriculture and handicrafts; and the economic implications of the Community Development Programme, primarily in reference to costs, combinations of factors chosen, locations, etc.

(d) Assist in the preparation of an outline of the Community Development Plan and the corresponding projects in such a way that they can be presented with and be complementary to the General Development Plan, according to the plan of work of the year. The plan of work will include: general considerations; diagnosis of the present situation; projections to five and ten years; programming community development on a national scale; administrative structure and organization of the National Programme of Community Development; and estimation of costs.

(e) Prepare the objectives and goals which will serve as guide-lines for the final preparation of the Community Development Programme in the General Development Plan.

(f) Advise the National Planning Board on the lines the programmes should take, on the economic side, above all when it implies an action of Rural Community Development.

Qualifications. Economist with solid background in economics and practical experience in countries in the process of development, especially in the field of rural development; experience in countries in Latin America or in countries with similar social aspects, which would permit an immediate initiation of the work; sufficient experience in aspects of planning of an intersectoral type to permit operation within the group of experts who are working on various aspects of programming.

Language. Spanish.

Expert de la planification sociale

Référence. TOG-462-A.

Lieu d'affectation, Lomé (Togo).

Attributions. L'expert assistera et conseillera l'organisme national de planification pour tout ce qui concerne les questions ci-après : programmation sociale (besoins auxquels il faut répondre), enquêtes et statistiques, critères et méthodes à appliquer pour déterminer les objectifs sociaux prioritaires et le montant des crédits à affecter au secteur social, rapports entre les programmes sociaux et le développement économique, participation des populations et moyens de susciter l'intérêt dans le public, dispositions administratives concernant la planification sociale, élaboration, en accord avec les services techniques, d'une politique en faveur de l'enfance et de la jeunesse, mesures à prendre pour assurer la coordination des diverses activités des services et organismes s'occupant du secteur social (santé, éducation, affaires sociales, croix-rouge, etc.).

L'expert devra également donner des avis sur les études et recherches sociales et préparer des programmes en vue de la formation du personnel de planification sociale.

Formation et aptitudes requises. Expérience du développement social et de la planification ; bonne connaissance des problèmes de l'enfance et de la jeunesse dans les pays en voie de développement.

Durée. 1 an (avec possibilité de prolongation).

Lieu d'affectation. Conakry (Guinée).

Expert de la planification économique

Référence. GUI-022-E.

Attributions. L'expert, qui sera attaché à la Direction du plan du Ministère d'État chargé des finances et du plan, sera appelé à :

Donner des avis sur la planification générale et la planification par secteur ainsi que sur la méthodologie de la planification et du contrôle du plan ;

Analyser les modifications qu'il convient d'apporter au plan et en évaluer la portée ;

Donner des avis sur la coordination et l'harmonisation des activités économiques, ainsi que sur divers projets ;

Effectuer des études analytiques et synthétiques sur différents secteurs ;

Établir les budgets relatifs au plan et faire des analyses générales sur leur exécution ; préparer des bilans par secteur ;

Former les homologues guinéens du Ministère d'État aux tâches précitées.

Formation et aptitudes requises. Le titulaire du poste devra être un économiste ayant une solide formation universitaire théorique du niveau universitaire et une bonne expérience pratique de la planification telle qu'elle est pratiquée aussi bien au niveau des entreprises industrielles que dans les organismes centraux de planification ; il est préférable que l'expert connaisse également les problèmes africains.

Durée. 1 an (avec possibilité de prolongation).

Coordonnateur économique

Reference. RWA-022-B.

Lieu d'affectation. Kigali (Rwanda).

Attributions. L'expert devra s'acquitter des tâches suivantes :

Il aidera le Ministère de la coopération internationale et du plan à assurer le bon fonctionnement de la Direction générale de la planification économique, ainsi que la coordination des assistances techniques multilatérales et bilatérales ;

Il veillera à ce que les experts affectés au titre des différents programmes d'assistance technique travaillent conjointement, en évitant tout double emploi et tout gaspillage de fonds ;

Il prêtera son concours au Ministère de la coopération internationale et du plan pour la réalisation du plan national de développement et aidera le gouvernement à trouver les moyens de financement nécessaires auprès des organismes internationaux ou des groupes financiers, en vue de l'exécution du plan économique ;

Il s'occupera des questions suivantes : relations avec tous autres projets similaires ou complémentaires ; exécution des projets sectoriels qui seront entrepris ; études et analyses économiques intéressant la réalisation du plan et l'utilisation rationnelle de l'assistance d'origine bilatérale.

Formation et aptitudes requises. Formation économique au niveau universitaire ; expérience approfondie des problèmes de la planification et de la coordination économiques ; connaissance de l'anglais souhaitable.

Durée. 1 an.

Announcement

Behavioural Science Research in India

Behavioural Science Research in India: A Directory, 1925-1965 has been published by Behavioural Sciences Centre, 32 Faiz Bazar, Delhi 6 (India). The directory contains about 17,000 items. Work is in progress on (a) a directory of researches completed by Indian behavioural scientists abroad, or published abroad, and (b) a directory of research by non-Indian behavioural scientists on Indian themes. Bibliographical details of the items to be included in the directories may be sent to Udai Pareek.

A directory of Indian behavioural scientists is being compiled and is scheduled to be published in 1968. Indian behavioural scientists abroad may obtain copies of blanks for supplying information from Udai Pareek, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514.

Documents and publications of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies¹

General, population, health, food, housing

POPULATION

Proceedings of the World Population Conference (1965). Vol. I: *Summary report on the conference held at Belgrade (30 August to 10 September 1965)*. 1966, 349 pp., \$5.50. (UN/E/CONF. 41/2.)

**Demographic projections for North African countries*. May 1966, 42 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/NA/EGOP/2.)
[St. Bl.] Basic outlines of the problem.

BIRTH CONTROL

**Administrative aspects of family planning programmes*. 1966, 64 pp., \$1. (UN/E/CN.11/742.)

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Report of a working group (Bangkok, 16 to 24 March 1966) on conditions in Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand. Means and staff necessary to carry out the aims of the next stages.

Epidemiological and vital statistics reports. Vol. 19, no. 12, 1966, 87 pp., \$2.25. Vol. 20, No. 1, 1967, 96 pp., \$2.25. Vol. 20, no. 2, 1967, 67 pp., \$2. (WHO.)

[St.] Parts of a continuing digest of world statistics on population movements and the incidence of various diseases. Each part contains regular basic tables and studies on different subjects, e.g., includes information about the frequency of malignant tumours (Vol. 19, no. 12), a study of the ten principal causes of death in various European countries and in North America (Vol. 20, no. 1), a

i. As a general rule, no mention is made of publications and documents which are issued more or less automatically—regular administrative reports, minutes of meetings, etc. Free translations have been given of the titles of some publications and documents which we were unable to obtain in time in English. Titles thus translated are indicated by an asterisk (*).

The following conventional abbreviations have been used:

Bl. = Contains a particularly interesting bibliography.

St. = Specially important or rare statistics.

study continued in regard to Africa, Latin America and Asia (Vol. 20, no. 2). Information covers the period 1962 to 1964.

Trends in the study of morbidity and mortality. Geneva, 1967, 196 pp., \$2.75. (WHO.) A series of articles dealing especially with the extent of morbidity and with health levels, and with the study of national and international health surveys carried out by interviews.

Trends in cancer research. 1967, 84 pp., \$2. (WHO.) [St.] General evolution according to countries. Action of the environment upon human cancer. Detection at the mass level. Stimulation of research. Index of research institutions.

HOUSING

European programme of current housing statistics. 1966, 23 pp., \$0.35. (UN/ST/ECE/HOU/29.)

Statistical series which countries are asked to draw up and publish regularly. Definition—types and classifications to be employed. Sources of information and methods generally used to unite and group such statistics.

Social structures, economics, social service

STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF WORKING POPULATION

The world's labour force and its industrial distribution, by Samuel Baum. January-February 1967, 23 pp. (Offprint from the *International labour review*, vol. 95.) (ILO.)

[St.] Changes (absolute figures and percentages) in the distribution of manpower over the three main sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry, services. The different countries of the world are grouped by regions and according to their level of development.

ECONOMIC FORECASTS, PLANNING

Sectoral aspects of long-term economic projections—with special reference to Asia and the Far East. November 1966, 112 pp. (UN/E/CN.II/L.165.)

Techniques used in sectoral programming. Study of the elasticity for the rate of growth in the various branches of the economy. Relations between over-all estimates and sectoral planning. Input-output analyses.

**Government budgeting and economic planning in developing countries.* December 1966, 59 pp., \$1.00. (UN/ST/TAD/SER.C/93.)

Relationship between government budgeting and planning. Two examples: India and the Philippines. Report of a working group (Copenhagen, 31 August to 11 September 1964) which studied the problems of budget classification in the developing countries.

Report of the 4th workshop on problems of budget reclassification and management. January 1967, 43 pp. (UN/ST/TAO/SER.C/92.)

Economic planning in relation to government budgets. Progress made since the 3rd Workshop. The 4th Workshop met in Bangkok (22 August to 2 September 1966).

INCIDENCES OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND AUTOMATION

Labour and automation: manpower adjustment programmes: France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom. 1967, 207 pp., \$2.50. (ILO.)

[Bl.] Series of ILO studies of nine countries. The first three monographs, given in the present publication, are drawn up on the same plan to facilitate the comparison of one country with another: economic panorama of the country dealt with; action of the public authorities to secure full employment in the sectors under automation; analysis of methods to prevent redundancy, help for redundant workers, adaptation to changing conditions of labour; research.

STANDARDS OF LIVING

Household income and expenditure to statistics (1950-1964). No. 1, 1967, 290 pp. (ILO). [St. Bl.] International comparisons. Sources of revenue. Structure of expenditure. Methods of classification.

The concept and measurement of 'minimum living standards'. *International labour review.* Vol. 95, April 1967, 28 pp. (ILO.)

Definition of the notion of vital minimum. Examples of estimates of various countries to establish the vital minimum scientifically. The struggle against poverty.

STATISTICAL PROBLEMS IN ASIA

Report of the Conference of Asian statisticians, 7th session. 26 July 1966. 56 pp. (UN/E/CN.II/74I.)

Report of the Conference on Asian Statistics (Bangkok, 13-24 June 1966). Development of statistics in Asia and the Far East. National accounts. Price indexes. Practical and theoretical training of statisticians. Classification and description of posts. Report of a working group on investigation techniques. Future programme.

PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS

Labour inspection, a world survey of national law and practice. 1966, 105 pp., \$1. (ILO.)

[Bl.] Extract of the report of the 36th session (1966) of the Commission of Experts for the application of conventions and recommendations of ILO. Fundamental problems of the organization and working of any labour inspection system. Indication of various methods applied in the world.

Institutional aspects of labour management relations within undertakings in Asia. 1966, 225 pp. (*Professional relations*, no. 26.) (ILO.)

Findings of Asian experts who met in Ceylon (19-30 April 1965). System of workers' representation. Procedures needed for settling disputes. Workers' participation in the management of the enterprise.

WAGES

Wages policy in Sweden, by Jean Mouly. March 1967, 36 pp. (Extract from the *International labour review*, Vol. 95.) (ILO.)

Agreements concluded since 1956 between associations of employers and employees. Applications and results obtained. Value of this policy.

TRAINING OF MANPOWER IN AFRICA

Working Party of the Economic Commission on Manpower and Training (Addis Ababa) Documentation of special interest:

Recent developments in education and training. August 1966, 39 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/WP.6/3/Add.1.)

Trained manpower for accelerated development in Africa. July 1966, 58 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/WP.6/4.)

Manpower planning and training machinery in Africa. July 1966, 23 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/WP.6/5.)

Manpower requirements for agricultural development in Africa. July 1966, 20 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/WP.6/7.)

ECONOMIC SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

Economic survey in 1965 for the six countries of the North African sub-region. May 1966, 83 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/NA/ECOP/5.)

[St.] A study presented by the Economic Commission for Africa at a sub-regional meeting on economic co-operation in North Africa. (Tangier, 20-27 June 1966.) A general survey of the situation.

AGRICULTURE

Sampling methods and censuses. 1966, 213 pp., \$3.50.

The use of sampling methods in agricultural censuses. Respective advantages of sampling and over-all censuses. Combination of the two methods. Sampling: principles and methods.

With an annex: examples taken from agricultural census carried out in the United States in 1964.

Report of the 1960 world census of agriculture. Rome, 1967, 234 pp., \$3.50

[St.] Results of censuses carried out in the twenty-five countries and territories under consideration. Main headings: the cultivator, the land, utilization of land, crops, livestock and poultry, power, machinery, irrigation and drainage, fertilizers and soil ameliorators.

World crop statistics, area. Production and yield: 1948-1964.

[St.] Long-term statistics (1948-64) on land area, production and yield based on annual FAO data. Statistics given by countries for all parts of the world.

Land reform. Conclusions of the 1966 world land reform conference in relation to social development. January 1967, 12 pp. (UN/E/CN.4/411.)

The World Land Reform Conference (Rome, 20 June to 2 July 1966) examined land administration and structural reform; economic and social aspects of land reform; administrative and financial aspects; training problems.

Agrarian reform and employment, with special reference to Latin America, by M. J. Sternberg. January-February 1967, 26 pp. (ILO.) (Offprint from the *International labour review*, vol. 95.)

Examination, with special reference to Latin America, of labour potential in agriculture in the developing countries. Obstacles preventing the full use of this potential, land reform measures to prevent loss of potential.

Improvements of conditions of life and work of tenants, sharecroppers and similar categories of agricultural workers. 1966, 92 pp., \$1. (ILO.)

Document prepared for the fifty-first session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva, 1967). Survey of problems. Security of tenure. Return for the use of land. Arbitration of disputes. Access to land ownership. Conditions of life. Questionnaire with governmental replies and conclusions about future measures.

INDUSTRIALIZATION

The role of small-scale industry in over-all industrial development strategy. September 1966, 11 pp. (UN/ST/ECLA/CONF.25/L.10.)

Study by the Economic Commission for Latin America. Integration of the expansion of small-scale industry in over-all industrial development. Economic and social factors of this expansion. Role of the government in the development of small-scale industry.

**Industrial development in Asia and the Far East. Report of the Asian conference on industrialization. Manila, Philippines, 6-20 December 1965.* November 1966, 105 pp. (UN/E/CN.11/719.)

Report of the Asian Conference on Industrialization. Basic problems. Industrialization in these areas. Measures taken and envisaged. Concordance of development plans. Key industries. Expansion of commerce in finished and semi-finished articles. Elevation of the technological level development of infrastructure.

The development of the rubber industry in West Africa. December 1966, 58 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/INR/131.)

[St.] Present situation. Conditions of a more expanded industrialization. Consumption of rubber in West Africa. The tyre industry.

The refractory products industry in West Africa. November 1966, 20 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/INR/132.)

[St.] Present situation. Needs, resources and possibilities of development.

Development of the sugar industry in the West African sub-region. October 1966, 136 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/INR/135.)

[St.] The sugar industry in West Africa. Consumption, commerce, prices and prospects for 1980. Reports from the following countries: Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta.

The role of ILO in the industrialization of developing countries. 1967, 52 pp., \$0.75. (ILO.)

Report prepared for the fifty-first session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva 1967). Proposals designed to intensify the action of ILO in favour of industrializing developing countries. Human resources. Amelioration of standards of living in industry. Role of social institutions. Choice of industries for development. Commercialization of industrial products.

STEEL

Statistics of world trade in steel, 1965. December 1966, 51 pp., \$1. (UN/ST/ECE/STEEL/19.)

[St.] Information about the export of finished and semi-finished steel products, classified according to regions and countries for export.

TRADE

Report of the Trade and Development Board. October 1966, 205 pp. (UN/A/6315.)

Second annual report of the Conference on Trade and Development (30 October 1965 to 24 September 1966). Work of the third and fourth sessions of the Conference. Reports of various commissions (maritime transport, manufactured products, etc.).

Export credits and development financing. 1966, 43 pp., \$1.00. (UN/E/4274.)

[St.] Brief historical survey of the development of current systems (national and

international) of financing export credits. The present situation. Main problems involved.

Prospects of increasing intra-West African trade. September 1966, 55 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/WA/ECOP/3.)

[St.] Present trends. Commercial policy. Possible ways of increasing commercial exchanges between various regions of Africa.

Transit problems of African land-locked States. February 1966, 117 pp. (UN/E/CN.14/TRANS/29.)

[St.] Study of the Economic Commission for Africa. Problems of African land-locked States. Comparative data on countries of transit.

Promotion of imports by the socialist countries of Eastern Europe of manufactured and semi-finished products from developing countries. January 1967, 27 pp. (UN/TD/13/C.2/21.) Recent evolution. Measures mentioned in the different annexes of the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1964). Factors which might contribute to the expansion of exports to the socialist countries from developing countries.

SOCIAL SECURITY

Revision of conventions nos. 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40, concerning old age and survivors' pensions. Geneva 1966, 99 pp., \$1.00. (ILO.)

Report prepared for the fifty-first session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva 1967). Summary of findings of the previous session and a draft convention and recommendation. Survey of governmental opinions.

TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

Technical co-operation activities in social development. January 1967, 32 pp. (UN/E/CN.5/412.)

Proposals to reinforce technical co-operation services in the social field. Resources available. Future programme.

The ILO and technical co-operation. Geneva 1967, 108 pp., \$1.50. (ILO.)

[St.] Report drawn up for the fifty-first session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva 1967). Trends of technical co-operation programmes of the ILO. Evaluation of main factors governing the technical co-operation activities of the ILO. Statistical tables in this regard.

Education, science

EDUCATION

Access of women to education. January 1967, 48 pp. (UN/E/CN.6/475.)

Report prepared by the Secretariat of Unesco on the activities of the agency in this field. Collaboration between Unesco and various other governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations. Programme for 1967-68 of activities for ensuring women's access to education, science and culture.

Labour education, no. 9, March 1967, 40 pp. (ILO.)

[Bl.] *Labour education* is published three times a year in French, English and Spanish

by the International Labour Organisation. No. 9 contains articles and information on mass education today. Bibliographical analyses.

Higher education and development in South-East Asia. Vol. III, part 1: *High-level manpower*, by Guy Hunter. 1967, 184 pp., \$3.50. (Unesco and the International Association of Universities.)

[St.] This volume belongs to a series of studies undertaken jointly by Unesco and the International Association of Universities. The author calculates the high-level manpower needs of Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and the Republic of Viet-Nam. The term 'high-level manpower' here covers agricultural and industrial workers (and employees) for whom only a primary or secondary education supplemented by vocational training is necessary, as well as persons with a university training. Projections for the next decade are given by sector—agriculture, industry, education, medicine, etc. General report for the region as a whole. Individual country studies.

Higher education and development in South-East Asia. Vol. III, part 2: *Language policy*, by Richard Noss. 1967, 216 pp., \$3.50. (Unesco and the International Association of Universities.)

This work belongs to the same series as the volume mentioned above. Very complex problems are involved in the choice of a language of instruction and languages for inclusion in the curriculum for the various educational levels—primary, secondary and higher—in South-East Asia. There are two aspects to these problems: the relationships between the national languages and the local vernaculars and the use of foreign languages, especially English and French. The author describes the present situation and analyses the policy adopted by the authorities in this respect in Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and the Republic of Viet-Nam. He studies the implications for the modernization of the universities.

CULTURAL RELATIONS

Unesco handbook of international exchanges: II (1967). 1967, 1102 pp., \$1.00. Quadlingual publication. English, French, Spanish, Russian. (Unesco.)

Detailed information on international exchanges in education, science, culture and information. All manner of provisions made by 131 States and territories with regard to the circulation of persons, documents and information. Activities of some 300 international organizations and 5,000 national institutions (addresses given). Information on 4,600 bilateral and multilateral cultural agreements. This volume complements the publication entitled *Study abroad: international guide, fellowships, scholarships, educational exchange*. Introductory studies summarize current trends in cultural exchanges. These deal with international training policy in the context of economic development, exchanges in science, technology and art, and the effects of space communication on cultural relations.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Decisions and decision-makers in the modern State. Third collection of articles reprinted from the *International social science journal*. Introduction by Jean Meynaud. 1967, 276 pp., \$5.50. (Unesco.)

In an introduction, not previously published, Jean Meynaud comments on the broad themes of the collection. Studies are grouped as follows: 1. The role of the executive in the modern State: Canada (J. E. Godgetts), France (P. Laroque), United Kingdom (J. W. Grove), United States of America (R. C. Macridis), Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A. Iojrych), Yugoslavia (J. Djordjevic); 2. The parliamentary profession: France (L. Hamon), Israel (B. Akzin), Italy (G. Sartori),

United Kingdom (H. B. Berrington and S. E. Finer), United States of America (D. R. Matthews), Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (K. Gubin); 3. Technical change and political decision (C. B. Macpherson); 4. The politics of planning (Robert A. Dahl); 5. Citizen participation in political life in Norway and the United States of America (Stein Rokkan and Angus Campbell). Information has been updated by the authors where necessary.

**LEGAL AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY**

Implementation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty. December 1966, 103 pp. (UN/A/6611/Add.1.)

This Addendum contains the resolutions of the first Solidarity Conference of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Handbook of civil service laws and practices. 1966, 451, pp., \$4.00. (UN/ST/TAO/M/29.) The purpose of this handbook is to make better known the administrative institutions of the developing countries and to promote modernization of the corresponding practices. It covers countries in which the British tradition predominated and countries marked by French influence and describes the systems of Latin America and those of countries with planned economies, as well as other cases.

Local government personnel systems. 1966, 103 pp., \$2.00. (UN/ST/TAO/M.33.)

Requirements of a well-planned system for the recruitment and training of local government personnel. Information concerning the prevailing practice in a number of countries selected as examples (Ecuador, India, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Taiwan, United Arab Republic).

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Progressive development of the law of international trade. September 1966, 140 pp. (UN/A/6396.)

The role of international commercial law. Methods applied to overcome divergencies arising from the disparity of national laws. Work done so far by inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations with a view to gradually unifying and bringing into harmony international commercial law. Tasks the United Nations intend to undertake in this sphere.

International tax agreements, vol. IX, suppl. no. 13. 1966, 169 pp. \$3.00. (UN/ST/ECE/SER.C/9 Suppl. 13.)

This volume contains twenty-eight new agreements on the taxation of income and estate, including personal estate.

International tax agreements, vol. IX, suppl. no. 14. 1966, 57 pp., \$1.00. (UN/ST/ECA/SER.C/9/Suppl. 14.)

Twelve more agreements are included in this volume.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Study of equality in the administration of justice. November 1966, 17 pp. (UN/E/CN/4/Sub.2/266.)

Information received from fifty countries and from non-governmental organizations. Report of the proceedings of the eighteenth session of the Sub-Commission

on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the follow-up of the study. Plan proposed by the Sub-Commission. A rough outline of the causes of discrimination in the administration of justice is annexed.

Parental rights and duties, including guardianship. February 1967, 143 pp. (UN/E/CN.6/474.)

Nature of the respective rights and duties of the mother and the father in the principal legal systems in the world. Normal cases. Provision made for cases where, as a result of the death of the husband, abandonment or any other reason, the mother remains alone.

Seminar on human rights in developing countries. 1966, 57 pp. (UN/ST/TAO/HR/25.)

This Seminar was held at Dakar from 8-22 February 1966. Rights of individual ownership, religious liberties, right to education, institutions and procedures for ensuring the promotion of, and respect for, human rights in developing countries. Role of judicial authorities and parliamentary institutions.

Seminar on participation in local administration as a means of promoting human rights. 1966, 48 pp. (UN/ST/TAO/HR/26.)

This Seminar was held in Budapest from 14-25 June 1966. Right of citizens to take part in local government. Actual opportunities. Extent of this participation. Membership of local authorities. Local protection of human rights. Relations between local authorities and national bodies.

SLAVERY

Report on slavery. 1966, 314 pp., \$4.50. (UN/E/4168 Rev.)

Study by Mohamed Awad, Special Rapporteur on slavery. Questionnaire sent to Member States on slavery and similar practices and replies from 25 African countries, 20 Asian countries, 22 European countries, 9 Latin American and North American countries. Information provided by a certain number of non-governmental organizations. Suggestions as to measures the United Nations might take.

DISCRIMINATION

Special study of racial discrimination in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres.

November 1966, 128 pp. (UN/E/CN.4/Sub.2/267.)

[Bl.] Activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in connexion with the race question. Annotated list of the main resolutions adopted by the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, annotated bibliography of works and articles.

Seminar on apartheid. 1966. 41 pp. (UN/ST/TAO/HR/27.)

This seminar, organized by the United Nations in co-operation with the Government of Brazil, was held from 23 August to 4 September at Brazilia. Apartheid, its consequences in South Africa, its effects on international relations. Measures to be taken to lead the public to a greater awareness of the dangers of apartheid and enlist more support for United Nations action in this respect.

STATUS OF WOMEN

Survey of the work of the Commission and of the results achieved of the international level.

February 1967, 21 pp. (UN/E/CN.6/372/Add.5.)

Status of women, political rights, education, economic rights, situation of women who work and who have family responsibilities, professional status of nurses and domestic employees, the principle of equal pay for equal work, private law, family law, rights and duties of parents, marriage, nationality questions.

Resources available to Member States for the advancement of women through technical co-operation programmes of the United Nations system and through programmes of non-governmental organizations having consultative status. 1966, 82 pp, \$1.00. (UN/E/CN.6/463.)

Information on technical co-operation programmes of organizations of the United Nations system and of various non-governmental organizations.

Nationality of married women. January 1967, 65 pp., (UN/E/CN.6/471.)

Supplementary information to a publication issued under the same title in 1964. Relates to new provisions adopted by the following countries: Gambia, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Malawi, Malta, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia and Zambia. Also includes information on the constitutional principles obtaining in Algeria, Chad, France, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Netherlands, Poland, Rwanda, Singapore, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Upper Volta and Western Samoa.

The participation of women in community development programmes. February 1967, 85 pp. (UN/E/CN.6/473.)

Evolution of the idea of community development. Participation of women in community development and means of increasing this participation. Effects on the advancement of women.

Books received

General or methodological works

- ENTRETIENS DE MONACO EN SCIENCES HUMAINES. Session 1964. *La technique des modèles dans les sciences humaines / Model building in the human sciences*. Organisateur scientifique Herman O. A. Wold. Monaco, Editions Sciences Humaines, 1966. 26 cm., xii + 321 pp., fig., bibliogr. (Centre International d'Étude des Problèmes Humains.)
- LEWIN, Kurt. *Field theory in social science. Selected theoretical papers*. Edited by Dorwin Cartwright. London, Tavistock, 1967. 22 cm., xxii + 346 pp., fig., bibliogr. (Social science paperbacks, SSP.15.)

History

- APTHEKER, Herbert. *Nat Turner's slave rebellion*. Together with the full text of the so-called 'confessions' of Nat Turner made in prison in 1831. New York, Humanities Press, 1966. 21 cm., iv + 152 pp., \$1.95. (American Institute for Marxist Studies.)
- APTHEKER, Herbert. 'One continual cry', *David Walker's appeal to the colored citizens of the world (1829-1830), Its setting and its meaning*. Together with the full text of the third, and last, edition of the appeal. New York, Humanities Press, 1965. 21 cm., 150 pp., bibliogr. (American Institute for Marxist Studies.)
- HARTWICH, Hans-Hermann. *Arbeitsmarkt Verbände und Staat 1918-1933, Die öffentliche Bindung unternehmerischer Funktionen in der Weimarer Republik*. Mit einem Vorwort von Georg Kotowski. Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1967. 24 cm., xvi + 488 pp., fig., tabl., bibliogr., index. (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin beim Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut der freien Universität Berlin. 23.)
- HOWE, Bertha W. *An American century. The recollections of Bertha W. Howe, 1866-1966*. Recorded and edited, with a bibliographical introduction, by Oakley C. Johnson. New York, Humanities Press, 1966, 21 cm., xii + 142 pp., pl., portr., index. (American Institute for Marxist Studies.)
- SOCIÉTÉ DE DÉMOGRAPHIE HISTORIQUE. [Paris]. *Annales de démographie historique 1966 (Études, chronique, bibliographie, documents)*. Paris, Sirey, 1967. 25 cm., 440 pp., fig., tabl., bibliogr., F32.00.
- TUDESQ, André-Jean. *Les conseillers généraux en France au temps de Guizot. 1840-1848*.

Préface de Louis Girard. Paris, A. Colin, 1967. 24 cm., 294 pp., maps, tabl., bibliogr., index. (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 157.)

Law

- ARIAS, Patricio J. H.; CORRAL, Mariela B.; AITKEN, Oscar L. *La seguridad social del sector público. Caja nacional de empleados públicos y periodistas. Caja de retiro y previsión de los empleados municipales de la República. Caja de previsión de la Defensa Nacional. Caja de previsión de los carabineros de Chile.* Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1966. 21 cm., viii + 308 pp., bibliogr. (Memorias de Prueba para optar al Grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Universidad de Chile. Escuela de Derecho.)
- BOLINTINEANU, Alexandru; POPESCU, Dumitra. *Mijloacele juridice prin care statele devin párti la tratate.* Bucuresti, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1967. 21 cm., 248 pp. (Academia Republicii Socialiste România. Institutul de Cercetări Juridice.) [Résumé in French.]
- CANTARERO BASULTO, Rafael. *Organos de la reforma agraria.* Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1966. 21 cm., 96 pp., bibliogr. (Memoria de Prueba para optar al Grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Universidad de Chile. Escuela de Derecho.)
- HENRÍQUEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Silvia. *La previsión social de los conductores de automoviles de alquiler.* Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1966. 21 cm., 105 pp., bibliogr. (Memoria de Prueba para optar al Grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Universidad de Chile. Escuela de Derecho.)
- IONASCU, Traian, et al. *Organizatiile socialiste ca persoane juridice in România* by Traian Ionascu, Mihail Eliescu, Yolanda Eminescu, Virgil Economu. Bucuresti, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1967. 24 cm., 399 pp. (Academia Republicii Socialiste România. Institutul de Cercetări Juridice.)
- MONSALVE SCIACCALUGA, Sigisfredo. *Estudio doctrinario positivo y jurisprudencial del título III del estatuto administrativo.* Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1966. 21 cm., 136 pp., bibliogr. (Memoria de Prueba para optar al grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Universidad de Chile. Escuela de Derecho.)
- PÉREZ BUSTOS, Sara. *La sentencia internacional.* Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1966. 21 cm., 96 pp., bibliogr. (Memoria de Prueba para optar al Grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Universidad de Chile. Escuela de Derecho.)
- SABAL TUMA, Andrés. *Las Ferias de animales y de productos agrícolas.* Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1966, 21 cm., 87 pp., bibliogr. (Memoria de Prueba para optar al Grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Universidad de Chile. Escuela de Derecho.)
- VILLARROEL SERRANO, Miguel. *Bases para una clasificación de reclusos.* Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1966. 21 cm., 76 pp., bibliogr. (Memoria de Prueba para optar al Grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Universidad de Chile. Escuela de Derecho.)

Economics, demography

- BALDAMUS, Wilhelm. *Efficiency and effort. An analysis of industrial administration.* London, Tavistock, 1967. 22 cm., viii + 139 pp., tabl., bibliogr., index. (Social science paperbacks. SSP.14.)

- BRUBAKER, Sterling. *Trends in the world aluminum industry*. Baltimore (Md.), Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 23 cm., xiv + 260 pp., tabl., index., \$6.95. (Resources for the future.)
- HUNTER, Guy. *The best of both worlds? A challenge on development policies in Africa*. London, Oxford University Press, 1967. 21 cm., viii + 132 pp., 16s. (Institute of Race Relations.)
- JOHNSTON, Bruce F. *Agriculture and economic development: The relevance of the Japanese experience*. Stanford (Calif.) Stanford University Press, 1967. 25 cm., pp. 251-312, fig., \$2.00. (Reprinted from *Food Research Institute studies*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1966.)
- MÜLLER, J. O. *Probleme der Auftrags-Rinderhaltung durch Fulbe-Hirten (Peul) in Westafrika, Motivationen und Meinungen im Hinblick auf die Entwicklung der bäuerlichen Viehwirtschaft am Beispiel der Ewe und anderer Stämme in Togo*. Berlin, Springer, 1967. 23 cm., xii + 124 pp., maps, bibliogr. (IFO-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, München. Afrika-Studien, 14.)
- NESS, Gayl D. *Bureaucracy and rural development in Malaysia. A study of complex organizations in stimulating economic development in new States*. Berkeley (Calif.), University of California Press, 1967. 24 cm., xvi + 257 pp., maps, tabl. bibliogr., index., \$6.50.
- PAULUS, Margarete. *Das Genossenschaftswesen in Tanganyika und Uganda, Möglichkeiten und Aufgaben*. Mit einem redaktionellen Nachtrag. Berlin, Springer, 1967. 23 cm., xiv + 156 pp., maps, tabl., bibliogr. (IFO-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, München. Afrika-Studien, 15.)
- PÖSSINGER, Hermann. *Sisal in Ostafrika, Untersuchungen zur Produktivität in der bäuerlichen Wirtschaft*. Berlin, Springer, 1967. 23 cm., xiv + 172 pp., fig., maps, tabl., bibliogr. (IFO-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, München. Afrika-Studien, 13.)
- REICHER-SGRADI, R. *Introduction à l'aide internationale aux pays sous-développés*. Paris, Éditions de la Société générale de recherches, analyses et documentation internationale, Dunod, 1966. 2 vol., 27 cm., tabl., bibliogr., F24.68.
 1. *Introduction générale*. 179 pp.
 2. *Historique*. 2nd ed., 141 + vi + [9] pp.
- TEL AVIV-YAFO MUNICIPALITY. *Water saving drive*. Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 1967. 24 cm., xv + 21 pp., tabl. (Municipality of Tel Aviv-Yafo. Department of Research and Statistics. Special survey. 21.) [Texts in English and Hebrew.]
- WANG, N. T. *New proposals for the international finance of development*. Princeton (N. J.), Princeton University, 1967. 23 cm., 27 pp. (Princeton University. Department of Economics. International Finance Section. Essays in international finance. 59.)

Political science

- ASTORQUIZA ALTANER, S. Gaston. *El convenio de las Bermudas, sobre transporte aéreo internacional*. Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1966. 21 cm., 116 pp., bibliogr. (Memoria de Prueba para optar al Grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Universidad de Chile. Escuela de Derecho.)
- BARAONA, Juan M. S. *Caracteres fundamentales del régimen político español*. Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1966. 21 cm., 310 pp., bibliogr. (Memoria de Prueba para optar al Grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Universidad de Chile. Escuela de Derecho.)
- BENEDICT, Burton (ed.). *Problems of smaller territories*. London, Athlone Press, 1967. 22 cm., 153 pp., bibliogr., 35s. (University of London. Institute of Commonwealth Studies. Commonwealth papers. 10.)
- BOSC (le P. Robert), S. J. *Sociologie de la paix*. Paris, Spes, 1965. 23 cm., 255 pp.,

- bibliogr., index., F15.00. (Institut catholique de Paris. Institut d'études sociales. Action populaire. Bibliothèque de la recherche sociale.)
- DALAND, Robert T. *Brazilian planning. Development politics and administration*. Chapel Hill (N.C.), University of North Carolina Press, 1967. 22 cm., x + 231 pp., bibliogr., index., \$6.00.
- FROMONT, Jacques. *La politique étrangère des États-Unis à l'égard de l'Europe occidentale de 1945 à 1955. Une période exceptionnelle de coopération internationale*. Bruxelles. Éditions Labor, 1967. 20 cm., 189 pp. Bibliogr., 170 Belgian francs.
- GARNER, William R. *The Chaco dispute. A study of prestige diplomacy*. Washington, D.C. Public Affairs Press, 1966. 23 cm., viii + 151 pp. bibliogr., index, \$4.50.
- GLASER, William A.; SILLS, David L. (ed). *The government of associations. Selections from the behavioral sciences*. Totowa (N.J.), Bedminster Press, 1966. 28 cm., xvi + 264 pp., fig., index, \$10.00.
- HERMAN, Edward S.; DU BOFF, Richard B. *America's Vietnam policy. The strategy of deception*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1966. 23 cm., 123 pp., \$2.00.
- LABIN, Suzanne. *Goliath et David. Justice pour la Chine libre*. Paris, Éditions de la Ligue de la Liberté, 1967. 21 cm., 48 pp.
- PAPINI, Roberto. *Les relations entre l'Unesco et les organisations non gouvernementales*. Bruxelles, Union des associations internationales, 1967. 20 cm., 116 pp. (Union des associations internationales. Documents pour servir à l'étude des relations internationales non gouvernementales. 15.)
- SALGADO SALGADO, José Eusebio. *El desarrollo de la marina mercante mexicana y sus problemas internos e internacionales*. México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1967. 23 cm., vi + 498 pp., bibliogr. (Thesis in international relations. México. 1967.)
- SCHEINMAN, Lawrence. *Euratom: nuclear integration in Europe*. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967. 20 cm., 66 pp. (*International Conciliation*. May 1967, no. 563.)
- SCHWARZ, Hans-Peter. *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik. Deutschland im Widerstreit der aussen politischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren des Besatzungsherrschaft 1945-1949*. Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1966. 21 cm., xxxvi + 884 pp., bibliogr., index. (Politica. Abhandlungen und Texte zur politischen Wissenschaft, 38.)
- SPINELLI, Altiero. *The Eurocrats. Conflict and crisis in the European community*. [Rapporto sull'Europa]. Translated by C. Grove Haines. Baltimore (Md.), Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 22 cm., xii + 230 pp., index, \$5.95.
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Tome XIX, numéro double

Économie appliquée

Mars-avril 1966

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| F. Perroux | Intégration économique. Qui s'intègre ? Au bénéfice de qui s'opère cette intégration ? |
| G. Destannes de Bernis | Les industries industrialisantes à la base d'une politique d'intégration régionale |
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| F. Rosenfeld | L'industrie motrice dans la région et dans l'espace intégré
L'exemple de l'industrie mécanique dans la région de Turin |
| F. Gazier | Un préalable indispensable à toute politique d'industrialisation : le plan national d'équipement administratif |
| A. Decouffe | Coproduction et industrialisation concertée (aspects socio-politiques de l'accord franco-algérien du 29 juillet 1965 sur les hydrocarbures et de développement industriel de l'Algérie) |
| P. Llau | Note sur la programmation du financement de l'industrialisation |
| J. M. Martin | Le rôle de l'industrie nucléaire dans l'industrialisation de l'Argentine |
| G. Di Nardi | L'apport de l'action régionale au développement économique général : comptabilité des objectifs et des programmes |
| A. Labasse | La géographie volontaire |
| R. Erbes | Théorie de l'intégration |

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Les réformes des structures dans la dynamique du développement.

La réforme fiscale et la politique monétaire à la lumière du premier plan.

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Vers une formulation économétrique du plan.

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N. C. Kakwani
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Articles

The integral equation of population analysis
Note on the bias of the Prals and Aitchison's and Fisher's iterative estimators in regression analysis with heteroscedastic errors
Theory of multiphase sampling from a finite or an infinite population on successive occasions, 1, 2
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XXXII, N. 3, Settembre 1967

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B. Leoni
M. W. Suleiman
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Rappresentanza politica e rappresentatività dei partiti
The Arabs and the West: communication gap

Note e discussioni

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O. M. Smolansky
E. B. McLean
F. Rossolillo
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R. E. Herzstein
A. Zopolo
K. V. Lottich
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Contents

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Promulgation of Tokugawa statutes
Local government and the law in Southern Nigeria
Some remarks on the judicial system in China: historical development
and characteristics
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